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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the policy debate on the performance of health systems. It 
investigates performance dimensions such as quality and efficiency focusing on hospitals in the 
English National Health Service. The thesis comprises four chapters, of which the first two 
contribute to the limited literature on specialist hospitals. The first chapter analyses efficiency, as 
measured by the patient’s length of stay, between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and ‘trauma and 
orthopaedics’ departments in general hospitals. The findings suggest that there are no differences 
in efficiency between specialist and general hospitals. The second chapter examines whether profit 
margins differ between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and trauma and orthopaedics departments. 
It finds that, under the current payment system, specialist orthopaedic hospitals have lower profit 
margins compared to general hospitals. This is because specialist orthopaedic hospitals admit 
patients that are older and more complex (i.e. more diagnoses and procedures). The third and fourth 
chapter contribute to the literature on hospital competition. The third chapter explores whether a 
hospital’s quality or efficiency responds to its neighbouring rivals’. This chapter models hospital 
interactions within an econometric spatial framework. Although the theory suggests that hospitals 
might respond to their rivals’ quality but not directly to efficiency, the empirical results indicate 
the absence of interactions across rival hospitals in both quality and efficiency. The fourth chapter 
studies whether the introduction of the Choice policy in 2006, which encouraged competition 
among hospitals, had an effect on efficiency as measured by resource management and cost 
indicators. The findings show that competition improves efficiency through an increase in 
admissions per bed and proportion of day cases, and a decrease in the proportion of wasted meals. 
It however reduces efficiency by increasing the number of cancelled elective operations. 
Competition tends to stimulate efficiency in highly competitive areas or when efficiency is low. 
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Preface 
Healthcare is one of the most relevant sectors in both developed and developing economies. 
Its growing share of gross domestic products and the increasing resource scarcity raise the question 
of how to best organise the delivery of healthcare services. In the last decades, the members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have encouraged health 
systems towards greater responsiveness, affordability, and efficiency in order to provide services 
that are accessible and of high quality (Docteur, 2004, OECD, 2017). Although all important, these 
goals do not necessarily move in the same direction. A responsive system accommodates patients’ 
needs and preferences through, for example, shorter waiting times or a wider choice of providers 
for long-term care. Similarly, systems fostering fair access to healthcare will, for example, 
strengthen their workforce or extend the use of new medical technologies. Such interventions are 
however costly and represent a challenge for any country’s budget. A more efficient delivery of 
healthcare services may help to deal with budget constraints but only to the extent that higher 
efficiency does not affect the quality of services. The way of achieving a good balance of these 
ambitious objectives is still the subject of a lively debate. 
This thesis contributes to this policy debate by providing empirical evidence on some 
performance dimensions including quality and efficiency. It focuses on hospitals in the English 
National Health Service (NHS), which provides healthcare that is universal, tax financed, and free 
at the point of use. Public hospitals deliver secondary healthcare and are run by trusts, some of 
which are called Foundation Trusts with greater financial autonomy.1 Some hospital trusts are 
teaching trusts providing research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited 
range of conditions or client groups. Private hospitals are small and mostly focus on elective 
surgical procedures. Unlike public hospitals, private providers can refuse to treat highly severe 
                                                 
1 Although the separation between NHS foundation trusts and NHS trusts still exists, the financial autonomy of 
foundation trusts has been in practice eroded in the last years up to the point where they can no longer decide how to 
invest their surplus (Collins, 2016). 
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patients (Mason et al., 2008).2 Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, 
the National Tariff Payment System, that pays a fixed tariff for each patient treated. The tariff 
value depends on diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics as categorised by a 
patient classification system called the Healthcare Resource Group (HRG). In this context, 
hospitals compete on quality to attract patients because the latter are free to choose their preferred 
hospital for any elective procedure. Hospitals are also incentivised to improve efficiency in order 
to increase profits, which must be reinvested within the hospital. 
Given such an institutional framework, the thesis is structured into two parts, with each part 
including two chapters. The first part investigates whether specialist orthopaedic hospitals are 
more efficient and financially viable compared to general hospitals. The second part relates to 
hospital competition and explores whether competition triggers strategic interactions across 
hospitals in quality and efficiency, and whether competition affects various dimensions of 
efficiency. 
The first part of the thesis contributes to the limited literature on specialist hospitals. 
Specialisation is an organisational form which is supposed to generate the benefits of the ‘focused 
factory’, i.e. greater efficiency, quality, and responsiveness (Skinner, 1974, Herzlinger, 1996, 
Schneider et al., 2008) but not necessarily lower costs. Recent empirical findings show that 
specialist hospitals have similar or higher costs, are more inefficient, and apply higher charges 
compared to general hospitals (MedPAC, 2005, Carey et al., 2007, Kim et al., 2013, Carey et al., 
2015). 
More precisely, the first two chapters investigate efficiency and profit margins of specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals. The NHS includes more than 200 general hospitals with a T&O department 
                                                 
2 This has led to an ongoing debate because of the greater financial burden generated on public hospitals (e.g. Wallace, 
2006). 
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and three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. Although there are few specialist orthopaedic hospitals, 
they play an important role. They deliver a high proportion of specialised services, commonly low-
volume but high-cost treatments for patients with complex and rare conditions. Specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals therefore allow the achievement of a critical mass of clinical expertise to 
ensure patients receive specialised treatments that produces better health outcomes (NHS 
commissioning board, 2012). The focus is on specialist orthopaedic hospitals because trauma and 
orthopaedics (T&O) is one of the specialties with the highest volume of patients. 
Chapter 1 investigates efficiency between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments within general hospitals in England. It analyses a large sample of patients admitted to 
a T&O department in 2011/12. Efficiency is measured through the patient’s length of stay (LOS). 
Following Laudicella et al. (2010), LOS is analysed using a two-stage regression model. In the 
first stage, LOS is regressed on various patient characteristics (e.g. age, gender, diagnosis) and 
hospital fixed effects. The estimated hospital fixed effects, which capture risk-adjusted relative 
performance, are regressed in the second stage to compare efficiency between specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments after accounting for some hospital characteristics (e.g. 
quality, size, input prices). The idea behind this approach is that LOS is likely to reflect solely 
hospital efficiency after allowing for patient and hospital characteristics that may be confounded 
with efficiency. The key finding suggests that there is no statistical difference in efficiency 
between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals. 
Chapter 2 investigates the financial viability of specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O 
departments in general hospitals. Its primary objective is to test whether the current prospective 
payment system covers the costs of specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O departments 
in general hospitals. In other words, the chapter tests whether costs of specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals are higher than T&O departments in general hospitals even after accounting for 
differences in revenues. 
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Data at HRG level are collected from the NHS reference cost database for the financial year 
2013/14. Such data allow the analysis of the unit cost per patient of every inpatient HRG delivered 
through the T&O department of each hospital trust in the sample. The econometric strategy 
employs four regressions. The first regression provides raw differences in unit costs between 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. The second regression compares unit costs 
after controlling for differential payments (due to different HRGs and other tariff corrections). 
This is the key model and provides differences in profit margins between the two types of hospital. 
The third regression explains any differences in profit margins as a function of possible 
determinants including some patient and hospital characteristics. The fourth regression examines 
the heterogeneity in profit margins across specialist hospitals. These models are estimated by 
weighted least squares, clustering standard errors within hospitals. 
The findings suggest that specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on average 13% lower overall 
profit margins than T&O departments. The results show also that the overall profit margins in 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals are no longer significantly different from those in T&O 
departments after controlling for some patient characteristics such as patient age and severity as 
captured by number of diagnoses and procedures. Finally, none of the three specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals have profit margins significantly above the average: two of them have profit margins that 
are significantly below the average, while the third one has average profit margins. 
The second part of the thesis mostly relates to the empirical literature on hospital competition. 
This literature studies the relationship between hospital competition and some dimensions of 
hospital performance such as quality and efficiency providing mixed results. The first studies 
originate from the US (e.g. Joskow, 1980, Robinson and Luft, 1985, Bamezai et al., 1999) but 
there exist a number of later studies focusing on European countries, especially the UK. Some of 
these find that competition increases efficiency (Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013) while 
others report no association (Söderlund et al., 1997). Concerning the effects of competition on 
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quality, some studies find negative effects (Propper et al., 2004, Propper et al., 2008) or positive 
effects (Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2013, Bloom et al., 2015), some find mixed effects 
based on the quality indicator (Gravelle et al., 2014a), and some find no effects (Berta et al., 2016). 
Chapter 3 studies hospitals’ strategic interactions on quality and efficiency. This approach is 
an alternative to examining the relationship between measures of competition and hospital quality 
and efficiency. In a competitive environment, a hospital may be expected to respond to an increase 
in quality by a rival hospital by also increasing quality. Similarly, a hospital may respond to an 
increase in efficiency by a rival hospital by also increasing efficiency (Department of Health, 
2004). This chapter, therefore, investigates whether quality and efficiency are strategic 
complements or strategic substitutes so that higher rivals’ quality (efficiency) induces a hospital 
to increase or reduce its quality (efficiency). 
The chapter explores both clinical and non-clinical dimensions of quality. Clinical quality is 
measured through risk-adjusted overall mortality and readmission rate, mortality rates for hip 
fracture and stroke, and health gains for hip replacement. Non-clinical dimensions of patients’ 
experience using patient satisfaction with their overall hospital experience, hospital cleanliness, 
and the extent to which clinicians involved the patients in the treatment decision. Hospital 
efficiency is captured by indicators for bed occupancy, cancelled elective operations, and cost 
indices for overall hospital activity, elective and non-elective activity, and for hip replacement. 
Most of the quality and efficiency indicators are unconditionally spatially correlated according 
to the global Moran’s I test. The spatial cross-sectional models are estimated by quasi-maximum 
likelihood controlling for observable determinants of quality and efficiency. Spatial panel models 
with hospital fixed or random effects are also estimated to control for unobserved time-invariant 
determinants of quality and efficiency. These models suggest that a hospital’s quality or efficiency 
does not respond to its rivals’ quality or efficiency, except for a hospital’s overall mortality which 
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is positively associated with that of its rivals. The results are robust to allowing for spatially 
correlated covariates and spatially correlated errors and to instrumenting rivals’ quality and 
efficiency. 
Finally, Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on hospital competition by investigating the 
effect of market structure on efficiency. It extends the existing studies on unit costs and LOS to a 
number of other efficiency indicators including measures of resource management and cost. The 
resource management indicators are admissions per bed, bed occupancy rate, number of cancelled 
elective operations, proportion of day, and percentage of untouched meals. The cost indicators are 
cleaning services costs, linen and laundry costs, and the reference cost index (RCI) for all 
admissions and for elective activity. The market structure is measured through the ‘equivalent’ 
number of rivals calculated as the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Kessler and 
McClellan, 2000). 
The analysis focuses on a sample of public hospital trusts from the financial year 2002/03 to 
2010/11. In such a context, the ‘Patient Choice’ reform is analysed as a natural experiment using 
a quasi difference-in-difference approach. This exploits the existence of more competitive areas 
with several hospitals and less competitive areas with one or few hospitals which are, respectively, 
more or less likely to respond to the policy. Differently from other studies, however, the quasi 
difference-in-difference regressions are estimated for nine indicators simultaneously through 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) to increase the precision of the estimates. In addition, 
this chapter employs an Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) approach to investigate 
whether the effect of competition varies along the efficiency indicators’ distribution. 
The findings suggest that competition affects efficiency in different ways. When exposed to 
the choice policy, one more equivalent rival increases on average the admissions per bed by 1.1% 
and the proportion of day cases increases by 3.8 percentage points. It decreases the proportion of 
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untouched meals by 3.5 percentage points. In contrast, an additional equivalent rival reduces 
efficiency by increasing the number of cancelled elective operations by 2.6%. Instead, there are 
no significant effects of competition on bed occupancy rate, cleaning services costs, laundry and 
linen costs, and RCI for all admissions and for elective admissions. The results also suggest that 
SUR is a better fit than OLS. UQRs indicate that hospitals exhibiting low efficiency may be more 
responsive under greater competition. For instance, for hospitals with fewer admissions per bed 
(25th quantile), one more equivalent rival increases this indicator by 2.2%. 
In sum, the first part of the thesis on hospital specialisation suggests that specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals have lower profit margins but similar levels of efficiency compared to T&O departments 
in general hospitals. The findings in the second part of the thesis about hospital competition 
indicate that strategic interaction across rival hospitals on quality and efficiency does not 
necessarily occur. They show also that competition may have a different effect on efficiency 
depending on the indicator considered. 
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Chapter 1 – Are Specialist Orthopaedic Hospitals More Efficient 
Than General Hospitals? 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether specialist orthopaedic hospitals are more efficient than trauma 
and orthopaedic departments in general hospitals. To identify efficiency, we analyse the length of 
stay of all patients in trauma and orthopaedics allowing for patient and hospital characteristics. 
Using a sample of 197 English hospitals in 2011/12, we implement a two-stage regression model 
that includes patient-level variables in the first stage and hospital-level variables in the second 
stage. We find no statistical difference in efficiency between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 
general hospitals. 
1.1 Introduction 
The efficiency of health care systems is a key goal for policy makers across Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. It has been argued that increasing 
the number of specialist hospitals may enhance efficiency (Casalino et al., 2003, Shactman, 2005). 
Some countries are therefore moving towards a greater degree of hospital specialisation. For 
instance, US specialist hospitals tripled from 1991 to 2005 (Barro et al., 2006, Schneider et al., 
2007). Similarly, from 2001 to 2009, China increased on average the number of specialist hospitals 
by 10% every year (Tang et al., 2013). 
Specialist hospitals may foster better efficiency owing to a direct involvement of doctors in the 
management of facilities, higher patient volumes, and an improved learning-by-doing experience 
(Schneider et al., 2008). However, recent empirical findings show that specialist hospitals have 
similar or higher costs than general hospitals. In the US, orthopaedic and surgical specialist 
hospitals have from 20% to 30% higher costs than general hospitals (MedPAC, 2005; 2006). Carey 
et al. (2008) suggest that such hospitals are on average more inefficient than general hospitals. 
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Indeed, specialist hospitals appear to exploit economies of scale and scope less effectively (Carey 
et al., 2015). Although these studies cast doubts on the capability of specialist hospitals to realise 
their organisational advantages in practice, the activities of general hospitals are more 
wide-ranging and heterogeneous than specialist hospitals. Thus, some of the observed cost 
differences could be due to a failure to properly account for differences in the type of work 
performed. 
To improve comparability, the present study investigates the efficiency in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals and trauma and orthopaedics (T&O) departments within general hospitals. 
We measure efficiency through the length of stay (LOS) of a large sample of patients admitted to 
the T&O department of any English hospital in 2011/12. Following Laudicella et al. (2010), we 
analyse LOS using a two-stage regression model. In the first stage, we regress LOS on various 
patient characteristics (e.g. age, gender, diagnosis) and hospital fixed effects. The estimated 
hospital fixed effects, which capture risk-adjusted relative performance, are regressed in the 
second stage to compare efficiency between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments 
after accounting for some hospital characteristics (e.g. quality, size, input prices). The idea behind 
this approach is that LOS is likely to reflect solely hospital efficiency after allowing for patient 
and hospital characteristics that may confound efficiency. Our key finding suggests that there is 
no statistical difference in efficiency between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments in general hospitals. 
In 2011/12, the English NHS includes more than 200 general hospitals with a T&O department 
and three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals are few in number but 
they play an important role in the English NHS. They provide high proportions of specialised 
services, i.e. low-volume but high-cost treatments for patients with complex and rare conditions. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospitals therefore facilitate the achievement of a critical mass of clinical 
expertise to ensure that such complex patients experience better health outcomes (NHS 
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commissioning board, 2012). For instance, they provide 90% of bone and soft tissue sarcomas 
surgeries, and 50% of scoliosis treatments. They also deliver high proportions of more common, 
corrective procedures, such as 50% of revision knee replacements and 20% of revision hip 
replacements (Briggs, 2012). We focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals because T&O is one of 
the hospital specialties with the highest volume of patients. In 2013, 6.7% of all NHS patients were 
treated in a T&O department. The efficient delivery of orthopaedic services is therefore critical for 
policymakers. 
This study builds on the efficiency literature concerning US specialist hospitals. We propose 
the focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals to improve 
comparability. Since LOS is measured at patient-level, our econometric model does not require 
assumptions on the efficiency distribution as in previous studies, such as half-normal distribution 
within a stochastic frontier framework (e.g. Carey et al., 2008). In addition, our research is one of 
the first to investigate the efficiency in T&O. Other studies analyse efficiency in general surgery, 
vascular, or obstetrics departments (Harper et al., 2001, Olsen and Street, 2008, Laudicella et al., 
2010). 
The next section (1.1.1) presents the literature review. Section 1.1.2 describes the institutional 
background, section 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the method and the data, respectively. Section 1.4 
discusses the results, and section 1.5 concludes. 
1.1.1 Related literature 
The role of specialist hospitals has been debated at length during the last decade. Herzlinger 
(1996) is one of the first authors to relate the hospital framework to the ‘focused factory’ model 
(Skinner, 1974). Specialist hospitals have the potential to supply services with higher quality and 
lower costs. Better quality can be guaranteed through greater volumes and stricter monitoring of 
patient needs. Reduced costs can be achieved owing to greater economies of scale and a more 
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effective learning-by-doing process (Schneider et al., 2008). Opponents to the emergence of 
specialist hospitals, however, have raised two main concerns. First, new specialist hospitals may 
produce excess capacity because of the lack of sufficient competition implying higher fixed costs 
eventually borne by the patients (Shactman, 2005). Second, specialist hospitals may ‘cherry-pick’ 
patients jeopardising the financial viability of general hospitals (Barro et al., 2006). In particular, 
the second issue led the US government to impose a moratorium on referrals to specialist hospitals 
in 2003 (Carey et al., 2007). 
A number of empirical studies test the impact of specialist hospitals on health care quality and 
costs. For instance, Greenwald et al. (2006) analyse 2003 Medicare claims and conduct site visits 
in 2004 to investigate quality across specialist and general hospitals. They observe lower mortality 
and greater satisfaction for patients admitted to specialist hospitals. Cram et al. (2007) find similar 
results for Medicare patients undergoing total hip and knee replacement between 1999 and 2003. 
Their findings suggest that patients are less likely to die or suffer surgical complications if treated 
in specialist hospitals. Barro et al. (2006) study costs in addition to quality focusing on US 
specialist cardiac hospitals in 1993, 1996, and 1999. They find that the entry of specialist hospitals 
reduces spending without a drop in quality. In our analysis, we examine whether specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals are more efficient than T&O departments in England. 
1.1.2 Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) provides health care that is universal, tax financed, 
and free at the point of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding to around 150 
local authorities, called clinical commissioning groups, which use it to pay for secondary 
healthcare provided to NHS patients by public and private hospitals. Public hospitals deliver the 
great majority of healthcare and are managed by NHS trusts or NHS foundation trusts, the latter 
having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital trusts are teaching trusts providing 
research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited range of conditions and 
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client groups.  
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff 
Payment System (NTPS). This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRG), a patient 
classification system similar to the US Diagnosis-Related Group or DRG. HRGs categorise 
patients into homogeneous groups depending on diagnoses, procedures, and some patient 
characteristics. A fixed tariff is calculated for each HRG group as its national cost averaged across 
providers but with adjustment for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input 
prices and the higher costs of specialised care (Daidone and Street, 2013, Department of Health, 
2013a). 
Specialist hospitals predominantly provide elective surgical care but they treat a broad range 
of conditions similarly to departments in public hospitals. In 2011/12, there are three trusts 
specialised in orthopaedic services: the Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital, the Robert Jones & 
Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic Hospital, and the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital. Originally, the NHS 
included five specialist orthopaedic trusts but, after the wave of mergers started in 1997 by the 
Labour Government, their number was reduced (Gaynor et al., 2012a).3 
From 2003, moreover, the policy maker has fostered hospital specialisation through a different 
form of health care provider: the treatment centre. This facility provides a few surgical elective 
procedures such as, for instance, hip replacement and cataract surgery. The treatment centre 
programme was implemented under the argument that the separation of emergency and elective 
departments improves outcome and efficiency (House of Commons Health Committee, 2005). 
One of the main purposes was to reduce waiting times for the most common high-volume 
procedures (e.g. hip replacement). In four years, the number of treatment centres increased to 
                                                 
3 The Wrightington Hospital NHS trust was merged with the Wigan and Leigh NHS Trust in April 2001, and the 
Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre NHS trust merged forming the Oxford University Hospitals NHS trust in November 
2011. 
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almost 100, half of which were private (Street et al., 2010b). Treatment centres are regarded as 
specialist providers but they are distinct from specialist hospitals on which we focus. Treatment 
centres are therefore excluded from our analysis. 
1.2 Methods 
This study explores the variation in patient LOS across specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 
T&O departments in general hospitals. Following Laudicella et al. (2010), we split the analysis 
into two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the following linear model by OLS: 
  ln ik ik k iky      x   (1.1) 
where yik is the LOS of patient i (i=1,…,Ik) admitted to the T&O department of hospital k 
(k=1,…,K);   is the intercept; xik is a vector of patient characteristics, for example, gender, age, 
admission type, and diagnosis; αk is a vector of hospital fixed effects (FE); and εik is the 
idiosyncratic error term. We estimate clustered standard errors to account for correlations between 
patients within each hospital. 
Estimates of the hospital FE ( ˆ
k ) are our key focus in the first stage. FE are interpreted as 
deviation of hospital k’s LOS from average LOS. A positive value ˆ 0k   indicates that hospital 
k’s LOS is above the average hospital’s LOS, after controlling for patient characteristics. Hence, 
ˆ
k  can be viewed as an indicator of relative hospital performance. With no assumptions on the 
correlation between αk and xik, consistency of ˆk  requires Ik→∞. This is achieved due to the high 
number of patients in each hospital. On the contrary, a random-effects (RE) estimator of αk is 
unlikely to be consistent because the assumption of no correlation between xik and αk is unlikely 
to hold in our case. For example, relative hospital performance may rely on the type and number 
of procedures provided to patients with a given condition. 
In the second stage, we estimate the following regression: 
 ˆ
k k k ks       z  (1.2) 
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where η is the intercept; sk is a dummy variable taking value one if the hospital is specialist; zk is 
a vector of hospital characteristics such as quality of care as measured by average health change 
for hip and knee replacement and emergency readmission rate in the T&O department, the number 
of patients in the T&O department to account for economies of scale, the market forces factor that 
captures exogenous variation in input prices (e.g. nurses, buildings), and a dummy indicating 
whether the hospital is run under a foundation trust or whether it is a teaching hospital; ξk is the 
error term. 
The key coefficient is δ which compares efficiency across specialist and general hospitals 
because it reflects the LOS after allowing for patient and hospital characteristics that may be 
confounded with efficiency (e.g. patient severity, quality). ˆ 0   indicates that specialist hospitals 
are on average less efficient than T&O departments in general hospitals. Recall that LOS is log 
transformed in the first stage, which implies that ˆ
k  measures the percentage by which each 
hospital’s LOS deviates from the average LOS. Hence, ˆ  captures the difference in the LOS 
deviation between specialist and general hospitals expressed in percentage points. 
We bootstrap the standard errors using 100 replications because our second-stage dependent 
variable ( ˆ
k ) is estimated and not observed. The inference for estimated dependent variable 
models may indeed be incorrect if heteroscedasticity in both sampling and random errors is 
neglected (Saxonhouse, 1976, Battese and Coelli, 1992, Jusko and Shively, 2005, Lewis and 
Linzer, 2005). Our approach is an alternative to the one proposed by Street et al. (2012). The 
authors model the LOS in the first stage as a Poisson process, and they use weighted least squares 
in the second stage estimating Efron robust standard errors. 
1.3 Data 
Our sample includes 842,460 patients treated across 197 hospitals in 2011/12, whose main 
specialty of admission is T&O. The primary source of data is HES (Hospital Episode Statistics), 
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which includes detailed information on every single patient admitted in English hospitals (e.g. age, 
gender, diagnosis, procedure). We collect the market forces factor (MFF) from the reference cost 
database, and patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) data on hip and knee replacement from 
NHS digital. 
We remove duplicates, miscoded observations, and outliers from our data. To make our final 
sample more homogenous we also exclude patients falling under HRG codes with less than 100 
observations, and hospitals treating less than 500 patients in their T&O department. Appendix 
A1.1 gives further details on the sample definition. 
1.3.1 Variables 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the patient’s LOS including the day of admission. 
The LOS is equal to one if the patient stays in hospital for less than one day. It is equal to two if 
the patient stays in hospital between one and two days, and so on. This allows the log 
transformation of the dependent variable improving the model fit. As a sensitivity check, we re-
run the analysis using a square root transformation of the LOS excluding the day of admission (see 
section A1.3). 
In the first stage, we control for patients’ characteristics such as gender (whether the patient is 
male), age, ethnicity (whether the patient is white, which is the reference category, Asian, black, 
Chinese, mixed, or of other ethnicity), residence (whether the patient lives in an urban area with 
no less than 10,000 inhabitants), and deprivation of the residential area (including income, 
disability, living environment, and crime deprivation). Other patient-level variables capture 
admission type (whether the patient is admitted in an emergency, which is the reference category, 
as elective, day case, after a transfer from another hospital, or in any other way), waiting time, 
primary diagnosis and procedure, number of secondary diagnoses and procedures, and HRG 
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classification.4 
The second stage includes a dummy variable equal to one if the hospital is a specialist 
orthopaedic hospital, which is our key variable. To account for quality, we add the unadjusted 
average health change for hip and knee replacement, and the unadjusted emergency readmissions 
for patients admitted to T&O departments. We control for department size using the number of 
patients in T&O, market forces factor, and teaching trusts. Following Marini et al. (2008), we 
control for foundation trusts defining three dummies taking a value of one for, respectively, trusts 
that have gained the foundation status for no more than three years, foundation trusts with four to 
five years, and foundation trusts with more than five years. 
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
As shown in Figure 1.1, most T&O patients are discharged the same day of admission while a 
few patients stay in hospital for more than eight months (250 days). After taking the logarithm, 
the LOS distribution is less dispersed around the mean but still right-skewed. 
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics of the patient-level regressors. 48% of patients are male, 
and the average patient is 53 years old. The great majority of patients are white (95.3%), 3% are 
Asian, 1.6% are black, and a small percentage is composed by Chinese (0.1%), mixed (0.6%), and 
patients of other ethnicities (1.1%). 79% of patients live in urban areas, which in most cases feature 
low deprivation in all dimensions (income, disability, living environment, crime) because the 
distribution of the deprivation indexes is always right-skewed. 28.3% of patients re admitted in an 
emergency, 34.7% are elective, 37% are day cases, 0.4% are transferred from another hospital, 
and only 0.04% is admitted through a different method. Patients wait on average 51 days between 
                                                 
4 We define a dummy for each primary diagnosis and procedure to cover 81% and 80% of the sample generating 99 
diagnosis and 92 procedure dummies, respectively. The remaining diagnoses and procedures flow into a residual 
dummy. Similarly, we define 49 HRG dummies to cover 91% of the sample, while the residual 9% is captured by a 
single dummy. 
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the decision of admission and the actual admission. Patients receive on average 2.6 diagnoses and 
2.3 procedures. 
As reported in Table A1.1, the three most frequent primary diagnoses are knee arthrosis (8%), 
hip arthrosis (5%), and derangement of meniscus (5%). In Table A1.2, the three most common 
procedures are knee replacement with cement (6%), endoscopic resection of semilunar cartilage 
(5%), and injection of therapeutic substance into joint (5%). Moreover, 12% of patients go to 
hospital for a test (e.g. ultrasound scan, X-rays) and, therefore, they do not undergo any procedure. 
As Table A1.3 shows, the three most frequent HRG codes in T&O departments are arthroscopies 
(10%), primary knee replacement (7%), and minor procedures to the musculoskeletal system 
(7%).5 
Table 1.1 also illustrates some descriptive statistics for the second-stage regressors. The sample 
includes three specialist orthopaedic hospitals (1.5% of all hospitals). The average health changes 
after hip and knee replacement are positive, 0.419 and 0.305 respectively, suggesting that patients 
report on average a health gain. The T&O emergency readmission rate is on average 2%. T&O 
departments treat on average 5,485 patients, and the MFF is on average 1.075 varying from 1.005 
to 1.298. There are 34 teaching hospitals (17.3%), and 101 foundation trusts of which 20 have 
acquired their status for no more than three years (10.2%), 25 from four to five years (12.7%), and 
56 for more than five years (28.4%). 
1.4 Results 
Table 1.2 provides the first-stage estimates. Most of patient-level regressors are statistically 
significant at 5% level. Male patients stay 2.7% less in hospital than females, and patients younger 
than 20 years (-0.004/(2×0.0001)) have shorter LOS than older patients. White patients’ LOS is 
on average 2.7% lower than Asians, 4% lower than blacks, 3.8% lower than Chinese, and 2.4% 
                                                 
5 Descriptive statistics for all diagnoses, procedures, and HRG codes are reported in the Appendix 1 (section A1.2).  
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lower than other ethnicities. Patients from urban areas have on average 0.8% longer LOS than 
patients coming from rural areas. Elective patients have on average no different LOS than 
emergency patients, while day case patients stay in hospital 63.2% less than emergency patients. 
One more day of waiting for an elective procedure implies 0.002% longer LOS. One more 
secondary diagnosis or procedure increases LOS by 5.2% or 5.5%, respectively. The standard 
deviation of the FE estimates is lower than the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic error term.6 
This indicates that the regressors account for most of the variation in LOS between T&O 
departments. Overall, the R-squared suggests that the regressors explain 75% of the variation in 
LOS. 
Table 1.3 presents the results of the second-stage regression, which includes hospital 
characteristics such as quality, size, input prices, and hospital type. Our key finding is that 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals are 5.6 percentage points more inefficient than T&O departments 
in general hospitals but this result is statistically insignificant. 
In general, we observe low statistical significance across the second-stage regressors. These 
explain only 6% of the remaining variation in LOS (see adjusted R-squared in Table 1.3). Health 
gain after knee replacement and the teaching hospital dummy are instead statistically significant 
at 5% level. An increase in the health change after knee replacement by 0.03 units, corresponding 
to 10% of the mean, implies a 0.8% (0.03×0.272×100) reduction in efficiency. T&O departments 
in teaching hospitals are 3.6% less efficient than those in non-teaching hospitals. Instead, the 
estimated parameters on the average health change after hip replacement, the T&O emergency 
readmission rate, the number of patients in T&O, the market forces factor, and the foundation trust 
dummies are statistically insignificant. 
As a sensitivity check we take the square root transformation of the dependent variable in the 
                                                 
6 The Hausman test suggests that the RE estimator is inconsistent. 
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first stage, rather than the log transformation (e.g. Ettner et al., 1998). As showed in Figure A1.1, 
the square root transformation has a milder normalising effect compared to the log transformation. 
Results for first and second stage are reported in Table A1.4 and Table A1.5, respectively. 
Estimates are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the log transformation. 
1.5 Conclusions 
This study investigates the efficiency of specialist orthopaedic hospitals in England. Specialist 
hospitals should benefit from a number of organisational advantages such as, for example, high 
volumes, focused activity, better monitoring of patients’ needs (Schneider et al., 2008). In contrast, 
empirical studies on US specialist hospitals have not found that specialist hospitals are more 
efficient (Carey et al., 2008). These studies, however, compare specialist providers with general 
hospitals although the latter provide a more heterogeneous range of services. 
We focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals, and 
explore the variation in the LOS of patients admitted to a T&O department in England. The 
analysis controls for several factors including patient and hospital characteristics. The remaining 
variation in LOS is therefore assumed to reflect efficiency. Our key result indicates that there is 
no statistical difference in efficiency between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments in general hospitals. This suggests that the organisational advantages of specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals may not necessarily translate into better efficiency as measured by LOS. 
Although no more efficient than T&O departments, specialist orthopaedic hospitals might provide 
services of higher quality. 
This study has two limitations. First, we analyse only three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. 
Such a small number of specialist orthopaedic hospital trusts, however, is not the result of sample 
selection but reflects the reality that there are only three specialist orthopaedic hospital trusts in 
the English NHS. Second, some covariates in the first and second stage of the analysis are proxies. 
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In the first stage, waiting time is included as a proxy of severity but it could be correlated with 
efficiency (Siciliani et al., 2009). In the second stage, the average health change after hip and knee 
replacement and the T&O emergency readmission rate are not risk-adjusted. Further research is 
required before a definitive recommendation about the best way of organising T&O services. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1 – Descriptive statistics. 
Regressor Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Measured at patient level         
Male 0.477 0.499 0 1 
Age    53 23 0 111 
Ethnicity: white (reference) 0.953 0.237 0 1 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Ethnicity: black 0.016 0.127 0 1 
Ethnicity: mixed 0.006 0.080 0 1 
Ethnicity: Chinese 0.001 0.035 0 1 
Ethnicity: Any other 0.011 0.105 0 1 
Urban 0.788 0.409 0 1 
Deprivation index: income 0.147 0.109 0.000 0.770 
Deprivation index: disability 0.026 0.856 -3.100 3.790 
Deprivation index: living environment 20.661 15.997 0.060 92.990 
Deprivation index: crime -0.035 0.815 -3.280 3.810 
Admission: emergency (reference) 0.283 0.467 0 1 
Admission: elective 0.347 0.453 0 1 
Admission: day case 0.365 0.481 0 1 
Admission: transferred from other provider 0.004 0.064 0 1 
Admission: other 0.0004 0.004 0 1 
Waiting time (days) 50.8 69.8 0.0 607.4 
Number of secondary diagnoses 2.6 2.6 0.0 19.0 
Number of secondary procedures 2.3 2.0 0.0 23.0 
Measured at hospital level         
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Average health change after hip replacement 0.419 0.064 -0.165 0.803 
Average health change after knee replacement 0.305 0.049 0.169 0.632 
T&O emergency readmission rate 0.019 0.008 0.004 0.062 
Number of patients in orthopaedics 5,485 2,692 541 15,959 
Market forces factor 1.075 0.062 1.005 1.298 
Teaching hospital 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Foundation trust with no more than 3 years 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Foundation trust with 4 to 5 years 0.127 0.334 0 1 
Foundation trust with more than 5 years 0.284 0.452 0 1 
Number of patients 842,460        
Number of hospitals 197        
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Table 1.2 – First-stage regression. 
Regressor Coeff Std Err. p-value 
Male     -0.027*** 0.002 0.000 
Age    -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 
Age Squared 0.0001*** 0.000 0.000 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.027*** 0.004 0.000 
Ethnicity: black 0.040*** 0.006 0.000 
Ethnicity: Chinese 0.038** 0.017 0.024 
Ethnicity: mixed 0.006 0.006 0.318 
Ethnicity: Any other 0.024*** 0.006 0.000 
Urban 0.008*** 0.002 0.000 
Deprivation index: income -0.0003 0.013 0.981 
Deprivation index: disability 0.004** 0.002 0.040 
Deprivation index: living environment 0.0002*** 0.000 0.002 
Deprivation index: crime 0.001 0.001 0.460 
Elective -0.0001 0.001 0.971 
Day case -0.632*** 0.010 0.000 
Transferred from other provider 0.007 0.009 0.404 
Other admission type 0.078 0.096 0.415 
Waiting time -0.00002** 0.000 0.049 
Waiting time squared 0.00000001 0.000 0.166 
Number of secondary diagnoses 0.052*** 0.001 0.000 
Number of secondary procedures 0.055*** 0.002 0.000 
Constant 0.196*** 0.029 0.000 
Standard deviation of alpha 0.073     
Standard deviation of epsilon 0.486     
Observations 842,460     
R-square (overall) = 0.750 
Test of alphas jointly equal to zero, F(196, 196) = 78.15 p-value = 0.000 
Primary diagnosis, primary procedure, HRG code, and hospital fixed effects are not 
reported. Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 replications). 
***=p-value<0.01, **=p-value<0.05, *=p-value<0.1 
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Table 1.3 – Second-stage regression. 
Regressor Coeff Std Err. p-value 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.056 0.039 0.151 
Average health change after hip replacement -0.121 0.105 0.247 
Average health change after knee replacement 0.272*** 0.099 0.007 
T&O emergency readmission rate 0.191 0.718 0.790 
Number of patients in orthopaedics -0.000001 0.000 0.717 
Market forces factor 0.065 0.080 0.423 
Teaching hospital 0.036** 0.014 0.013 
Foundation trust with no more than 3 years -0.016 0.021 0.456 
Foundation trust with 4 to 5 years 0.018 0.015 0.207 
Foundation trust with more than 5 years -0.007 0.015 0.646 
Constant -0.116 0.118 0.328 
Observations 197     
R squared = 0.11, Adjusted R squared = 0.06 
Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 replications) 
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Figure 1.1 – Distribution of the logarithm of the length of stay. 
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Chapter 2 – Are costs differences between specialist and general 
hospitals compensated by the prospective payment system? 
Abstract 
Prospective payment systems fund hospitals based on a fixed-price regime that does not 
directly distinguish between specialist and general hospitals. We investigate whether current 
prospective payments in England compensate for differences in costs between specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals and trauma and orthopaedics departments in general hospitals. We employ 
reference cost data for a sample of hospitals providing services in the trauma and orthopaedics 
specialty. Our regression results suggest that specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on average 13% 
lower profit margins. Under the assumption of break-even for the average trauma and orthopaedics 
department, two of the three specialist orthopaedic hospitals appear to make a loss on their activity. 
The same holds true for 33% of departments in our sample. Patient age and severity are the main 
drivers of such differences. 
2.1 Introduction 
The prospective payment system (PPS) is commonly used to reimburse hospitals across 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Busse et al., 2006). 
It is built on a patient classification system that categorises patients into resource homogeneous 
groups, with each hospital receiving a fixed pre-determined tariff for every patient falling into a 
given group. This generates incentives for hospitals to contain costs. 
In its purest form, a PPS reimburses hospitals only on the basis of the volume and type of 
patients treated, without taking organisational characteristics into account. Under the German PPS, 
for example, tariffs do not depend on the hospital’s ownership status or membership to the national 
insurance programme (Klein-Hitpaß and Scheller-Kreinsen, 2015). In contrast, other PPSs do 
consider organisational characteristics. In the French PPS, for instance, prices differ for public and 
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private hospitals (Busse et al., 2011). In some countries, the PPS provides greater compensation 
to allow for the costs of specialist care. An example is the PPS of the Lombardy region in Italy, 
which applies a tariff top-up to all hospitals with ‘high specialisation’ units (Ettelt et al., 2006). In 
England, hospitals are paid extra if their patients receive specialised care (Daidone and Street, 
2013). 
Some health care systems feature hospitals that specialise on a single specialty, such as 
cardiology, ophthalmology, or orthopaedics.7 Specialisation is an organisational form which is 
supposed to generate the benefits of the ‘focused factory’, i.e. greater efficiency, quality, and 
responsiveness (Skinner, 1974, Herzlinger, 1996, Schneider et al., 2008) but not necessarily lower 
costs. In the US, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission showed that the costs of specialist 
hospitals were no lower than the costs of general hospitals. While cardiac hospitals’ costs were not 
significantly different from general hospitals’, orthopaedic and surgical hospitals had 20 percent 
higher inpatient costs. Higher costs were due to more specialised and costly facilities, higher 
staffing levels, better quality of care, but also excess capacity and low inpatient volumes 
(MedPAC, 2005, MedPAC, 2006). 
Such findings have stimulated empirical research on specialist hospitals’ costs. Barro et al. 
(2006) study the impact of specialist cardiac hospitals on overall expenditure and quality in the 
US between 1996 and 1999. They find that entry of specialist hospitals reduces expenditure growth 
without affecting outcomes. Carey et al. (2008) investigate the cost efficiency of US specialist 
hospitals between 1998 and 2004. They find higher levels of inefficiency in orthopaedic and 
surgical hospitals compared to general hospitals. Kim et al. (2013) analyse South Korean specialty 
orthopaedic hospitals between 2010 and 2012, which are found to apply higher patients’ charges 
                                                 
7 There are specialist hospitals in Europe (Ettelt et al., 2006, Medin et al., 2011), America (Carey et al., 2009, Araújo 
et al., 2014), Asia (Kim et al., 2013), India (Chanda, 2002), and Africa (Castro-Leal et al., 1999). 
38 
than general hospitals. The authors suggest that such higher charges are due to greater set-up, 
investment, staffing and treatment costs. 
The present study contributes to this small empirical literature. We investigate the financial 
viability of specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to trauma and orthopaedics (T&O) 
departments in general hospitals in the English National Health Service (NHS). Our primary 
objective is to test whether costs of specialist orthopaedic hospitals are higher than T&O 
departments in general hospitals even after accounting for differences in revenues. In other words, 
we test whether the current PPS covers the costs of specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O 
departments in general hospitals. 
In England, the majority of hospitals are funded through the national tariff payment system 
(NTPS).8 The NTPS is characterised by two key elements: the healthcare resource groups (HRGs), 
which classify patients into homogeneous categories based on diagnoses, procedures and some 
patients characteristics (Busse et al., 2011); and the tariffs, which vary by HRG and admission 
type (elective or non-elective) and reflect the national cost for an HRG averaged across all 
hospitals (Department of Health, 2013b). An additional payment for excess bed days is made for 
patients whose length of stay is beyond a threshold, called the trim point, which also varies by 
HRG and admission type.9 Both the base and excess bed day tariffs are adjusted by the market 
forces factor (MFF) index to account for exogenous geographical differences in input prices 
(Department of Health, 2013a). Tariffs are inflated if the patient receives specialised services 
under specific HRGs (Daidone and Street, 2013).10 With such a payment system, specialist 
                                                 
8 More than 60% of hospital income comes from the NTPS. The remaining part is agreed in the NHS standard contract 
on the basis of actual activity (Department of Health, 2012c). 
9 The trim point is the maximum expected length of stay for a patient falling under a specific HRG. It is defined by 
the Department of Health in order to identify unusually long lengths of stay and statistical outliers (Department of 
Health, 2013a). 
10 At the time of our study, top-ups were paid for Children’s, orthopaedic, spinal, and neurosciences specialised 
services. While all hospitals can obtain the top-up for specialised orthopaedic services, top-ups for the other specialised 
services are paid to a restricted number of eligible providers. 
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hospitals are likely to obtain higher revenues owing to the greater proportion of patients within an 
HRG who receive a specialised service. 
We collect data at HRG level from the NHS reference cost (RC) database for the financial year 
2013/14. Such data allow us to analyse the unit cost per patient of every inpatient HRG delivered 
through the T&O department of each hospital trust (hospital from now on) in the sample.11 Our 
econometric strategy employs four regressions. The first regression provides raw differences in 
unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. In a second regression, 
we compare unit costs after controlling for differential payments (due to different HRGs and other 
tariff corrections). This is our key model and provides differences in profit margins between the 
two types of hospital: given that HRG tariffs are fixed, any differences in unit costs after 
controlling for differences in payment will be reflected in the profit margin. In the third regression, 
we explain any differences in profit margins (i.e. in costs after controlling for payment) as a 
function of possible determinants including patient characteristics such as proportion of males, 
age, socio-economic status, number of diagnoses and procedures, and hospital characteristics such 
as the salary of doctors, hospital type, scale economies, quality, and geographical location. Our 
fourth regression examines the heterogeneity in profit margins across specialist hospitals. We 
estimate these models by weighted least squares (WLS), clustering standard errors within 
hospitals. 
The English NHS includes 141 general hospitals with a T&O department and three specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals. Although there are few specialist orthopaedic hospitals, they play an 
important role in the English NHS. They deliver high proportions of specialised services, 
commonly low-volume but high-cost treatments for patients with complex and rare conditions. 
                                                 
11 In the English NHS, a hospital trust or acute trust is an authority that provides secondary health care services through 
one or more acute hospitals. 
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Specialist orthopaedic hospitals therefore allow the achievement of a critical mass of clinical 
expertise to ensure patients receive specialised treatments that produces better health outcomes 
(NHS commissioning board, 2012). For instance, they provide 90% of bone and soft tissue 
sarcomas surgeries, and 50% of scoliosis treatments. They also perform high proportions of more 
common, corrective procedures, such as 50% of revision knee replacements and 20% of revision 
hip replacements (Briggs, 2012). We focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals because T&O is the 
specialty with the fourth highest volume of patients, after general medicine, general surgery, and 
paediatrics. In 2013, 6.7% of all NHS patients were treated in a T&O department. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to study differences in profit 
margins between specialist hospitals and departments within general hospitals undertaking similar 
activities. Previous work focuses on either costs (e.g. MedPAC, 2006) or revenues (e.g. Kim et al., 
2013). Our analysis is at HRG level, rather than patient level, making use of cost data that all 
English hospitals are required to report annually to the Department of Health (DH). This is a 
natural choice since payment is also at HRG level and our focus is on controlling for differences 
in payment across hospital types. As cost data are available only at HRG-level in most countries, 
our methodological approach can easily be employed and replicated in future studies, either to 
compare specialist and general hospitals, or to make other types of comparison, such as between 
teaching and non-teaching hospitals. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides the economic framework. Section 2.3 
describes the econometric strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data and shows descriptive statistics. 
Section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 discusses and concludes. 
2.2 Economic framework 
Under a PPS, hospitals are funded according to the number and type of patients treated. In the 
English payment system, the total revenue of hospital k=1,…,K for providing HRG j=1,…,J 
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amounts to: 
    1 1IN INjk jk jk jk jk jk jk jkE E kB jBR R R p te y p te q      , (2.1) 
where Rjk
IN is the total inlier revenue of hospital k for treating patients who have a normal length 
of stay for their HRG j; Rjk
EB
 is the total excess bed day revenue of hospital k earned for each 
additional day that patients stay beyond their specific HRG j’s trim point; pjk
IN
 is the HRG inlier 
price received by hospital k for treating a patient falling under HRG j; pjk
EB
 is the per diem price 
received by hospital k for a single excess bed day produced under HRG j; t is the tariff top-up on 
specialised orthopaedic services, which is a constant proportion across HRGs and hospitals; ejk is 
the proportion of patients in hospital k falling under HRG j receiving a specialised orthopaedic 
treatment; yjk is the number of patients admitted in hospital k under HRG j;
12 and qjk is the number 
of excess bed days produced in hospital k under HRG j. 
The HRG prices pjk
IN
 and pjk
EB can be written more explicitly as: 
  IN INjk j kp b m  , (2.2) 
  jk jEB EB kp b m  , (2.3) 
where αjk
IN
 is the inlier tariff for treating a patient falling under HRG j; αjk
EB
 is the excess bed day 
tariff of each excess bed day under HRG j. These do not vary by hospital. In contrast, mk is a MFF 
index capturing exogenous geographical differences in the prices of hospital inputs (staff, land, 
and buildings) that vary depending on the hospital’s location. Finally, b  is a fixed tariff adjustment 
common across hospitals, such as pay and price inflation or the national efficiency adjustment. 
The total cost of hospital k for providing HRG j is: 
 
IN EB IN EB
jk jk jk jk jk jk jkC C C c y c q    , (2.4) 
where Cjk
IN
 is the total inlier cost of hospital k for treating patients under HRG j (up to the trim 
                                                 
12 The number of patients is expressed by the number of finished consultant episodes (FCEs). A FCE is a hospital 
episode for a patient under the care of an individual consultant. 
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point); Cjk
EB
 is the total excess bed day cost of hospital k for the excess bed days produced under 
HRG j; cjk
IN
 is the inlier unit cost of hospital k for HRG j, and cjk
EB
 is the per diem unit cost of 
hospital k for each excess bed day falling under HRG j. Since the national tariffs are set equal to 
the national average cost, we can write them more explicitly as: 
    and   
IN
jk jk jk jkIN k k
j j
jk jk
B
k
E
EB
k
c y c q
y q
  
 
 
. (2.5) 
Therefore, the total profit function of hospital k for providing HRG j is: 
    1 1IN INjk jk jk jk jk jk jk jIN IN EB EB EB EBjk jk jk k jkjkR p te c y p te c qC R C               . (2.6) 
The profit margin, i.e. the profit per patient allocated to HRG j in hospital k, can be written as: 
    1 1jk jkIN IN EBjk jk jk jk jk jk jk
k
B
jk j
E
q
p te c p te c
y y

          , (2.7) 
where  1IN INjk jk jkp te c   is the inlier profit margin of hospital k for HRG j, and  1EB EBjk jk jkp te c   
is the per diem profit margin of hospital k for each excess bed day produced under HRG j. As 
prices are fixed, this simply demonstrates that profitability will vary according to differences in 
costs that are not accounted for in the payment arrangement.13 
Several factors driving hospital unit costs may also explain differences between specialist and 
general hospitals. Following Bradford et al. (2001), we summarise these in the following function: 
  ,jk jk kc c x z , (2.8) 
where xjk is a vector of patient characteristics not captured by the HRG classification system; and 
zk is a vector of hospital characteristics, such as input prices that are not captured fully by the 
market forces adjustment, teaching activity, or economies of scale. For instance, specialist 
                                                 
13 To illustrate this point, suppose that a specialist orthopaedic hospital s and a T&O department in general hospital g 
have the same volume of patients and excess bed days (ys=yg, qs=qg), the same location (ms=mg), and the same 
proportion of top-up tariffs (es=eg). Then, differences in profits will be equal to πgπs=(cs
IN
cg
IN
)yg+(cs
EB
cg
EB
)qg. For 
instance, πgπs>0 implies that the specialist orthopaedic hospital has lower profit margins than the T&O department 
in a general hospital. Such a difference will reflect factors not allowed for in the payment mechanism. 
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hospitals are likely to employ surgeons with advanced expertise that are paid higher salaries, and 
to use more costly high tech equipment. A high level of specialisation is likely to produce high 
quality of care and, perhaps, higher costs. Specialist hospitals might attract higher volumes of 
patients, which may allow them to exploit economies of scale but could translate into larger 
proportions of complex patients requiring a more intensive use of resources. Below, in our 
empirical analysis, we are able to control for a number of such explanatory factors. 
2.3 Econometric specification 
We focus on four key specifications. The dependent variable is the log of the inlier unit cost 
(cjk
IN
) or the per diem unit cost (cjk
EB
).14 All models are estimated by WLS in order to take into 
account, respectively, the number of patients (yjk) or excess bed days (qjk) of every HRG within 
each hospital. Moreover, we cluster standard errors within hospitals in order to allow for any form 
of serial correlation of errors across HRGs. 
In the first regression, model I, we test whether unit costs are on average higher in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals before accounting for any differences in payments across hospitals: 
  ln jk k jkc s     , (2.9) 
where cjk is the inlier or per diem unit cost of HRG j in hospital k, μ is the intercept, sk is a dummy 
equals one if hospital k is a specialist orthopaedic hospital, and εjk is the error term. 
The estimated coefficient ˆ  translates into  ˆexp 1    (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980, 
Bamezai et al., 1999 p. 240). This expresses the percentage difference in unit costs between 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals, i.e.  s g gc c c    
with 
sc  and gc  being respectively the specialist orthopaedic hospitals and the T&O departments’ 
unit cost averaged across HRGs and hospitals. Suppose that 0  , which implies higher unit costs 
                                                 
14 We take the logarithm to improve model fit, since unit costs are left-skewed. All estimated coefficients are therefore 
interpreted as semi-elasticities. 
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in specialist orthopaedic hospitals. This, however, does not necessarily imply that specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals have lower profit margins because no account is taken of hospital revenue. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospitals may provide more expensive treatments that are fully 
compensated by a higher HRG tariff. 
Our second and main econometric specification, model II, accounts for differences in payments 
across specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments: 
  ln jk k k jk j jkc s m e           , (2.10) 
where mk is the MFF index, ejk is the proportion of specialised services, and αj indicates a set of 
HRG fixed effects which controls for differences in average cost for each HRG; in turn, this 
controls for the fixed prices at HRG level which are based on the average cost within each HRG. 
This specification compares unit costs across specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments, after differences in the MFF and specialist top-up payments are taken into account. 
The tariffs are subtracted through the HRG fixed effects, i.e. a dummy variable for each HRG j. 
The estimated coefficient of every HRG dummy captures the average unit cost of the 
corresponding HRG category. Suppose again that 0   (computed using the estimated ˆ  in 
Model II). This result now implies that specialist orthopaedic hospitals exhibit lower profit margins 
compared with T&O departments. 
If we find that specialist orthopaedic hospitals are less financially viable, the finding could be 
due to a number of competing reasons which we account for in our model III. Following common 
practice (e.g. Street et al., 2010a, Gutacker et al., 2013), this model controls for patient and hospital 
characteristics that may explain differences in unit costs in addition to differences in payments 
and, therefore, profitability: 
  ln jk k jk j jkk jk kc s m e             zx , (2.11) 
where xjk is a vector of patient characteristics measured at HRG level namely the proportion of 
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males, average age, average socio-economic status, average number of diagnoses and procedures; 
and zk is a vector of hospital characteristics such as doctor salaries, a dummy indicating whether 
the hospital is teaching hospital or a foundation trust, size dummies calculated using the number 
of T&O beds to capture potential economies of scale, the average patient outcomes for hip and 
knee replacement as measure of quality, and regional dummies to allow for residual geographical 
differences not captured by other adjustments. 
The estimated coefficient ˆ  in model II provides an average effect across specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals. There may be heterogeneity in terms of their financial position, with some 
exhibiting lower deficits and others higher surpluses. To explore such heterogeneity, as a 
sensitivity analysis, we estimate the following model IV which includes hospital fixed effects and 
directly standardises unit costs (cjk) by the MFF index (mk): 
  ln jk k k jk j jkc m e        h . (2.12) 
In this specification, the specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy (sk) used in model I, II, or III 
is replaced with a vector of hospital dummies (hk). Also β is now a vector including k coefficients, 
one for each hospital dummy: for instance, if ˆ 0k   then the provision of trauma and orthopaedic 
services in hospital k implies lower profit margins relative to the average hospital. We directly 
standardise unit costs (cjk) because the MFF index (mk) would be perfectly collinear with hospital 
dummies (hk) if added as an additional control variable. 
All regression models are estimated separately for inlier and per diem unit costs because the 
HRG price is computed separately for inlier and excess bed day activity. For each model, we obtain 
the inlier and per diem estimates of β, which are then used to compute an overall measure of cost 
(for model I) or profitability (for models II, III, and IV). For instance, consider our key model II 
in equation (2.10), which estimates the percentage difference in inlier or per diem profit margins 
between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. The percentage difference in 
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overall profit margin per patient treated between specialist orthopaedics hospitals and T&O 
departments, after allowing for differences in unit costs of excess bed days, can be written as: 
 
   IN INs g sEB EBgg s
I
g g
EN B
g
c c y c c q
C c y c q
    


, (2.13) 
where 
g s   is the difference in profit averaged across HRGs and hospitals between T&O 
departments and specialist orthopaedic hospitals, expressed as a percentage of the T&O 
departments’ total cost averaged across HRGs and hospitals, gC  (to be consistent with the 
interpretation of profitability of the inlier activity, IN , and excess bed day activity, EB ); 
IN IN IN IN
s g gc c c   and 
EB EB EB EB
s g gc c c   are the difference in inlier and per diem unit costs 
averaged across HRGs and hospitals, respectively; y  and q are the average volume of patients 
and the average number of excess bed days, respectively.15 Standard errors of the overall estimates 
are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. 
2.4 Data 
Our primary source of data is the RC database for the financial year 2013/14. For every 
admission type of every single inpatient HRG, each hospital annually reports information on inlier 
unit costs, per diem unit costs, number of patients, and excess bed days. 
Hospitals follow a standard process in calculating unit costs by applying the rules set out in the 
NHS costing manual, which establishes three basic principles (Department of Health, 2012a): first, 
costs capture the full cost of the services delivered, so that they can be reconciled back to the 
original aggregated costs in the accounts; second, costs are preferably allocated through direct 
                                                 
15 The computation of the overall profitability for model IV in equation (2.12) differs from the computation described 
in equation (2.13). It becomes         EB EBI N I EN N BIk k kC c c y c c q c y c q       , where k  and kc  are 
the hospital k’s total profit and unit cost respectively averaged across HRGs and hospitals,   and c  are the total 
profit and unit cost respectively averaged across HRGs and hospitals, C  is the total cost averaged across HRGs and 
hospitals,  IN IN IN INkc c c   and  
EB EB EB EB
k
c c c  . Also in this case, the standard errors of the overall 
estimates are bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions. 
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imputation rather than through apportionment; and third, costs rigorously match the services 
generating them. The costing process consists of a top-down approach that, in the first instance, 
groups total costs into: costs that are directly attributable to patients (e.g. doctors, nurses, drugs); 
costs that are only indirectly linked to patients and that are identified on an activity basis (e.g. 
linen, catering); and overhead costs that are not related to patients (e.g. senior managers, 
administrative employees). Such costs are then attributed to macro-areas of treatment and support 
services (e.g. pharmacy, building maintenance), to hospital specialties (e.g. general surgery, 
orthopaedics), to wards, and finally to HRGs. Costs are further split by admission type such as 
non-elective (short or long), elective, and day case.16 Cost data are audited and must comply with 
validation rules to assure their accuracy, which is fundamental for the calculation of the national 
tariffs (Department of Health, 2014). 
Our sample for the analysis of inlier unit costs consists of 79,096 observations across 1,284 
HRGs and 134 hospitals.17 Of these observations, 14,181 refer to day case treatment, 18,170 to 
elective care, 19,532 are short-stay non-elective care, and 27,186 are long-stay non-elective care. 
The sample for the analysis of per diem unit costs comprises 16,098 observations, of which 4,087 
are elective and 12,011 are non-elective. 
For every HRG in each hospital, we calculate the proportion of patients who receive specialised 
orthopaedic services, the proportion of male patients, average patient age, average socio-economic 
status, average number of diagnoses and procedures using data summarised from patient-level 
information in the HES (Bojke et al., 2015).18 We collect several variables measured at hospital 
                                                 
16 Unlike elective and day case patients, the admission of non-elective patients is unplanned. Day case and short non-
elective patients do not have an overnight stay in hospital, while elective and long non-elective patients have at least 
one overnight stay. 
17 Ten T&O departments in general hospitals did not report data on PROMs for hip or knee replacement and they are, 
therefore, dropped from the sample. 
18 We count specialised services following the rules defined in the Prescribed Specialised Services (PPS), and not the 
criteria specified in the Specialised Services National Definition Sets (SSNDS). We use the overall Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD) as a measure of socio-economic status. This index is constructed through the combination of seven 
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level, most of which are from the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC; since 
renamed NHS Digital): a dummy variable for specialist orthopaedic hospitals, teaching hospitals, 
and foundation trusts; the average salary of doctors employed in the T&O specialty;19 and regional 
dummies. The HSCIC also provides Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) including, for 
each hospital, the average health change of patients undergoing hip and knee replacement 
(Appleby and Devlin, 2004, Gomes et al., 2015). PROMs measure the patients’ quality of life 
through the EQ-5D health-status questionnaire before and six months after their surgery. Hence, 
the health change is the difference between the post and pre-surgery EQ-5D scores, and it is 
estimated through a risk-adjustment methodology that takes account of patient characteristics and 
factors beyond hospitals’ control (Department of Health, 2012b).20 Using data from the NHS 
statistics, we construct dummies related to the size of the T&O department (small, medium, large, 
and very large), which are defined on the quartiles of the T&O beds distribution of all hospitals. 
Finally, the RC database reports the MFF index. 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that the distribution of inlier and per diem unit costs substantially departs 
from normality when in natural units, while it is approximately normal after taking the log. Table 
2.1 contains descriptive statistics of the variables measured at HRG level for the sample with 
observations of all admission types.21 Our sample includes the three specialist orthopaedic 
                                                 
IMD domains such as income, employment, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and training, barriers 
to housing and services, crime, and living environment. A value of one indicates extreme deprivation while 32,482 
indicates no deprivation. 
19 The salary of a doctor employed in the T&O specialty is estimated through an s-shape function of age, minimum 
and maximum salary. Further details are provided in section A2.1 of the Appendix 2. 
20 More precisely, the risk-adjustment methodology comprises three steps. The first step consists of estimating a 
Generalised Least Square fixed effects model in which the dependent variable is the post-surgery EQ-5D score of 
each patient, the covariates are pre-surgery EQ-5D score, patient characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity), economic 
deprivation, comorbidity, procedure and post-operative length of stay. This regression also controls for unobserved 
hospital heterogeneity through fixed effects. In the second step, the model is used to estimate predictions. The third 
step aggregates such predictions to obtain the adjusted average post-surgery EQ-5D score for each provider, from 
which the national average pre-surgery EQ-5D score is subtracted for the calculation of the adjusted average health 
gain. 
21 Table A2.1 and Table A2.2 in section A2.2 of the Appendix 2 show descriptive statistics of the variables measured 
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hospitals and 131 T&O departments in general hospitals. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on 
average higher inlier unit costs than T&O departments (£5,196 vs £2,987) and a higher number of 
patients per HRG (20 vs 12). The proportion of patients receiving specialised services is higher in 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals (1.1%) than T&O departments (0.1%). 49% of patients are male 
in both specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments, while patients in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals are on average eight years younger (47 vs 55) and better-off (deprivation 
index greater by 2%). Specialist orthopaedic hospitals record about the same number of diagnoses 
(5) for their average patient but provide one more procedure (4 vs 3) than T&O departments. 
The lower part of Table 2.1 also provides descriptive statistics for excess bed days. Per diem 
unit costs are on average higher in specialist orthopaedic hospitals (£465) than in T&O 
departments (£301). There are on average 22 excess bed days per HRG, but many more in the 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals (45) than in T&O departments (22). The proportion of patients 
receiving specialised services with a per diem unit cost is also higher in specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals (2.7% vs 0.1%). Similarly, the proportion of male patients with a long length of stay in 
specialist hospitals is slightly greater than in T&O departments (47.5% vs 46.8%). Long-stay 
patients are nine years younger (49 vs 58), better-off (deprivation index greater by 3%), and have 
the same number of diagnoses (5) but one more procedure (4 vs 3) in specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals compared to T&O departments. 
Table 2.2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables measured at hospital level. 24 
(17.9%) trusts are teaching hospitals, and 80 (59.7%) hospitals have foundation status. Two of the 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals are foundation trusts but none is a teaching hospital. 15 hospitals 
are in the London region, one of which is specialised. The remaining two specialist orthopaedic 
                                                 
at HRG level for the sample with day case and elective observations, and short non-elective and long-non elective 
observations, respectively. 
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hospitals are located in the West Midlands region, which includes 14 other general hospitals. The 
regions with the largest and smallest number of hospitals are, respectively, the North West 
including 22 hospitals, and the East Midlands and the North East with 8 hospitals. On the basis of 
the quartile division, a T&O department is categorised as small if it has less than 46 specialty beds, 
medium if between 46 and 61 beds, large if between 62 and 79 beds, and very large if it has more 
than 79 beds. The three specialist orthopaedic hospitals fall into the very large group. The MFF 
index is on average greater in specialist orthopaedic hospitals compared to T&O departments 
(1.085 vs 1.075). A doctor working in T&O earns on average approximately £86,000. Doctors in 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals are paid 5.6% more, on average, than doctors in T&O departments. 
Of all NHS patients treated in the T&O specialty, 9.5% receive a hip replacement and 6.7% 
undergo a knee replacement. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have a higher average health gain 
for hip (0.442 vs 0.425) and knee (0.317 vs 0.315) replacement. 
2.5 Results 
Table 2.3 provides the estimation results of models I, II and III for inlier and per diem unit 
costs when all admission types are included in the sample. Recall that unit costs are in logs. The 
specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy’s estimated coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level in model I and II but it is insignificant in model III for the inlier unit costs. 
It is always negative but statistically insignificant in the regressions for the per diem unit costs. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals have therefore 
statistically different costs for the inlier activity but statistically similar costs for the excess bed 
day activity. The first column of Table 2.3 shows the estimates of model I in equation (2.9), 
indicating raw differences in unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on average (exp(0.149)−1=)22 16.1% higher 
                                                 
22 The exponential transformation is applied to all the figures reported in the text in this section. This explains the 
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inlier unit costs. In contrast, they have on average 14.4% lower per diem unit costs but this result 
is not statistically significant. 
Model II in equation (2.10) provides estimates of differences in unit costs after accounting for 
differences in revenue by subtracting tariffs (HRG fixed effects) and by accounting for tariff 
adjustments (MFF and specialised services top-ups). The specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy’s 
estimated coefficient therefore can be interpreted as the difference in profit margins between 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments.23 Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on 
average 20.3% lower inlier profit margins. A percentage point increase in the proportion of 
specialised services raises inlier unit costs by 1.2%. A standard deviation increase in the MFF 
(0.064) is associated with an increase in inlier unit costs of 5.6%. 
With model III in equation (2.11), we investigate whether differences in profit margins can be 
explained by patient and hospital characteristics. The differences in inlier and per diem unit costs 
(?̂?) are both statistically insignificant, as are the variables capturing hospital characteristics. 
Instead, patient characteristics measuring age and number of diagnoses and procedures are 
significant at 1% level in explaining the differences in inlier (but not per diem) profit margins 
between specialist orthopaedic hospital and T&O departments.24 Age and inlier unit costs have a 
quadratic relationship so that unit costs decrease up to 75 years (-0.015/(2×0.0001)) and increase 
above that. At the sample mean of 54.7 years, one more year decreases inlier unit costs by 0.4% 
                                                 
differences with the coefficients reported in Table 2.3. 
23 Recall that the unit cost is the dependent variable in model II (III or IV) while tariffs are on the right-hand-side of 
the equation. Under such a regression design, β reflects the difference between unit costs and tariffs instead of the 
definition of profit margins, i.e. difference between tariffs and unit costs. To abide by the correct definition of profit 
margins, the interpretation of β must be reversed so that, for example, a positive estimate indicates lower profit margins 
in specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O departments in general hospitals. 
24 To reinforce this finding, we provide the results of a stepwise regression in Table A2.3 in section A2.3 of the 
Appendix 2. These results show that age, number of diagnoses and procedures together drive the differences in inlier 
unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals, with there being a 
seeming difference between the hospital types if any of these patient characteristics is omitted. Table A2.4 shows that 
differences between hospital types in per diem unit costs are always statistically insignificant whether or not patient 
characteristics are accounted for. 
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(-0.015+2×0.0001×54.7). An additional diagnosis or procedure raises inlier unit costs by 3.8% or 
2.4%, respectively. We extend model III by adding interactions between all control variables. We 
find that differences in both inlier and per diem profit margins between specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals and T&O departments remain statistically insignificant (see Table A2.5 in section A2.3 
of the Appendix 2).25 
So far, we have presented our findings on specialist orthopaedic hospitals for inlier and excess 
bed day hospital activity, separately. Table 2.4 reports the overall percentage change in unit costs 
(𝛽) between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments for each admission type.26 The 
overall percentage change is calculated as the sum of inlier and per diem percentage changes in 
unit cost or profit margins. The first column shows the percentage changes derived from model I. 
The overall unit costs are not statistically different between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 
T&O departments. In model II, when hospital revenues are taken into account, specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals have on average 13% lower overall profit margins than T&O departments 
at 1% of statistical significance (see footnote 23 for details on the interpretation). Model III shows 
that the overall profit margins in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are no longer significantly 
different from those in T&O departments after controlling for some key determinants including 
patient characteristics such as proportion of males, age, socio-economic status, number of 
diagnoses and procedures, and hospital characteristics such as salary of doctors, hospital type, 
specialty size, quality, and other regional differences. 
                                                 
25 As a further robustness check, we estimate model V which is akin to model III but also includes hospital random 
effects. Unlike the hospital fixed-effects model, the hospital random-effects model can be estimated when the 
specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy is included although this requires the additional assumption that the covariates 
are uncorrelated with the time-invariant unobserved hospital heterogeneity. Table A2.6 in section A2.3 of the 
Appendix 2 shows that the results for model V are very similar to those for model III. 
26 Recall that the percentage change (?̃?) is obtained through the exponential transformation of the estimated coefficient 
(?̂?). 
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2.5.1 Sensitivity analysis 
As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate the same three models for each admission type. The 
lower panel of Table 2.4 (second column) shows that statistically significant lower overall profit 
margins in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are found for elective (22.6%) and long non-elective 
activity (38.9%), but not for short non-elective and day case activity. 
Finally, estimation of model IV including hospital fixed effects in equation (2.12) suggests 
wide variation in overall (inlier) profit margins across hospitals in our sample, from 37.5% 
(38.6%) below the average to 38% (40.6%) above the average. Figure 2.1 indicates that 45 
hospitals, i.e. about a third, have significantly lower overall profit margins compared to the average 
profit margins, and 42 have significantly higher overall profit margins.27 None of the three 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals have overall or inlier profit margins significantly above the 
average. In particular, as shown in Table 2.5, the overall profit margins of the Robert Jones and 
Agnes Hunt orthopaedic hospital (minus 19.9%) and the Royal orthopaedic hospital (minus 
35.2%) are significantly below the average.28 The Royal National orthopaedic hospital has instead 
average overall profit margins. The latter finding is driven by higher profit margins on day case 
activity (40.6%). 
2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
The English NTPS is used to reimburse hospitals according to the amount and mix of activity 
that they undertake. Like most PPSs, there is a recognition that HRGs imperfectly account for all 
patient or exogenous hospital characteristics that might influence costs (Busse, 2012, Monteith, 
                                                 
27 We count only hospitals for which confidence intervals do not overlap the dashed horizontal line at zero, i.e. 
hospitals for which the deviation of profit margins from the mean is statistically different from zero. 
28 Recall that βk in model IV captures the deviation of hospital k’s profit margins from the mean profit margins: a 
positive βk means that hospital k’s profit margins are lower than the mean, while a negative βk suggests that hospital 
k’s profit margins are higher than the mean (see also footnote 23 for details on the interpretation). For ease of 
interpretation, we multiply the estimate of βk by minus one and, therefore, the negative sign now indicates profit 
margins that are lower than the mean. All coefficients in Table 2.5 indicate the percentage change (𝛽𝑘) obtained 
through the exponential transformation of ?̂?𝑘. 
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2013). As such, payment adjustments include top-ups to the tariff if patients received particular 
specialised care and payment corrections allow for differential costs of labour and capital across 
the country. These refinements help ensure a fair reimbursement system that rewards hospitals 
according to the care that they provide, not the advantageous circumstances in which they might 
operate (Daidone and Street, 2013, Grašič et al., 2015). 
Given these payment adjustments, hospitals that provide care at a cost below tariff should be 
more profitable. Arguably specialist hospitals should be in a strong position to benefit financially 
from these arrangements. By focussing on a limited set of services they should be able to better 
exploit informational or organisational advantages associated with specialisation. Such advantages 
derive from concentrating on a specific, defined caseload that enhances learning-by-doing and 
attracts staff with particular expertise and more easily allows efficient practice in care delivery to 
be identified and operationalised (Schneider et al., 2008). 
If these advantages obtain we would expect specialist hospitals to earn higher profits than 
general hospitals that undertake similar activities. The evidence provided in this study does not 
support this claim. We have analysed the costs and revenues associated with delivery of trauma 
and orthopaedic services in all three specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 131 T&O departments in 
general hospitals in England. We find that, compared to the national average, profit margins are 
13% lower in the three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. Profits are statistically significantly lower 
across all patients that have at least one overnight stay, either elective or non-elective. 
These lower profits are not due simply to patients in specialist hospitals requiring long lengths 
of stay or specialist care. Payment arrangements allow for this possibility through excess bed day 
payments and tariff top-ups for specialised treatments, and we account for these revenue 
adjustments in our analysis. Nor does it appear that differences can be explained by the 
characteristics of the hospitals such as their teaching and foundation status or geographical 
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location, nor by the number of the T&O patients treated, nor by variation in doctors’ salaries, nor 
by the quality of care as captured by PROMs for two high-volume orthopaedic procedures such as 
hip and knee replacement. Lower profits are observed even after these potential explanatory factors 
are taken into account. 
Instead, we find that lower profit margins in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are explained by 
patient characteristics such as age and severity as captured by the number of diagnoses and 
procedures. This means that, although hospital payments are based on a detailed patient 
classification system (HRG) and on adjustments for the higher cost of specialised care, providers 
that generally attract more complex patients such as specialist orthopaedic hospitals may be 
financially disadvantaged. That said, being part of a general hospital does not guarantee better 
financial performance with 33% of the T&O departments also making a loss. 
Our study has three main limitations. First, our sample includes only three specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals. Such a small number of specialist orthopaedic hospital trusts, however, is 
not the result of sample selection but reflects the reality that there are only three specialist 
orthopaedic hospital trusts in the English NHS. Specialist hospitals are few and far between in 
many countries. Hence, we believe that our analysis is appropriate and generally applicable. 
Moreover, although we are limited by the actual number of hospitals, we analyse hundreds of 
HRGs for each specialist hospital and we investigate heterogeneity across the three hospitals in 
model IV using hospital fixed effects. This model shows that two of the three specialist hospitals 
make a loss and none of them makes a profit, which confirms that specialist orthopaedic hospitals 
are in a relatively weak financial position. 
Second, our estimated tariffs may not be identical to current tariffs, i.e. the actual tariffs that 
hospitals receive in 2013/14. We compute tariffs by including in our models (II, III, or IV) the 
HRG fixed effects, which capture the unit cost of each HRG averaged across hospitals. This 
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reflects the methodology used to compute current tariffs but, in practice, current tariffs are based 
on cost data lagged by three years in order to ensure data accuracy and stakeholder engagement in 
their calculation (Department of Health, 2013a). To account for the time lag, the current tariffs’ 
methodology adjusts for inflation and efficiency trends. We therefore argue that tariffs estimated 
through our methods are a reasonable approximation to current tariffs. 
Finally, PROMs are currently available only for two orthopaedic procedures such as hip and 
knee replacements. These procedures are however the most common in T&O departments: of all 
NHS patients treated in the T&O specialty, 9.5% receive a hip replacement and 6.7% undergo a 
knee replacement. We therefore argue that hip and knee replacements are indicative of 
departmental performance. 
Future research may be required before a definitive recommendation about whether profit 
margins differ in trauma and orthopaedic services across general and specialised hospitals. But we 
have set out a methodology that can be applied to other types of hospital service and in other 
settings, to investigate the extent to which differences in costs between groups of hospitals are 
adequately covered by prospective payment systems. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 – Descriptive statistics of variables measured at HRG level. 
  
Variable at HRG level 
All hospitals   Specialist hospitals   General hospitals 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
In
li
er
 
Inlier unit cost 3,031 3,484 22 129,419   5,196 8,555 173 129,419   2,987 3,287 22 78,447 
Number of patients (FCEs) 12.2 37.4 1 1,622   20.3 57.7 1 644   12.1 36.9 1 1,622 
Number of specialised services 0.05 0.73 0 55   0.66 4.23 0 55   0.04 0.42 0 26 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.7 0.0 100.0   1.1 6.1 0.0 69.2   0.1 1.5 0.0 100.0 
Proportion of males (%) 49.1 19.6 0.0 100.0   49.2 24.3 0.0 100.0   49.1 19.5 0.0 100.0 
Age 54.7 18.9 0.0 97.0   47.4 17.4 1.0 90.0   54.8 18.9 0.0 97.0 
Deprivation index 15,969  4,889  12  32,474    16,296  4,365  194  32,417    15,963  4,899  12  32,474  
Number of diagnoses 4.969 2.655 1 20   4.733 2.511 1 13   4.974 2.657 1 20 
Number of procedures 3.079 2.108 0 24   4.118 2.158 0 12   3.058 2.102 0 24 
Number of HRGs 1,284   415   1,272 
Observations 79,069   1,564   77,505 
E
x
ce
ss
 b
ed
 d
ay
 
Per diem unit cost 305 474 20 54,422   465 2,867 65 54,422   301 188 20 9,499 
Number of excess bed days 22.2 35.5 1 715   44.8 81.8 1 715   21.7 33.4 1 538 
Number of specialised services 0.11 1.31 0 55   1.95 7.56 0 55   0.07 0.56 0 26 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 2.0 0.0 69.2   2.7 9.6 0.0 69.2   0.1 1.3 0.0 45.6 
Proportion of males (%) 46.8 16.2 0.0 100.0   47.5 18.1 0.0 100.0   46.8 16.2 0.0 100.0 
Age 57.8 15.7 0.1 97.0   49.2 16.2 7.9 90.0   58.0 15.6 0.1 97.0 
Deprivation index 16,047  4,564  201  32,268    16,499  3,636  1,428  31,664    16,036  4,583  201  32,268  
Number of diagnoses 5.096 2.535 1 20   4.906 2.501 2 13   5.100 2.536 1 20 
Number of procedures 3.160 2.096 0 24   4.378 2.265 0 12   3.131 2.084 0 24 
Number of HRGs 675   183   662 
Observations 16,098   373   15,725 
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Table 2.2 – Descriptive statistics of variables measured at hospital trust level. 
Variable at hospital trust level 
All hospitals   Specialist hospitals   General hospitals 
Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.022 0.148 0 1   1.000 0.000 1 1   0.000 0.000 0 0 
Market forces factor 1.076 0.064 1.003 1.298   1.085 0.082 1.032 1.180   1.075 0.063 1.003 1.298 
Salary of doctors (£10,000) 8.664 0.744 6.596 10.060   9.134 0.293 8.797 9.324   8.653 0.749 6.596 10.060 
Teaching hospital 0.179 0.385 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.183 0.388 0 1 
Foundation hospital 0.597 0.492 0 1   0.667 0.577 0 1   0.595 0.493 0 1 
Small department 0.201 0.403 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.206 0.406 0 1 
Medium department 0.284 0.452 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.290 0.456 0 1 
Large department 0.254 0.437 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.260 0.440 0 1 
Very large department 0.261 0.441 0 1   1.000 0.000 1 1   0.244 0.431 0 1 
Average health change after hip replacement 0.425 0.028 0.311 0.476   0.442 0.033 0.410 0.476   0.425 0.028 0.311 0.474 
Average health change after knee replacement 0.315 0.028 0.215 0.396   0.317 0.025 0.288 0.332   0.315 0.028 0.215 0.396 
London 0.112 0.316 0 1   0.333 0.577 0 1   0.107 0.310 0 1 
East Midlands 0.060 0.238 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.061 0.240 0 1 
East of England 0.127 0.334 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.130 0.337 0 1 
North East 0.060 0.238 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.061 0.240 0 1 
North West 0.164 0.372 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.168 0.375 0 1 
South East 0.149 0.358 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.153 0.361 0 1 
South West 0.112 0.316 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.115 0.320 0 1 
West Midlands 0.119 0.325 0 1   0.667 0.577 0 1   0.107 0.310 0 1 
Yorkshire and The Humber 0.097 0.297 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.099 0.300 0 1 
Number of trusts 134   3   131 
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Table 2.3 – Estimation results when all admission types are included. 
Regressor 
Inlier   Per diem 
Model I Model II Model III   Model I Model II Model III 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 
0.149** 0.185** 0.149   -0.156 -0.276 -0.140 
(0.059) (0.076) (0.097)   (0.187) (0.196) (0.204) 
Market forces factor 
  0.845*** 0.928**     0.353 0.485 
  (0.213) (0.460)     (0.381) (1.228) 
Proportion of specialised services 
  0.012** 0.010*     0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.006)     (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion of males 
    -0.00009       -0.0004 
    (0.000)       (0.001) 
Age 
    -0.015***       -0.006 
    (0.004)       (0.006) 
Age (squared) 
    0.0001***       0.0001* 
    (0.000)       (0.000) 
Deprivation index 
    -0.000003       -0.000007 
    (0.000)       (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
    0.037***       -0.031* 
    (0.010)       (0.018) 
Number of procedures 
    0.024***       -0.017 
    (0.007)       (0.012) 
Salary of doctors 
    0.003       -0.041 
    (0.021)       (0.040) 
Teaching trust 
    0.057*       0.097 
    (0.034)       (0.076) 
Foundation trust 
    -0.049*       0.011 
    (0.026)       (0.059) 
Medium department 
    -0.019       -0.068 
    (0.035)       (0.081) 
Large department 
    -0.021       0.002 
    (0.032)       (0.083) 
Very large department 
    0.022       -0.117 
    (0.034)       (0.077) 
Average health change after hip replacement 
    0.952*       -1.896* 
    (0.523)       (1.081) 
Average health change after knee replacement 
    -0.414       0.468 
    (0.465)       (1.177) 
Constant 
    6.625***       6.429*** 
    (0.608)       (1.607) 
HRG fixed effects NO YES YES 
  
NO YES YES 
  
Regional fixed effects NO NO YES 
  
NO NO YES 
  
Observations 79,069 79,069 79,069   16,098 16,098 16,098 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.797 0.805   0.005 0.074 0.157 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 2.4 – Differences in unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments 
in general hospitals. 
Inpatient activity Model I Model II Model III 
A
ll
 a
d
m
is
si
o
n
 t
y
p
es
 
Overall1 
0.114 0.135*** 0.116 
(0.157) (0.000) (0.466) 
Inlier 
0.161** 0.203** 0.161 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.125) 
Per diem 
-0.144 -0.241 -0.131 
(0.408) (0.161) (0.494) 
E
le
ct
iv
e 
Overall1 
0.254*** 0.226*** 0.204** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Inlier 
0.311*** 0.282*** 0.249*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Per diem 
-0.225 -0.248 -0.176 
(0.195) (0.175) (0.243) 
L
o
n
g
 n
o
n
-e
le
ct
iv
e Overall1 
0.601*** 0.389*** 0.403* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.076) 
Inlier 
0.741* 0.499*** 0.486*** 
(0.064) (0.004) (0.003) 
Per diem 
-0.140 -0.192 -0.033 
(0.395) (0.196) (0.864) 
Short non-elective 
0.293 0.320 0.369* 
(0.101) (0.147) (0.099) 
Day case 
-0.071 0.029 -0.018 
(0.731) (0.887) (0.924) 
1 Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. 
p-value in parentheses; *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 2.5 – Specialist orthopaedic hospitals’ overall profit margins. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 
All admission 
types 
Day case Elective 
Short non-
elective 
Long non-
elective 
Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital NHS 
Trust 
0.0% 40.6%* -30.5%* -79.4* -80.5%* 
Robert Jones And Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
-19.9%* -21.5%* -18.0%* 4.2% -4.8% 
Royal Orthopaedic Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 
-35.2%* -29.5%* -29.0%* -69.0%* -30.6%* 
* significantly different from the average hospital at 5% 
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Figure 2.1 – Distribution of inlier and per diem unit costs in natural units and logs. 
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Figure 2.2 – Distribution of overall and inlier profit margins. 
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Chapter 3 – Do Hospitals Respond to Rivals’ Quality and 
Efficiency? A Spatial Panel Econometric Analysis 
Abstract 
We investigate whether hospitals in the English National Health Service change their quality 
or efficiency in response to changes in quality or efficiency of neighbouring hospitals. We first 
provide a theoretical model which predicts that a hospital will not respond to changes in the 
efficiency of its rivals but may change its quality or efficiency in response to changes in the quality 
of rivals, though the direction of the response is ambiguous. We use data on eight quality measures 
(including mortality, emergency readmissions, patient reported outcome, and patient satisfaction) 
and six efficiency measures (including bed occupancy, cancelled operations, and costs) for public 
hospitals between 2010/11 and 2013/14 to estimate both spatial cross-sectional and spatial fixed 
and random effects panel data models. We find that although quality and efficiency measures are 
unconditionally spatially correlated, the spatial regression models suggest that a hospital’s quality 
or efficiency does not respond to its rivals’ quality or efficiency, except for a hospital’s overall 
mortality which is positively associated with that of its rivals. The results are robust to allowing 
for spatially correlated covariates and spatial correlated errors and to instrumenting rivals’ quality 
and efficiency. 
3.1 Introduction 
Quality and efficiency are fundamental goals for policymakers in the hospital sector. In the 
presence of fixed prices, policymakers have argued that competition may induce hospitals to 
compete on quality to attract patients and to enhance their efficiency (Gaynor, 2007). 
Investigations of the effect of competition on quality and efficiency in the US, the United 
Kingdom, and other OECD countries have produced mixed results (section 3.1.1). 
In this study, rather than examining the relationship between measures of competition and 
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hospital quality and efficiency, we use an alternative approach by examining hospitals’ strategic 
interactions. For example, in a competitive environment we may expect a hospital to respond to 
an increase in quality by a rival hospital by also increasing quality: in industrial economics terms 
qualities are strategic complements. We present a simple theory model (Section 2) which shows 
that this intuition can be correct if treatment costs are increasing in quality. The reduction in 
demand which follows from an increase in rival’s quality reduces total treatment cost of providing 
quality and at the margin incentivises the hospital to increase quality. There is however an 
offsetting effect: the reduction in demand also reduces incentives to contain cost which reduces 
the profit margin on additional patients. We therefore investigate empirically whether quality and 
efficiency are strategic complements or strategic substitutes so that higher rivals’ quality 
(efficiency) induces a hospital to increase or reduce its quality (efficiency). 
We consider both clinical and non-clinical dimensions of quality. We measure clinical quality 
through risk-adjusted overall mortality and readmission rate, and mortality rates for high-volume 
conditions such as hip fracture and stroke. Since the vast majority of patients do not die or have 
an emergency readmission we also measure health gains for a common elective procedure (hip 
replacement) using patients-reported outcomes (PROMs). We capture non-clinical dimensions of 
patients’ experience using patient satisfaction with their overall hospital experience, hospital 
cleanliness, and the extent to which clinicians involved the patients in the treatment decision. We 
measure hospital efficiency through indicators for bed occupancy, cancelled elective operations, 
and cost indices for overall hospital activity, elective and non-elective activity, and for hip 
replacement. All these measures are in the public domain so that hospital managers and senior 
physicians are in principle able to compare themselves with their rivals. 
The global Moran’s I test suggests that most of the quality and efficiency indicators are 
unconditionally spatially correlated. We estimate spatial cross-sectional models by quasi-
maximum likelihood (ML) controlling for observable determinants of quality and efficiency. To 
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control for unobserved time-invariant determinants of quality and efficiency, we also estimate 
spatial panel models with hospital fixed or random effects. These models suggest that a hospital’s 
quality or efficiency does not respond to its rivals’ quality or efficiency, except for a hospital’s 
overall mortality which is positively associated with that of its rivals. The results are robust to 
allowing for spatially correlated covariates and spatially correlated errors and to instrumenting 
rivals’ quality and efficiency. 
Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 review the literature and the institutional background. Section 3.2 
provides a simple theoretical model. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 
describes the data. Section 3.5 discusses the results, and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.1.1 Related literature 
Our study contributes to the literature on hospital competition and, more broadly, to spatial 
econometrics applications in health economics. Early studies focus on the relationship between 
hospital competition and efficiency in the US. They show that non-price competition combined 
with a cost-based reimbursement system may lead to overprovision of hospital services (e.g. 
Joskow, 1980, Robinson and Luft, 1985). Later studies find a beneficial effect of price competition 
on costs (e.g. Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988, Bamezai et al., 1999). Studies on the impact of 
hospital competition on clinical quality, measured usually by mortality, have mixed results. Some 
find that competition improves quality (Kessler and McClellan, 2000, Kessler and Geppert, 2005), 
others that competition reduces quality (Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003) or has no effect 
(Mukamel et al., 2001). 
UK studies also have mixed results. While some find that competition increases efficiency 
(Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013) others report no association (Söderlund et al., 1997). 
Some studies find negative effects of competition on quality when prices are not fixed and 
negotiated with the purchaser (Propper et al., 2004, Propper et al., 2008); some later studies find 
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positive effects where prices were fixed within a DRG type system (Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor 
et al., 2013, Bloom et al., 2015), and some find mixed effects based on the quality indicator 
(Gravelle et al., 2014a). 
A smaller number of studies take a different approach: rather than examining the quasi-reduced 
form relationship between market structure and quality or price, they use spatial econometric 
methods to investigate strategic interactions amongst hospitals by examining whether a hospital’s 
quality or price depends on the quality or price of its rivals. Mobley (2003) and Mobley et al. 
(2009) examine strategic complementarity in prices within the US context where hospital prices 
are not fixed. Similarly, Choné et al. (2014) study strategic complementarity of GPs’ prices in 
France using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Gravelle et al. (2014b) use a cross section 
of English data and find that four out of sixteen clinical and patient-reported hospital quality 
measures are strategic complements. 
We contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, we complement the theory model 
in Brekke et al. (2012), which shows that competition can influence efficiency through its effect 
on quality, and the finding in Cooper et al. (2012), which suggest that market structure affects 
efficiency, by examining strategic interactions amongst hospitals with respect to efficiency. 
Second, we employ panel data to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. Third, 
previous studies on strategic interactions amongst hospitals have been cross-sectional and so may 
be biased when estimated by ML because of unobserved factors generating spatial correlations 
amongst hospitals. We therefore address potential endogeneity in cross-sectional models by using 
an IV approach. 
More generally, our study contributes to the small but growing literature on spatial 
econometrics applications in health economics. As well as hospital competition, this literature 
discusses alternative sources of spatial dependence across healthcare authorities. Following 
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Manski (1993), Moscone and Knapp (2005) propose a classification of spatial effects for mental 
health expenditure in England. More recently, Atella et al. (2014) investigate spillovers in 
healthcare expenditure amongst Italian local health authorities and Guccio and Lisi (2016) look at 
interactions amongst hospitals’ caesarean section rates. Another strand of this literature focuses on 
healthcare expenditure and its determinants. Some studies investigate whether spatial interactions 
affect expenditure (Moscone et al., 2007a, Moscone et al., 2007b). Other studies allow for spatial 
dependence to identify the effect of other factors, such as income, on healthcare expenditure 
(Costa-i-Font and Pons-Novell, 2007, Baltagi and Moscone, 2010, Moscone and Tosetti, 2010, 
Baltagi et al., 2016). Other studies show that it is necessary to allow for spatial correlations when 
examining the determinants on health outcomes, such as mortality (Lorant et al., 2001), avoidable 
emergency admissions (Mobley et al., 2006, Weeks et al., 2016), admission, discharge and 
treatment indicators (Bech and Lauridsen, 2008, Baltagi and Yen, 2014, Gaughan et al., 2015), 
and HIV prevalence rate (Docquier et al., 2014). 
The present study extends the analysis by Gravelle et al. (2014b) on strategic interactions 
amongst English hospitals in several directions. In terms of research question, we focus on 
strategic interactions in efficiency in addition to quality. Gravelle et al. (2014b) use cross-sectional 
data from the financial year 2009/10 while our study covers the more recent and longer period 
from 2010/11 to 2013/14, which gives us the opportunity to exploit panel data methods. We also 
analyse quality indicators not included by Gravelle et al. (2014b), i.e. the PROMs for two high-
volume orthopaedic procedures (hip and knee replacement). Most importantly, we employ a ML 
panel spatial lag model and a cross-sectional IV approach. We also use a richer set of demand and 
supply shifters to better account for potential factors generating spatial correlations. Our results 
are different but compatible with those obtained by Gravelle et al. (2014b) as discussed in greater 
detail in Section 5.3. 
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3.1.2 Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) provides healthcare which is universal, tax financed, 
and free at the point of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding to around 150 
local health authorities which use it to pay for secondary healthcare provided to NHS patients by 
public and private hospitals. Public hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts, 
the latter having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital trusts are teaching trusts 
providing research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited range of 
conditions or client groups. 
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff 
Payment System. This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), a patient classification 
system similar to the American Diagnosis-Related Group or DRG. The HRGs categorise patients 
into homogeneous groups depending on diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics. 
A fixed tariff is calculated for each HRG group as its national cost averaged across providers but 
with adjustments for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input prices and the 
higher costs of specialised care (Department of Health, 2013a). 
Hospital competition has been encouraged by relaxing restrictions on patients’ choice of 
hospital for elective care. Since 2008 patients have been allowed to choose any qualified provider 
(Department of Health, 2009). Choice is facilitated through the website ‘NHS Choices’, which 
provides information on hospital performance (e.g. mortality, waiting times). 
3.2 Theoretical model 
We sketch a simple two-provider model of quality competition and cost reducing effort. Hospital 
i has demand function Di(qi,qj) which is increasing in own quality qi and decreasing in the quality 
of hospital j. The objective function of hospital i is: 
      , ; , ; , ;i i i i i i i j i i i i iU p c q e D q q G q e        (3.1) 
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where p is the fixed price per treatment that the hospital receives from a third-party payer. ci(qi,ei) 
are variable treatment costs, which are increasing in quality and decreasing in cost-containment 
effort or efficiency ei. Gi(qi,ei) are monetary and non-monetary fixed costs which are increasing in 
both quality and cost-containment (managerial) effort. We assume that quality and cost-
containment effort are substitutes, i.e.  , 0
i iiq e i i
G q e  , since both are types of managerial effort. 
To keep computations simple, we assume that quality and efficiency are instead independent in 
variable costs, i.e.  , 0
i iiq e i i
c q e  . i is a vector of shift parameters (such as local input prices, 
population demographics, and morbidity). 
Hospital i chooses quality and efficiency to satisfy: 
      , ; ( , ; ) , ; ( , ; ) , ; 0
i i i iiq i i i i iq i j i iq i i i i i j i iq i i i
U p c q e D q q c q e D q q G q e            (3.2) 
      , ; , ; , ; 0
i i iie ie i i i i i j i ie i i i
U c q e D q q G q e       (3.3) 
where 0
iiq
D  , 0
iiq
c  , and 0
iiq
G  , and denote partial derivatives with respect to quality. With 
strictly concave utility functions these optimality conditions are also sufficient. Note that the price 
must exceed the marginal cost of treating additional patients if the hospital is to be induced to 
provide positive quality. The optimal quality is determined such that the marginal profit from 
higher additional demand is equal to the marginal cost of quality. The optimal level of efficiency 
(cost-containment effort) is such that the marginal benefit from lower costs and higher profits are 
equal to the marginal disutility from efficiency. 
 The first order conditions (3.2) and (3.3) define the reaction functions for hospital i’s 
quality and efficiency as functions of the choice of quality by hospital j: 
 ( ; )
R
i i j iq q q   (3.4) 
 ( ; )
R
i i j ie e q  . (3.5) 
Since neither of the first order conditions depends on the efficiency of hospital j, it is apparent 
that quality and efficiency of hospital i are strategically independent of the efficiency of hospital 
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j. 
Totally differentiating the first order conditions we obtain: 
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  (3.6) 
where 
2 0
i i i i i iiq q ie e iq e
U U U     by the concavity of the objective function. The term in square 
brackets in (3.6) is the direct effect of the rival’s quality on the marginal profit from higher quality. 
It is not obvious whether an increase in rival’s quality reduces or increases the marginal gain in 
patient numbers from higher quality. Suppose for simplicity that 
i jiq q
D  is zero. The second part of 
the square bracketed term is the reduction in the variable cost because the increase in rival’s quality 
reduces demand and so the marginal cost of output of hospital i, which then responds by increasing 
quality. However, the second term in the curly bracket shows that the lower demand also reduces 
incentives to contain costs (indirect effect) and so variable cost may increase, making increases in 
quality to attract additional patients less profitable. 
3.3 Methods 
We investigate whether hospitals’ quality or efficiency responds to the quality or efficiency of 
their rivals estimating cross-sectional linear versions of the reaction functions by ML: 
 i ij j i ijy w y X       (3.7) 
where yi is the quality or efficiency of hospital i (i = 1,…,I); yj is the quality or efficiency of hospital 
i’s rival j (j≠i); wij are spatial weights, Xi is a vector of covariates including demand shifters (e.g. 
population density, proportion of elderly individuals), supply shifters (e.g. number of managers, 
proportion of consultants), hospital type (e.g. foundation trusts, teaching hospitals) and a constant; 
and i is the error term. In matrix form we estimate: 
 Y WY X      (3.8) 
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where W is the spatial weight matrix composed of the elements wij. The spatial weights are 
generated from the inverse distance function: 
 1
   0      if     
      if   30 km  and  
   0      if   30 km  and  
ij ij ij
ij
i j
w d d i j
d i j

 

  
  
  (3.9) 
where dij is the straight line distance between hospital i and j. We assume, as in recent literature, 
that 30 km is the radius within which hospitals compete (Gaynor et al., 2012a, Bloom et al., 2015). 
Hospitals that are further away within a 30 km radius have a lower weight, and hospitals that are 
further than 30 km have a zero weight. The weight matrix W is row standardised, i.e. the elements 
of each row sum to one. WY  is therefore a weighted average of the rivals’ quality or efficiency. 
The key coefficient is . If  > 0 then quality (efficiency) increases in response to an increase 
in rivals’ quality (efficiency). But there are two other potential reasons for spatial correlation in 
outcomes. First, a hospital’s quality may vary with characteristics of rival hospitals, such as 
proportion of foundation trusts amongst rivals. Second, unobserved characteristics common across 
rival hospitals may affect quality in a given area. For instance, rival hospitals with appealing 
neighbourhoods are more likely to attract and employ skilled doctors and managers, and provide 
similar quality. If we fail to account for these factors, spatial correlation will be spurious. 
There is an analogy between our spatial approach and the peer-effects literature where the 
identification issue is known as the “reflection problem” (Manski, 1993). Strategic interactions 
amongst hospitals, as captured by the rivals’ quality or efficiency (WY), are the endogenous effects 
of the peer-effects literature. Observed characteristics of rival hospitals (WX) are the contextual 
effects and unobserved hospital characteristics similar across rivals are correlated effects contained 
in the error term . 
To control for time-invariant unobserved factors, we estimate spatial panel models using the 
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fixed (FE) or random-effects (RE) ML estimator:29 
 it ij jt it i t itjy w y X          (3.10) 
where γt is a year indicator. The hospital effect αi captures unobserved time-invariant hospital 
heterogeneity and will therefore potentially reduce time-invariant bias from contextual and 
correlated effects. Estimates, however, might still be biased in the presence of unobserved 
time-varying factors affecting the patient case-mix. For instance, patient comorbidities and 
severity not captured by the risk adjustment may lead to higher hospital mortality rates. 
Risk-adjustment methodologies generally use routine patient data that reflect the information 
collected through DRG-type patient classification systems. Although such systems provide a large 
number of patient categories, there is recognition that they can only imperfectly capture patient 
complexity (e.g. Mason et al., 2011, Gutacker et al., 2013). Since patient comorbidities and 
severity vary over time, we cannot rule them out as a potential source of endogeneity.  
We test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we estimate the spatial Durbin 
model (SDM) adding all the spatially lagged covariates (WX) to the cross-sectional and panel 
models. This will reduce potential bias due to contextual effects. Second, we allow for correlated 
effects which lead to spatially correlated errors by estimating spatial autocorrelation (SAC) models 
with spatially lagged errors: it ij jt itj w     . Third, following the theory in section 3.2, we 
test whether a hospital’s quality (efficiency) responds to rivals’ efficiency (quality) by adding a 
spatially lagged efficiency (quality) measure to the main regressions. We also examine whether 
results are sensitive to extending the radius within which hospitals compete to 60 km or 90 km. 
Finally, in cross-sectional models, to further address potential bias from contextual and 
correlated effects we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumenting WYt with its two or three 
                                                 
29 We use the Stata user-written command spreg to estimate cross-sectional models (Drukker et al., 2015), and xsmle 
to estimate panel models (Belotti et al., 2014). 
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year lagged value (WYt-2 or WYt-3). An instrument is valid (Stock and Watson, 2003, p.423) if it is 
exogenous (not a regressor in the second stage regression and uncorrelated with unobserved factors 
captured by the error term) and relevant (correlated with the instrumented endogenous variable). 
We argue that, whilst current outcomes are potentially influenced by rival’s current outcomes (or 
possibly last period outcomes), adjustment is sufficiently rapid that current outcomes are not 
affected by what rivals were doing two or three years previously. Some studies on the English 
NHS (Gaynor et al., 2012b, Sivey, 2012, Gutacker et al., 2016) show that patients choose hospitals 
with higher quality and lower waiting times. For example, Gutacker et al. (2016) find that the 
demand of a hospital decreases by 0.63% if a rival located within 10 km increases its PROMs 
quality by 1%. Hospitals are therefore unlikely to delay their reaction to changes in rivals’ 
performance by two or three years in order to avoid reductions in the volume of patients treated 
and, hence, revenue. On the other hand, WYt-2 (or WYt-3) is likely to be relevant because hospital 
quality is unlikely to change rapidly over time so that WYt-2 (or WYt-3) will be a good predictor of 
WYt. We can also test for relevance in the first stage model. 
3.4 Data 
We have eight quality indicators and six efficiency indicators measured at hospital trust level and 
have four years of data (from 2010/11 to 2013/14, except for the readmission rate where we use 
data for 2008/09 to 2011/12).30 Such indicators are issued annually or quarterly in the public 
domain, with the most recent collection released in 2010 (patient reported outcome measures).31 
They are therefore available to providers.32 
                                                 
30 Detailed definitions of the quality and efficiency indicators are included in the Appendix 3 (Table A3.1 and Table 
A3.2). The publication of the emergency readmission rate has been suspended because of a revision of the 
methodology. 
31 The SHMI was published annually until 2011 and quarterly afterwards. Bed occupancy data were released annually 
up to 2009/10 and quarterly afterwards. Cancelled elective operations have been issued quarterly since their first 
publication in 1996/97. All other indicators have annual frequency. 
32 The SHMI is only available for general hospitals but not for specialist hospitals. The reference cost index for hip 
replacement is not directly available as the other reference cost indexes. Its calculation, however, follows the same 
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3.4.1 Quality indicators 
The risk-adjusted Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is the ratio of the actual 
number of deaths from all causes in hospital or within 30 days of discharge to the number of deaths 
expected given the characteristics of patients. The expected deaths are estimated through a logistic 
regression controlling for differences in patient case-mix. We also use risk-adjusted mortality rates 
for two emergency conditions (hip fracture and stroke), and risk-adjusted emergency readmissions 
for all conditions. These three indicators are calculated through an indirect standardisation 
methodology that multiplies the ratio between observed and expected events (deaths or 
readmissions) by the national rate of patients. The expected events are in this case the product 
between the number of patients for a provider and the national rate of patients for each 
risk-adjustment category (e.g. gender-age combination) summed over all categories. 
We use risk-adjusted average health change for elective hip replacement patients derived from 
PROMs (patient reported outcome measures) data. On the basis of the EQ-5D questionnaire 
(Brooks, 1996, Brooks et al., 2005), the change in a patient’s health is calculated as difference 
between the self-assessed health status of elective patients before and six months after their 
surgery. Clinical quality indicators and PROMs are available from the health and social care 
information centre (HSCIC).33 
We use three patient satisfaction indicators for overall experience, hospital cleanliness, and 
involvement in treatment decisions. Patients were asked to rate their hospital experience on a scale 
between 0 and 100, whereas 0 indicates extreme dissatisfaction and 100 complete satisfaction. The 
indicators are obtained by averaging the patient rates across hospitals and they are risk-adjusted 
                                                 
transparent methodology (Department of Health, 2014) and uses public data firstly released in January 2011. 
33 The SHMI is adjusted for gender, age, admission method, year index, Charlson comorbidity index, and diagnosis. 
Hip fracture and stroke mortality are adjusted for gender and age. The emergency readmission rate is adjusted for 
gender, age, admission method, diagnosis, and procedure. The health change after hip replacement is adjusted for 
patient characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnics), initial health status, self-assessed health status, economic 
deprivation, comorbidity, procedure, and post-operative length of stay. 
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using patients’ gender, age, ethnic group, and admission method (elective or emergency). They 
are available from the annual NHS Inpatient Surveys conducted for the Care Quality Commission. 
3.4.2 Efficiency indicators 
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of occupied to available hospital beds (e.g. Zuckerman et al., 
1994). We measure the rate of cancelled elective operations as the ratio of the number of cancelled 
elective operations for non-clinical reasons to the number of elective admissions (Rumbold et al., 
2015). The reference cost index (RCI) compares a hospital’s total costs with the national average 
total costs for the same HRG groups. A RCI greater than 100 indicates higher than average costs. 
We also use the RCI for elective and non-elective activity, and for hip replacement. 
3.4.3 Control variables 
Our control variables include demand and supply shifters. Demand shifters comprise: demographic 
variables such as population density and proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, which we 
calculate using annual mid-year population estimates; socioeconomic measures: proportion of 
individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, and proportion 
of owner occupier households; and a measure of population health: proportion of individuals in 
good or very good health. Socioeconomic and health measures are computed using 2011 Census 
data for all small areas within a 15 km radius.34 
Supply shifters include: the number of managers, junior doctors in training as a proportion of 
total clinical staff, consultants as a proportion of total clinical staff, and the number of beds.35 
Junior doctors in training are qualified doctors under postgraduate training at the start of their 
medical career. Consultants lead teams of lower grade doctors and are primarily responsible for 
patients. Increasing the proportion of experienced doctors is likely to improve patient outcomes 
                                                 
34 These areas (Lower Layer Super Output Areas) have on average 1,500 inhabitants and a minimum of 1,000. 
35 The total clinical staff is the total number of doctors, nurses, and allied professionals (e.g. therapists, healthcare 
scientists, technicians). 
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and possibly efficiency.36 Information on hospital staff is collected from the HSCIC, whilst NHS 
statistics provide the number of beds.37 Finally, we control for type of hospital: foundation trust, 
teaching hospital, and specialist hospital. 
3.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 has descriptive statistics. The number of hospital trusts varies between 106 (for hip 
fracture mortality rate) and 142 (for emergency readmission rate) across indicators. The sample 
size for each indicator is determined by the number of hospitals with at least one rival, and is 
constant over time because we use a balanced panel. Hospitals with no providers within a radius 
of 30 km (i.e. monopolists) are dropped because, by construction, they do not compete. In the case 
of the sample for overall patient satisfaction, 13% of hospitals are monopolists, 23% are exposed 
to low competition with one or two rivals, 38% are located in areas with three to nine rivals, and 
26% have more than nine rivals (up to a maximum of 25 rivals). 
The SHMI and the RCIs are on average 100 by construction. On average, patients undergoing 
hip replacement have an average health gain of 0.413 HRQoL and 79% of all patients report high 
overall satisfaction. 
The summary statistics for the explanatory variables are for the overall patient satisfaction 
hospital sample. Amongst the demand shifters, for example, 15.7% of individuals are over 65 years 
old. 83 hospitals (62.9%) are foundation trusts, 24 (18.4%) are teaching, and 14 (10.6%) are 
specialist. 
Since hospital catchment areas overlap by construction for hospitals with at least one rival, a 
hospital’s demand shifters are always strongly (above 80%) correlated with its rivals’. In contrast, 
                                                 
36 Siciliani and Martin (2007) show that more consultants are associated with lower waiting times for elective care. 
37 Data on hospital staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. The number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors 
in training, and the proportion of consultants are therefore omitted in the regressions for the emergency readmission 
rate to allow comparability between cross-sectional and panel models. 
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supply shifters have more variations across rivals. 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.2 has the results of the global Moran’s I test for overall spatial correlation of the quality 
and efficiency indicators.38 Spatial correlation is significant (at 5% level) and positive for two 
clinical indicators (SHMI and emergency readmissions) and two patient-reported indicators 
(patient satisfaction on overall experience and hospital cleanliness). Its magnitude varies between 
moderate (0.150 for overall patient satisfaction in 2012/13) and high (0.528 for SHMI in 2012/13). 
All four cost indicators have a significant and positive spatial correlation ranging between 0.150 
(for RCI for hip replacement in 2011/12) and 0.483 (for RCI in 2013/14).39 
3.5.1 Regression results 
Table 3.3 reports the estimated spatial lag coefficient ( ˆ ) from the ML models for each quality 
and efficiency indicator after controlling for demand shifters, supply shifters, and type of hospital 
(full results with coefficients on the covariates are in Appendix Table A3.3 and Table A3.4). In 
the cross-sectional models, SHMI has positive and statistically significant spatial lag for two years. 
10% lower SHMI (higher quality) in rival hospitals increases the hospital’s SHMI by 2.9% in 
2010/11 and 2% in 2011/12. For other quality and efficiency indicators, we obtain a statistically 
insignificant or weakly significant (at 10% level) estimated spatial lag with a few exceptions 
(stroke mortality rate in 2013/14 and non-elective RCI in 2010/11).40 Overall, there is weak 
statistical evidence of spatial correlation in cross-sectional models. 
                                                 
38 The global Moran’s I test calculates the overall degree of spatial association between observations (Anselin, 2013). 
It differs from the local Moran’s I test, which provides a measure of spatial clustering for each observation (Anselin, 
1995). 
39 The local Moran’s I test on quality and efficiency indicators in 2010/11 (available upon request) has some evidence 
of spatial correlations for London hospitals. Other hospitals not located in London, however, also exhibit a positive 
and significant local spatial correlation. The majority of hospitals show an insignificant local spatial correlation. 
40 We also test the robustness of our results for bed occupancy rate and the RCI to risk-adjustment by controlling for 
proportion of male patients, patient age, and proportion of emergency admissions in equation (3.7) and (3.10). The 
results (available upon request) remain similar to those reported in Table 3.3. 
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Unlike supply shifters and hospital type dummies, demand shifters play a major role in 
generating cross-sectional spatial correlation. Rival hospitals are indeed close neighbours sharing 
similar population characteristics. 
Table 3.3 also has estimates of the spatial lag coefficient after controlling for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity with FE and RE panel data models. There is a positive statistically 
significant spatial lag for two of the quality measures (0.172 for SHMI and 0.110 for overall patient 
satisfaction) and none of the efficiency models have statistically significant spatial lags.41 In sum, 
the cross-sectional and panel ML estimates do not suggest that hospital quality or efficiency 
generally depends on rivals’ quality or efficiency. 
3.5.2 Robustness and sensitivity analysis 
We also estimate the effect of the spatial lag WY  in SDM models with spatially lagged 
covariates and SAC models which allow for spatial correlation in the error term. The SDM results 
in Table 3.4 are broadly similar to those in Table 3.3. Once we allow for possible contextual effects 
with spatially lagged covariates the only hospital outcome variable which is correlated with rival 
outcomes is SHMI. When we instead allow possible correlated effects with the SAC specification 
(Table 3.5) we again find that SHMI is the only quality indicator spatially correlated with rivals. 
However, two of the six efficiency measures (cancelled elective procedures, elective reference 
cost index) are negatively correlated with those of rivals. 
Likelihood ratio tests (reported in the Appendix Table A3.5) suggest that adding the spatial 
lags of covariates (the SDM specification) only improves model fit for overall patient satisfaction 
and the rate of cancelled elective operations. The SAC model only improves the fit in the case of 
cancelled elective operations. Thus, overall, allowing for contextual or correlated effects with 
                                                 
41 Results for cross-sectional and panel models also mirror the global Moran’s I test on the residuals. Residuals are 
obtained from a linear regression, estimated by OLS, including all controls except the spatial lag of the dependent 
variable. Results are available on request. 
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SDM or SAC models does not change the results from the simpler specification.42 
We also test whether a hospital’s quality (efficiency) responds to rivals’ efficiency (quality) 
by adding spatial lags of efficiency (quality) to the baseline model.43 Results in Table 3.6 are 
similar to those in Table 3.3 in respect of the effect of rivals’ quality (efficiency) on hospital quality 
(efficiency). In addition, and in line with our theoretical predictions, we do not generally observe 
an effect of rivals’ efficiency on a hospital’s quality (Appendix Table A3.6). Our theory model 
does however imply that rivals’ quality could affect hospital efficiency and we find some weak 
evidence for this (Appendix Table A3.7). For instance, higher rivals’ quality, as measured by the 
SHMI, is significantly associated with better efficiency, as measured by the non-elective RCI, in 
2010/11, 2011/12, and 2012/13. However, this association is only weakly significant (at 10% 
level) in 2013/14 and disappears in the panel model. 
3.5.3 IV results 
Table 3.7 has the results from 2SLS cross-sectional models instrumenting the spatial lags of quality 
or efficiency with their temporal spatial lags WYt-2 or WYt-3. The instruments appear relevant in 
that they have first stage F statistics greater than 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The IV estimates 
also suggest little evidence of strategic interactions across hospitals in quality or efficiency: the 
spatial lag is significant at 5% level for only the SHMI in 2012-13 and the emergency readmissions 
in 2013-14. 
The results in our study are compatible with those reported in Gravelle et al. (2014b), who 
analyse sixteen quality indicators for English hospitals in 2009/10 through a spatial lag model 
estimated by ML. The two studies have five indicators in common: three mortality indicators 
                                                 
42 We also find that expanding the catchment areas to 60 km or 90 km from 30 km does not change the results of the 
baseline models reported in Table 3.3. Results are available on request. 
43 We use rivals’ bed occupancy rate and reference cost index as measures of rivals’ efficiency, and rivals’ SHMI and 
overall patient satisfaction as measures of rivals’ quality. 
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(overall mortality, hip fracture and stroke mortality) and two patient satisfaction indicators 
(satisfaction with hospital cleanliness and decision involvement).44 Table 3.8 provides a direct 
comparison of the results. If we compare results from Gravelle et al. (2014b) in 2009/10 with ours 
in 2010/11 and 2011/12 (the two closest years), the spatial lag is significant for overall mortality 
and it is insignificant for hip fracture mortality in both studies. The stroke mortality spatial lag is 
weakly significant in Gravelle et al. (2014b) and insignificant in our study. The results for the 
patient satisfaction indicators differ. They are significant or weakly significant in Gravelle et al. 
(2014b) but insignificant in our model. The differences may be due to the different sample years 
and, in the case of satisfaction with decision involvement, to the inclusion of additional demand 
shifters.45 
3.6 Conclusions 
We investigated whether a hospital’s quality or efficiency responds to an increase in quality or 
efficiency of its rivals. We test for unconditional spatial correlation using the global Moran’s I test 
and find strong evidence of positive spatial correlation for four of the eight quality and four of the 
six efficiency indicators. But when we estimate ML spatial cross-sectional models that include 
covariates potentially affecting hospital demand and costs, we no longer observe statistically 
significant spatial dependence for most indicators. Only for overall hospital mortality there is 
significant correlation with rivals’ quality. Similarly, we observe little evidence of spatial 
dependence, except for overall mortality, after controlling for unobserved time-invariant hospital 
heterogeneity in ML spatial panel models. Finally, after instrumenting the spatial lags of quality 
                                                 
44 Gravelle et al. (2014b) explore the spatial dependence for other indicators not included in this study. Amongst these, 
they find a positive and significant spatial correlation for hip replacement readmissions and patient satisfaction on 
trust in the doctors. No (or weak) spatial dependence is instead observed for mortality from high and low risk 
conditions, deaths after surgery, hip replacement and stroke readmissions, hip and knee revisions, operations within 
two days from hip fracture, and redo rates for prostate resection. 
45 The additional demand shifters are: proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed 
or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion owner occupier households, and proportion 
of individuals in good or very good health. 
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and efficiency by their temporal lags, we again find little evidence of spatial dependence. Hospital 
quality (efficiency), therefore, does not appear to respond to the quality (efficiency) of 
neighbouring hospitals. 
In conclusion, our empirical analysis suggests the absence of hospital spillovers in quality and 
efficiency. The results are in line with our theoretical model, which shows that efficiencies are 
strategic independent. The model also implies that whether qualities are strategic complements or 
substitutes is in principle indeterminate. A hospital whose rivals have higher quality will, ceteris 
paribus, have lower demand and this may both reduce the marginal cost of providing quality but 
also weaken incentives to contain costs therefore reducing the price mark-up and the incentive to 
provide quality. These two effects may cancel out leaving quality unaffected by rivals’ quality. 
The lack of hospital strategic interaction on quality is not incompatible with the recent 
empirical literature (reviewed in section 3.1.1) which shows that areas with less concentrated 
hospital market structure (more competition) increases quality in England (Cooper et al., 2011, 
Gaynor et al., 2013, Bloom et al., 2015). For example, our model suggests that if the marginal cost 
of treatment is constant, then qualities are strategic independent. But in this scenario it is still the 
case that a market structure with a larger number of rivals increases the demand responsiveness 
and therefore the marginal revenue from an increase in quality (so that equilibrium quality 
increases in the number of providers). 
These findings have policy implications. They suggest that policy interventions incentivising 
quality or efficiency at local level will not generate positive (or negative) spillovers to other 
hospitals. A local policy intervention, e.g. a Care Commissioning Group which introduces a pay 
for performance scheme in a hospital will change quality in that hospital but will not increase the 
quality in other nearby hospitals. Similarly, the adoption of a new technology which increases 
quality in one hospital will not necessarily spread out to other hospitals. In turn, this implies that 
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there may be scope for policymakers to develop policies which encourage cooperation across 
hospitals. For example, in France a new policy tool was introduced in 2016 (Groupement 
Hospitalier de Territoire) to foster cooperation of public hospitals under which each hospital has 
to join a group associated with a teaching hospital, and can share activity, equipment, medical 
teams and a joint information system (Choné, 2017, Siciliani et al., 2017). 
The results have also implications for antitrust policies. Brekke et al. (2016) for example 
suggest that if two hospitals merge they will reduce quality and costs, and non-merging rival 
hospitals might also reduce quality if quality is a strategic complements. Our study suggests that 
hospital mergers will not induce other non-merging hospitals also to reduce quality or costs. Policy 
makers can therefore concentrate on evaluating just the immediate effects of a potential merger on 
the merging hospitals. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1 – Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs Trusts Monop Mean 
Std. dev. 
Min Max 
Ov Betw With 
Quality indicator                   
     Clinical                   
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 476 119 20 99.9 10.0 9.5 3.5 53.9 124.8 
Hip fracture mortality rate (%) 424 106 19 7.2 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.4 14.6 
Stroke mortality rate (%) 444 111 20 17.4 3.2 2.4 2.2 9.8 32.7 
Emergency readmission rate (%) 568 142 20 11.1 1.4 1.3 0.6 5.1 17.2 
     Patient reported                   
Average health change after hip replacement 428 107 19 0.413 0.033 0.022 0.025 0.264 0.538 
Overall patient satisfaction 528 132 19 78.8 3.9 3.5 1.8 67.3 90.4 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 528 132 19 88.1 3.3 3.0 1.3 77.3 96.8 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 528 132 19 72.0 3.9 3.4 2.0 61.8 85.4 
Efficiency indicator                   
Bed occupancy rate (%) 536 134 18 87.0 6.5 5.7 3.0 58.3 98.7 
Rate of cancelled elective operation (%) 536 134 17 0.81 0.37 0.31 0.19 0.02 2.41 
Reference cost index 560 140 18 100.6 10.8 10.2 3.5 81.1 148.2 
Elective reference cost index 560 140 18 100.8 15.5 13.6 7.4 62.7 167.7 
Non-elective reference cost index 560 140 18 102.4 17.9 16.0 8.1 70.4 213.1 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 508 127 18 99.6 24.6 20.4 13.9 37.8 237.1 
     Control variable                   
     Demand shifter                   
Population density (1,000 indv/km2)       1.808 2.032 2.037 0.041 0.124 7.859 
Proportion of individuals aged 65 and over (%)       15.7 3.1 3.1 0.6 9.2 25.2 
Proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job (%)       70.0 2.9 2.9 0.0 63.9 76.7 
Proportion of individuals with a degree (%)       18.4 7.9 7.9 0.0 7.4 35.9 
Proportion of owner occupier households (%)       61.6 8.9 9.0 0.0 40.0 77.6 
Proportion of individuals in good or very good health (%)       81.5 2.9 2.9 0.0 75.2 86.8 
     Supply shifter                   
Number of managers (100)       0.66 0.44 0.43 0.11 0.04 3.59 
Proportion of junior doctors in training (%)       2.6 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.0 6.7 
Proportion of consultants (%)       6.3 1.1 1.0 0.4 2.2 11.7 
Number of beds (1,000)       0.631 0.342 0.340 0.042 0.014 2.025 
     Hospital type                   
Foundation trust       0.629 0.484 0.477 0.087 0 1 
Teaching hospital       0.184 0.388 0.387 0.038 0 1 
Specialist hospital       0.106 0.308 0.387 0.038 0 1 
Obs=total number of observations, Trusts=number of non-monopolist hospital trusts, Monop=number of monopolists, Ov=overall, 
Betw=between, With=within 
Descriptive statistics refer to the sample of providers with at least one rival. 
Descriptive statistics on control variables are calculated on the overall patient satisfaction's sample. 
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Table 3.2 – Global Moran’s I test for spatial correlation. 
Indicator 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 All years 
Quality           
     Clinical           
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.516 0.460 0.528 0.507 0.487 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
0.160 0.134 -0.013 0.090 0.081 
(0.040)** (0.081)* (0.968)  (0.230)  (0.000)*** 
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.155 0.126 -0.073 -0.078 -0.040 
(0.067)* (0.079)* (0.421)  (0.387)  (0.060)* 
Emergency readmission rate 
0.163 0.235     0.165 
(0.009)*** (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
     Patient reported           
Average health change after hip replacement 
0.053 0.089 0.037 -0.030 0.041 
(0.438)  (0.228)  (0.568)  (0.806)  (0.035)** 
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.210 0.202 0.150 0.116 0.158 
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.026)** (0.080)* (0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
0.154 0.128 0.160 0.208 0.164 
(0.022)** (0.056)* (0.018)** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.093 0.105 0.031 0.116 0.083 
(0.156)  (0.113)  (0.587)  (0.080)* (0.000)*** 
Efficiency           
Bed occupancy rate 
0.069 0.040 -0.098 0.009 0.004 
(0.277) (0.502) (0.195) (0.813) (0.720) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.155 -0.050 0.088 0.046 0.053 
(0.019)** (0.546) (0.172) (0.444) (0.002)*** 
Reference cost index 
0.440 0.425 0.426 0.483 0.439 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Elective reference cost index 
0.226 0.230 0.293 0.337 0.272 
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-elective reference cost index 
0.272 0.341 0.273 0.209 0.281 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
0.189 0.150 0.196 0.260 0.201 
(0.006)*** (0.025)** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Correlations computed with an inverse distance weight matrix of 30 km catchment area. Data on the emergency 
readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The statistic in year 2012/13 and 2013/14 is therefore omitted. 
The statistic for all years is obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. 
p-values (in parentheses) are calculated assuming a normal distribution of the indicator 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3.3 – Spatial lag coefficient. 
Indicator 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.285 0.203 0.108 0.145 0.172 0.184 
(0.002)*** (0.044)** (0.278)  (0.194)  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
-0.025 0.119 -0.179 -0.156 -0.007 0.002C 
(0.831)  (0.297)  (0.116)  (0.184)  (0.896)  (0.976)  
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.172 -0.171 -0.174 -0.272 -0.056 -0.059 
(0.117)  (0.136)  (0.130)  (0.025)** (0.307)  (0.299)  
Emergency readmission rate 
0.070 0.137     0.100 0.130 
(0.483)  (0.140)      (0.055)* (0.010)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
0.048 -0.029 -0.199 -0.163 -0.044 -0.024C 
(0.685)  (0.810)  (0.097)* (0.124)  (0.456)  (0.682)  
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.100 0.095 0.048 0.105 0.110 0.122 
(0.178)  (0.190)  (0.534)  (0.185)  (0.034)** (0.005)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
-0.012 0.000 -0.061 0.086 -0.063 -0.023 
(0.898)  (0.998)  (0.497)  (0.313)  (0.261)  (0.647)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.024 0.048 -0.073 0.055 -0.023 0.016 
(0.778)  (0.561)  (0.398)  (0.543)  (0.668)  (0.740)  
Efficiency             
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.008 -0.015 -0.173 -0.079 -0.031 -0.023C 
(0.932)  (0.887)  (0.073)* (0.442)  (0.559)  (0.655)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.068 -0.157 0.032 -0.008 0.053 0.044C 
(0.476)  (0.151)  (0.749)  (0.934)  (0.289)  (0.380)  
Reference cost index 
-0.087 -0.079 -0.067 0.003 0.007 0.018 
(0.378)  (0.412)  (0.513)  (0.980)  (0.900)  (0.732)  
Elective reference cost index 
-0.003 -0.094 -0.051 -0.030 -0.039 -0.039C 
(0.973)  (0.323)  (0.612)  (0.776)  (0.447)  (0.437)  
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.211 -0.108 -0.168 -0.121 -0.072 -0.060 
(0.037)** (0.248)  (0.092)* (0.287)  (0.185)  (0.251)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
-0.054 -0.117 0.067 0.085 -0.041 -0.021 
(0.626)  (0.332)  (0.532)  (0.448)  (0.474)  (0.707)  
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, 
proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model also includes 
year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number 
of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3.4 – Spatial lag coefficient with Spatial Durbin Model. 
Indicator 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.201 0.139 0.053 0.143 0.152 0.172 
(0.063)* (0.237)  (0.641)  (0.247)  (0.004)*** (0.001)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
-0.073 0.045 -0.249 -0.197 -0.010 -0.009C 
(0.544)  (0.707)  (0.027)** (0.103)  (0.860)  (0.878)  
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.210 -0.181 -0.242 -0.246 -0.078 -0.056C 
(0.074)* (0.127)  (0.035)** (0.058)* (0.170)  (0.326)  
Emergency readmission rate 
-0.026 0.030     0.095 0.118 
(0.835)  (0.781)      (0.070)* (0.025)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
0.056 -0.062 -0.233 -0.264 -0.048 -0.031C 
(0.639)  (0.633)  (0.076)* (0.024)** (0.422)  (0.599)  
Overall patient satisfaction 
-0.137 -0.122 -0.096 0.012 0.073 0.085 
(0.171)  (0.265)  (0.380)  (0.914)  (0.160)  (0.102)  
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
-0.076 -0.088 -0.137 -0.014 -0.060 -0.050C 
(0.507)  (0.438)  (0.240)  (0.906)  (0.293)  (0.371)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
-0.005 -0.052 -0.204 -0.084 -0.039 -0.019 
(0.959)  (0.629)  (0.061)* (0.454)  (0.473)  (0.725)  
Efficiency             
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.058 -0.050 -0.115 -0.123 -0.036 -0.023C 
(0.600)  (0.674)  (0.300)  (0.265)  (0.508)  (0.679)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.052 -0.209 -0.130 -0.076 0.030 0.041 
(0.596)  (0.061)* (0.246)  (0.487)  (0.553)  (0.415)  
Reference cost index 
-0.174 -0.153 -0.104 -0.091 -0.004 0.002 
(0.118)  (0.182)  (0.358)  (0.434)  (0.934)  (0.968)  
Elective reference cost index 
0.018 -0.105 -0.095 -0.161 -0.038 -0.040C 
(0.870)  (0.314)  (0.396)  (0.171)  (0.450)  (0.447)  
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.283 -0.218 -0.268 -0.194 -0.076 -0.089 
(0.009)*** (0.050)* (0.012)** (0.101)  (0.160)  (0.104)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
-0.199 -0.191 0.056 0.014 -0.058 -0.048 
(0.092)* (0.110)  (0.636)  (0.909)  (0.288)  (0.388)  
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, 
proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The Spatial Durbin Model 
includes the spatial lag of all regressors. The panel model also includes year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number 
of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3.5 – Spatial lag coefficient with spatially correlated disturbances (SAC model). 
Indicator 
Spatial 
lag 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE 
Quality            
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
ρ 0.331** 0.108 0.240 0.085 0.345*** 
λ -0.080 0.154 -0.198 0.105 -0.204 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
ρ 0.133 0.045 0.193 0.239 -0.298* 
λ -0.215 0.095 -0.450** -0.429** 0.275* 
Stroke mortality rate 
ρ 0.099 -0.063 -0.293 -0.243 -0.009 
λ -0.341 -0.132 0.145 -0.047 -0.051 
Emergency readmission rate 
ρ 0.160 0.360***     0.051 
λ -0.152 -0.348**     0.052 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
ρ -0.104 -0.001 -0.135 -0.017 0.012 
λ 0.193 -0.044 -0.093 -0.208 -0.063 
Overall patient satisfaction 
ρ 0.224*** 0.117 0.097 0.033 0.199 
λ -0.342** -0.082 -0.107 0.142 -0.100 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
ρ -0.016 0.051 0.005 0.140 -0.027 
λ 0.007 -0.093 -0.124 -0.095 -0.039 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
ρ -0.089 0.025 0.056 0.102 -0.093 
λ 0.189 0.043 -0.202 -0.080 0.071 
Efficiency            
Bed occupancy rate 
ρ 0.348** 0.006 -0.410*** -0.076 0.059 
λ -0.417** -0.030 0.295* -0.004 -0.099 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
ρ 0.549*** -0.013 0.418*** 0.389*** -0.474*** 
λ -0.570*** -0.170 -0.510*** -0.507*** 0.491*** 
Reference cost index 
ρ 0.043 0.042 0.012 0.101 0.017 
λ -0.219 -0.225 -0.124 -0.166 -0.012 
Elective reference cost index 
ρ -0.215 0.086 0.083 0.107 -0.374*** 
λ 0.261 -0.221 -0.192 -0.223 0.336*** 
Non-elective reference cost index 
ρ 0.002 0.093 0.055 -0.013 -0.171 
λ -0.304* -0.341** -0.315* -0.175 0.114 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
ρ 0.122 -0.032 0.048 0.150 -0.066 
λ -0.267 -0.117 0.038 -0.085 -0.001 
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, 
proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The panel model also includes 
year dummies. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of 
specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number 
of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
The p-value is omitted. *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3.6 – Spatial lag coefficient with additional spatial lags of quality or efficiency. 
Indicator 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality             
     Clinical             
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.212 0.159 0.098 0.156 0.170 0.181 
(0.043)** (0.130)  (0.328)  (0.164)  (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
0.016 0.094 -0.199 -0.205 -0.040 -0.021C 
(0.891)  (0.403)  (0.085)* (0.083)* (0.468)  (0.710)  
Stroke mortality rate 
-0.156 -0.176 -0.189 -0.305 -0.060 -0.057C 
(0.156)  (0.132)  (0.097)* (0.013)** (0.279)  (0.316)  
Emergency readmission rate 
0.091 0.092     0.065 0.114 
(0.327)  (0.351)      (0.233)  (0.028)** 
     Patient reported             
Average health change after hip replacement 
-0.006 -0.064 -0.157 -0.195 -0.039 -0.035C 
(0.958)  (0.606)  (0.207)  (0.082)* (0.505)  (0.557)  
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.047 0.061 0.003 0.084 0.084 0.092 
(0.568)  (0.460)  (0.971)  (0.349)  (0.113)  (0.052)* 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
-0.016 -0.054 -0.082 0.044 -0.069 -0.045 
(0.873)  (0.565)  (0.371)  (0.624)  (0.218)  (0.382)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.035 0.075 -0.130 0.029 -0.032 -0.001 
(0.719)  (0.405)  (0.163)  (0.761)  (0.552)  (0.986)  
Efficiency             
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.054 -0.114 -0.097 0.049 -0.090 -0.053C 
(0.619)  (0.333)  (0.401)  (0.641)  (0.136)  (0.367)  
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.084 -0.024 0.125 0.040 0.018 0.050 
(0.424)  (0.839)  (0.246)  (0.713)  (0.736)  (0.353)  
Reference cost index 
0.016 0.034 0.030 -0.049 0.046 0.059 
(0.886)  (0.757)  (0.787)  (0.682)  (0.430)  (0.297)  
Elective reference cost index 
0.016 0.034 0.030 -0.049 0.046 0.059 
(0.886)  (0.757)  (0.787)  (0.682)  (0.430)  (0.297)  
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.064 -0.081 -0.145 -0.018 -0.076 0.025 
(0.572)  (0.468)  (0.189)  (0.884)  (0.179)  (0.647)  
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
-0.122 -0.187 -0.012 0.068 -0.107 -0.070 
(0.287)  (0.092)* (0.919)  (0.555)  (0.058)* (0.212)  
ML estimation. Each cross-sectional regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, 
proportion of individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good or very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in 
training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. The efficiency 
indicators added to the regressions for the quality indicators are bed occupancy rate and RCI. The quality indicators added to 
the regressions for the efficiency indicators are SHMI and overall patient satisfaction. The panel model also includes year 
dummies. 
In the regressions including SHMI, hip fracture and stroke mortality as dependent or independent variable, the specialist 
dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. Cross-sectional estimates in year 2012/13 and 
2013/14 are therefore omitted. Panel estimates are obtained using data from 2008/09 to 2011/12. In addition, data on hospital 
staff are available from 2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number 
of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the proportion of consultants. 
C = the RE estimator passes the Hausman test at 5% level, and it is therefore consistent and efficient. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3.7 – Spatial lag coefficient. IV estimates. 
Indicator 
WYt-2   WYt-3 
2012/13 2013/14   2013/14 
Quality         
     Clinical         
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator 
0.421 0.419   0.519 
(0.026)** (0.069)*   (0.090)* 
Hip fracture mortality rate 
-0.092 0.389   -0.035 
(0.820)  (0.189)    (0.939) 
Emergency readmission rate 
0.321 0.313   0.307 
(0.065)* (0.048)**   (0.087)* 
     Patient reported         
Overall patient satisfaction 
0.123 0.097   0.089 
(0.281)  (0.385)    (0.467) 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
0.034 0.126   0.155 
(0.799)  (0.276)    (0.218) 
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
0.068 0.196   0.266 
(0.654)  (0.162)    (0.081)* 
Efficiency         
Bed occupancy rate 
-0.042 0.095   0.0003 
(0.807)  (0.568)    (0.999) 
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
0.315 -0.226   -0.074 
(0.286)  (0.231)    (0.792) 
Reference cost index 
-0.124 -0.056   -0.110 
(0.526)  (0.727)    (0.518) 
Elective reference cost index 
0.116 0.069   0.027 
(0.758)  (0.771)    (0.920) 
Non-elective reference cost index 
-0.057 -0.175   -0.339 
(0.780)  (0.530)    (0.272) 
Reference cost index for hip replacement 
0.524 0.660   0.625 
(0.074)* (0.168)    (0.109)  
IV estimation. The first-stage F statistic for each specification and outcome indicator is reported in parenthesis 
following the same order of the table (WYt-2 in 2012/13; WYt-2 in 2013/14; WYt-3 in 2013/14): SHMI (94.49; 95.69; 
39.70), hip fracture mortality rate (16.58; 52.46; 14.30), emergency readmission rate (140.68; 168.39; 101.60), 
overall patient satisfaction (175.89; 261.03; 159.30), patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness (282.66; 467.54; 
234.30), patient satisfaction on decision involvement (100.42; 216.06; 145.80), bed occupancy rate (85.14; 135.99; 
103.92), rate of cancelled elective operations (30.46; 105.08; 35.54), reference cost index (87.65; 206.49; 164.61), 
elective reference cost index (16.29; 56.77; 50.91), non-elective reference cost index (60.16; 59.51; 42.62), reference 
cost index for hip replacement (44.49; 13.39; 31.14). 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of 
individuals employed or looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier 
households, proportion of individuals in good/very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors 
in training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the 
absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The estimate refers to the latest 
available years (2010/11 or 2011/12) and not to 2012/13 or 2013/14. 
For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, estimates are omitted because of the absence 
of a relevant instrument. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 3.8 – Comparison with results in Gravelle et al. (2014b). 
Indicator 
  GSS (2014)   Our study 
  2009/10   2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
Overall mortality 
(1) 
0.276   0.377 0.260 0.162 0.241 
(0.004)***   (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.106)  (0.027)** 
(2) 
0.234   0.314 0.214 0.105 0.173 
(0.019)**   (0.001)*** (0.036)** (0.304)  (0.119)  
Hip fracture mortality rate 
(1) 
0.028   0.118 0.103 -0.121 -0.105 
(0.807)    (0.286)  (0.374)  (0.283)  (0.370)  
(2) 
-0.066   -0.019 0.093 -0.218 -0.203 
(0.580)    (0.868)  (0.422)  (0.054)* (0.087)* 
Stroke mortality rate 
(1) 
0.179   -0.037 -0.172 -0.123 -0.291 
(0.100)*   (0.748)  (0.143)  (0.284)  (0.015)** 
(2) 
0.147   -0.127 -0.203 -0.163 -0.316 
(0.189)    (0.265)  (0.083)* (0.162)  (0.009)*** 
Patient satisfaction on hospital cleanliness 
(1) 
0.179   -0.003 -0.015 -0.060 0.045 
(0.070)*   (0.976)  (0.869)  (0.538)  (0.622)  
(2) 
0.171   -0.045 -0.030 -0.111 0.009 
(0.077)*   (0.633)  (0.740)  (0.248)  (0.918)  
Patient satisfaction on decision involvement 
(1) 
0.245   0.092 0.068 -0.022 0.060 
(0.012)**   (0.272)  (0.407)  (0.792)  (0.504)  
(2) 
0.167   0.005 -0.038 -0.087 -0.031 
(0.102)    (0.953)  (0.649)  (0.317)  (0.736)  
GSS (2014) = Gravelle at al. (2014b). Both GSS (2014) and our study's estimates are obtained by ML. While GGS (2014) use 
an inverse distance weight matrix with a 30 min travel distance threshold, we use a 30 km straight line distance threshold. 
Specification (1) controls for: number of rivals, teaching trusts, foundation trusts, specialist hospitals, number of patients, 
market forces factor, population density, London trusts. 
Specification (2) controls for all covariates in (1) and for: proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals 
employed and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion 
of individuals with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health. 
The specialist dummy is omitted if the quality indicator's sample does not include specialist hospitals, i.e. for all indicators 
included in Gravelle, Santos, and Siciliani (2014) and for SHMI, hip fracture and stroke mortality rate. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Chapter 4 – Does Hospital Competition Improve Efficiency? The 
Effect of the Patient Choice Reform in England 
Abstract 
We use the 2006 relaxation of constraints on patient choice of hospital in the English NHS to 
investigate the effect of hospital competition on dimensions of efficiency including indicators of 
resource management (admissions per bed, bed occupancy rate, proportion of day cases, cancelled 
elective operations, proportion of untouched meals) and costs (cleaning services costs, laundry and 
linen costs, reference cost index for overall and elective activity). We employ a quasi difference-
in-difference approach and estimate seemingly unrelated regressions and unconditional quantile 
regressions with data on hospital trusts from 2002/03 to 2010/11. Our findings suggest that 
increased competition had mixed effects on efficiency. An additional equivalent rival increased 
admissions per bed and the proportion of day cases by 1.1 and 3.8 percentage points, and reduced 
the proportion of untouched meals by 3.5 percentage points, but it also increased the number of 
cancelled elective operations by 2.6%. Unconditional quantile regression results indicate that 
hospitals with low efficiency, as measured by fewer admissions per bed and a smaller proportion 
of day cases, are more responsive to competition. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The efficiency of health care systems is a key goal for policy makers across OECD countries. 
Some of these, such as Australia, England, and the Nordic countries, pursue greater efficiency by 
stimulating hospital competition through policies that give individuals the right to choose among 
hospitals (Cookson and Dawson, 2012, Propper, 2012, Palangkaraya and Yong, 2013). 
In this paper, we use the 2006 English NHS relaxation of constraints on patient choice of 
hospital to investigate whether there was any effect of the exposure to greater competition on 
hospital efficiency. The aim of the reform was to induce hospitals to compete on quality and to 
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enhance efficiency. The theory suggests that, under a DRG-type payment system, patient choice 
may affect efficiency in different ways through its interaction with quality. Higher quality implies 
greater volumes of patients and, in turn, larger incentives to improve efficiency by containing costs 
to increase the profit margin on each extra patient (Ma, 1994). But making an additional effort to 
increase quality may reduce the cost-containment effort (Brekke et al., 2012). 
The previous empirical literature (reviewed briefly in section 1.2) focuses on unit costs and 
length of stay (e.g Cooper et al., 2012, Gaynor et al., 2013) measured at the aggregate level or for 
a specific procedure (hip and knee replacement). We provide a richer analysis by examining a 
wider range of efficiency dimensions. Hospitals may increase efficiency by treating more patients 
for a given number of beds. We therefore examine admissions per bed, bed occupancy, cancelled 
elective operations, and the proportion of day cases. Hospitals may also become more efficient via 
better management of amenities. We therefore examine the percentage of untouched meals, 
cleaning services costs and linen and laundry costs. Hospitals may also reduce unit costs which 
we measure through the reference cost index (RCI), which compares a hospital’s total costs with 
the national average total costs for the same mix of services and is used by the policy maker to 
assess hospital efficiency (Department of Health, 2014). 
We analyse samples of public hospital trusts from the financial year 2002/03 to 2010/11. As 
with studies such as Cooper et al. (2012) and Gaynor et al. (2013), we use the ‘Patient Choice’ 
reform as a natural experiment and use a quasi difference-in-difference approach. This empirical 
strategy exploits the variation in market structure facing different hospitals, under the plausible 
argument that hospitals in more competitive areas are more likely to change their behaviour after 
the relaxation of constraints on patient choice of provider. Unlike previous studies, we estimate 
the quasi difference-in-difference regressions for our nine efficiency indicators simultaneously 
through Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR; Zellner, 1962, 1963). SUR is supposed to 
improve the precision of the estimates, since we have a wide range of hospital efficiency outcomes, 
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which are potentially correlated. We also use the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 
approach suggested by Firpo et al. (2009) to investigate whether the effect of competition varies 
for more or less efficient hospitals. Competition is measured through the ‘equivalent’ number of 
rivals (Kessler and McClellan, 2000), which is calculated as the inverse of the predicted 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). 
Our findings suggest that competition has mixed effects on efficiency. Post Choice policy, one 
more equivalent rival increases efficiency as measured by admissions per bed by 1.1% and the 
proportion of day cases increases by 3.8 percentage points and decreases the proportion of 
untouched meals by 3.5 percentage points. But the number of cancelled elective operations 
increases by 2.6%.46 There are no statistically significant effects on the other five efficiency 
indicators (bed occupancy, cleaning services costs, laundry and linen costs, and RCI for all 
admissions and for elective admissions). We also find that SUR has generally better explanatory 
power than OLS and standard errors are smaller in most cases. The UQR results indicate that 
hospitals exhibiting low efficiency and facing greater competition may be more responsive to the 
Choice reform. For instance, one more equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 2.2% for 
hospitals with fewer admissions per bed (25th quantile), but there is no statistically significant 
effect for hospitals with more admissions per bed (e.g. 50th or 75th quantile). 
The next two sections briefly describe the related literature and the institutional background in 
the English NHS. Section 4.2 explains the econometric strategy. Section 4.3 describes the data, 
and Section 4.4 provides the results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.1.1 Related studies 
A number of empirical studies investigate the effect of competition on efficiency in the US 
                                                 
46 We analyse the log of admissions per bed and cancelled elective operations. The effect of market structure on these 
indicators is therefore expressed as a percentage change. Instead, proportion of day cases and untouched meals are 
studied in their natural units and the effect of market structure is interpreted in percentage points. 
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(Gaynor and Town, 2011). Early studies suggest that hospital competition leads to an inefficient 
use of resources under a retrospective payment system (e.g. Joskow, 1980, Robinson and Luft, 
1985).47 Later studies find evidence of lower hospital costs in more competitive areas after the 
introduction of prospective payment system and managed care (Zwanziger and Melnick, 1988, 
Bamezai et al., 1999).48 For example, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and Geppert 
(2005), find that hospital competition has a welfare-enhancing effect by reducing costs and 
increasing quality for patients who had a heart attack. 
For the UK, Söderlund et al. (1997) find no association between competition and unit cost after 
the introduction of the NHS internal market.49 Gaynor et al. (2013) focus on a more recent reform 
that aimed at stimulating competition among hospitals through Patient Choice (see section 1.2 for 
details on the reform). The authors implement a quasi difference-in-difference estimator and find 
that competition reduced length of stay but did not change expenditure per admission.50 Cooper et 
al. (2012) also exploit the Patient Choice reform and find that it reduced the pre-surgery length of 
stay of elective procedures such as hip and knee replacement, hernia repair, and arthroscopy more 
in competitive areas. By contrast, Bloom et al. (2015) use an IV strategy on a cross-section of 
hospitals in 2006 and find that competition increases average length of stay.51 
Our study contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we extend the analysis of length of 
stay and unit costs to a wider set of efficiency indicators. We include measures of resource 
                                                 
47 A retrospective payment system reimburses hospitals for the actual costs incurred for each patient.  
48 In 1982, hospitals in California were paid a fixed price for each patient treated, and new pro-competition laws 
allowed insurance companies to offer patients health care plans after negotiating the price with providers. 
49 The NHS internal market reform was introduced in 1991 and it stimulated competition by separating the roles of 
financier and supplier of health care services. Suppliers (hospitals trusts) had to compete to secure contracts, and 
therefore income, offered by the purchaser. The internal market was abolished some years later in 1997. 
50 Gaynor et al. (2013) study other aspect of hospital performance such as total number of admissions, total number 
and share of elective admissions, and total expenditure. They also investigate the effect of competition on quality as 
measured by heart attack and overall mortality. 
51 Most of the investigations on hospital competition focus on the US and the UK but recent studies explore hospital 
competition also in other countries. For example, Berta et al. (2016) examines the effect of hospital competition on 
quality in Italy and find no association using indicators such as mortality and readmission rates. 
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management such as admissions per bed, bed occupancy rate, cancelled operations, proportion of 
day cases and untouched meals, and cost indicators such as cleaning services costs and laundry 
and linen costs, and the RCI as an alternative indicator to unit costs. Second, we estimate 
simultaneously the regressions for our indicators by SUR to account for correlations across the 
error terms. Third, we test whether the effect of competition on efficiency varies at different 
quantiles of the efficiency distribution using the UQR estimator of Firpo et al. (2009). 
4.1.2 Institutional background 
The English National Health Service (NHS) provides healthcare which is universal, tax 
financed, and free at the point of use. The Department of Health distributes capitated funding to 
around 150 local health authorities, which use it to pay for secondary health care provided to NHS 
patients by public and private hospitals. Public hospitals are run by NHS Trusts or NHS 
Foundation Trusts, the latter having greater financial autonomy. Some NHS hospital trusts are 
teaching trusts providing research and teaching, and some are specialist trusts focusing on a limited 
range of conditions or client groups. Private hospitals are small, with no more than 50 beds, and 
overall provide about 6.5% of hospital beds (Boyle, 2011). They mostly focus on elective surgical 
procedures and, unlike public hospitals, they can refuse to treat highly severe patients (Mason et 
al., 2008). 
Hospitals are mainly funded through a prospective payment system, the National Tariff 
Payment System. This is based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), a patient classification 
system similar to the American Diagnosis-Related Group. HRGs are groups of patients who are 
homogeneous with respect to diagnoses, procedures, and some patient characteristics. A fixed 
tariff is calculated for each HRG group as its national cost averaged across providers, but with 
adjustments for individual hospitals to reflect exogenous variations in input prices and the higher 
costs of specialised care (Department of Health, 2013a). 
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Hospital competition has been encouraged by relaxing restrictions on patients’ choice of 
hospital for elective care. Before 2006, elective patients were mainly restricted to the set of 
hospitals in contract with their local health authority. In 2006, patients were given the right to be 
offered a choice of at least four hospitals for elective care. Since 2008, patients have been allowed 
to choose any qualified provider (Department of Health, 2009). Choice is facilitated through the 
website ‘NHS Choices’, which provides information on some aspects of hospital performance (e.g. 
mortality, waiting times). 
4.2 Methods 
To assess the impact of the Patient Choice reform on efficiency, we employ the following 
baseline model (Model I): 
 
2006-07kt k t kt t k kty M d X            (4.1) 
where ykt is an efficiency indicator for hospital k=1,…,K in year t=2002/03,…,2010/11; µ is the 
intercept;  
2005-06
2002-03
1
pre
k k ktt
M T M

   measures the average pre-reform market structure of 
hospital k, with Mkt being the market structure of hospital k in year t and Tk
pre the number of pre-
reform years for hospital k; dt≥2006/07 is a dummy equal to one from year 2006/07 onwards, when 
the policy was introduced; Xkt is a vector of hospital-level control variables (e.g. percentage of 
male patients, patient age); λt and αk are respectively year dummies to account for time trend (e.g. 
of technical progress) and hospital fixed effects to allow for time-invariant unobserved factors and 
εkt is an idiosyncratic error term. We use kM  instead of Mkt in equation (4.1) to avoid potential 
endogeneity due to, for example, low quality and efficiency of some hospitals affecting entry by 
rivals after the reform. 
Model I is a quasi difference-in-difference regression because it uses a variable with differing 
treatment intensity rather than a treatment or control group (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p. 175). 
The idea is that the Patient Choice policy affects to a greater extent areas with more providers (i.e. 
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more competitive areas) than areas with fewer providers (i.e. less competitive areas). The English 
NHS fits this empirical strategy because of the high geographical variation in the English hospital 
market structure.52 
The coefficient β in Model I is our difference-in-difference estimator. It indicates whether the 
effect of competition on efficiency changed after the reform. For example, β>0 implies that after 
the choice reform hospitals in more competitive areas experience a greater increase in the 
efficiency indicator compared to hospitals in less competitive areas. β is identified under the 
common trend assumption (i.e. efficiency in both more competitive and less competitive areas 
follow the same trend in the absence of the reform). 
We estimate Model I for nine efficiency indicators. These outcomes are likely to be influenced 
by common unobservable factors (e.g. unmeasured patient characteristics) and to respond to 
exogenous shocks (e.g. introduction of a new medical technology). As a result, the error terms 
across the nine regressions may be correlated. The single-equation OLS estimator neglects such 
correlations which, if accounted for, may allow more precise estimates. We, therefore, estimate 
Model I jointly for all the efficiency indicators via a SUR model.  
SUR and OLS are equivalent if there is no correlation between error terms (Zellner, 1962). 
Even when errors are correlated, SUR and OLS are equivalent if the covariates exhibit greater 
collinearity across regressions than within regressions. If covariate collinearity within regressions 
is greater than across regressions, SUR will still provide more efficient estimates (Baltagi, 2011, 
p. 245). This latter condition is likely to be met in our study because, although using mostly the 
same covariates across regressions, the inclusion of hospital dummies (i.e. the hospital fixed 
effects) may induce some collinearity within regressors, and also because of the heterogeneity of 
                                                 
52 For instance, hospitals in London generally compete with more than ten rivals within a radius of 30 km but some 
hospitals in the North East of England do not face any rival within the same radius. 
 99 
the different efficiency indicators we use.53 We estimate SUR by maximum likelihood and we 
cluster standard errors within hospitals to allow for the serial correlation of errors over time. We 
test the validity of SUR against OLS using a Breusch-Pagan (1979) test on the stacked error terms 
to verify the hypothesis of independent equations (i.e. no correlation between error terms). 
As in Kessler and McClellan (2000), we test whether the effect of the market structure on 
efficiency is non-linear using Model II: 
 2006-07kt k t kt t k kty Q d X            , (4.2) 
where Qk is a vector of three dummies constructed on the quartile of the pre-reform market 
structure (
kM ) distribution: a dummy equal to one for the second quartile (hospitals subject to low 
competition), one for the third quartile (high competition), and another for the fourth quartile (very 
high competition). The omitted dummy for the first quartile (hospitals subject to the lowest 
competition) is the reference category. 
We also estimate Model III that, differently from the previous models, controls for 
time-varying market structure: 
 2006-07kt kt t kt kt t k kty M d M X             . (4.3) 
The coefficient β in equation (4.3) has the same interpretation as in Model I, while δ captures the 
effect of competition in the pre-reform period. 
As an additional robustness check, we implement Model IV, a more flexible version of Model 
III, which allows β to vary in each period as follows: 
 kt t kt kt kt t k kty PM M X             , (4.4) 
where Pt is a vector of year dummies, excluding year 2005/06. This model provides information 
on the evolution of the effect of competition on efficiency in each pre- and post-reform year. We 
                                                 
53 Intuitively, by using a lot of different efficiency indicators, the conditional mean function of each indicator is likely 
to be affected differently by covariates, choice policy and hospital fixed-effects, thus reducing the potential of 
collinearity across regression on different outcomes. 
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expect a significant effect of competition on efficiency in the post-reform years and no effect in 
the pre-reform years. 
All the above models focus on the effect of competition on average efficiency. It may be 
argued that there is more scope for competition to affect efficiency when efficiency is low. In 
general, the effect of market structure on efficiency might vary (non-linearly) depending on the 
levels of the efficiency indicators. To investigate this, we implement in Model V the UQR 
approach suggested by Firpo et al. (2009) as follows: 
   2006-07kt k t kt t k ktR y M d X              , (4.5) 
where Rτ(ykt) captures the τth unconditional quantile of the efficiency indicator distribution.54 
Estimates from this approach have an interpretation similar to model I: βτ>0 indicates that, as a 
result of the choice policy, hospitals in the τth unconditional quantile of the efficiency indicator 
distribution and located in more competitive areas experience a greater increase in the efficiency 
indicator compared to similar hospitals located in less competitive areas.55 We focus on the 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th unconditional quantiles and we bootstrap clustered standard errors using 
1,000 replications.56 
                                                 
54More formally, Rτ(ykt) is the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) calculated as RIF(ykt;qτ)=qτ+(τ-1[ykt≤qτ])/fy(qτ), 
where qτ is the τth quantile of ykt, 1[ykt≤qτ] is a dummy equal to one when ykt is below qτ, and fy(qτ) is the estimated 
density function at qτ. The density function is estimated assuming a Gaussian kernel and using the optimal bandwidth 
that minimises the mean integrated squared error. 
55 Using UQRs to evaluate the effect of a change in policy provides several advantages compared to the alternative 
approach of conditional quantile regressions (CQR) introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). In CQRs, the 
covariates have the effect of redefining the quantiles of the dependent variable distribution (Borah and Basu, 2013): a 
hospital in the top of the efficiency indicator distribution may end up in the bottom of the conditional distribution. 
Hence, we cannot conclude whether explanatory variables have bigger or smaller effects on hospitals in particular 
quantiles. A further limitation of the conditional quantile approach concerns fixed effects, which must be treated as 
pure location shifters that remain constant across quantiles (e.g. Canay, 2011). This might be a strong assumption in 
empirical applications. In our case, for example, fixed effects are likely to capture unobserved case-mix, which needs 
to yield the same effect on the outcome for all hospitals, regardless of their conditional efficiency. 
56 We perform all estimations in Stata. We fit SUR through the command gsem. The unconditional quantile regression 
is implemented using xtrifreg (Borgen, 2016). 
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4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Efficiency indicators 
We have nine efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 2010/11.57 As a measure of resource 
management, we use the number of admissions per bed calculated with data on admissions from 
NHS Digital and on beds from the NHS statistics. Other indicators of resource management are 
bed occupancy rate and number of cancelled elective operations for non-clinical reasons from the 
NHS statistics, and proportion of day cases and proportion of untouched meals from the NHS 
Digital. We also use cost indicators including cleaning services costs and laundry and linen costs 
from the NHS Digital, and RCI and elective RCI which are available from the reference cost 
database.58  
4.3.2 Measure of hospital market structure 
We capture the market structure through the ‘equivalent’ number of rival hospitals, including 
both public and private providers. This is calculated as the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) based on hospitals’ predicted patient flows.59 Following Kessler and McClellan 
(2000), we calculate the HHI for hospital k as follows: 
  
2
k ko o ko oko o k
HHI S HHI S S     (4.6) 
where Sko is the predicted market share of hospital k’s patients living in neighbourhood o within 
30 km; and HHIo indicates the concentration of patients across neighbourhoods, which is 
calculated through the predicted share of patients living in neighbourhood o admitted to hospital k 
                                                 
57 Table A4.4 has the link to the website where each variable was collected. 
58 Cleaning services costs include all pay (e.g. salaries) and non-pay (e.g. equipment) costs for both in-house or 
contracted out cleaning services. Laundry and linen costs are defined in a similar way. 
59 To predict the patient flows, we estimate the following Poisson choice model for each year: 
   21 2 3| , exp,ko ko k o ko ko k oI distance distance distanceE L       z z L  , where Iko is the number of hospital k’s patients 
living in neighbourhood o, distanceko is the distance between neighbourhood o’s centroid and hospital k located within 
30 km, zk is a vector of hospital type dummies to control for public hospitals, foundation trusts, and teaching hospitals, 
and Lo is a vector of LSOA dummies. 
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(Sok).
60 The hospital HHI (HHIk) can be interpreted as a weighted average of the neighbourhood 
HHI (HHIo), which helps to identify each hospital’s market.61 The inverse of hospital HHI 
(HHIk
−1) represents therefore the number of rivals that would exist if patients were uniformly 
distributed across hospitals. The equivalent number of rivals is constructed using data from 
Hospital Episode Statistics (Gravelle et al., 2014a). 
4.3.3 Other control variables 
We include a number of control variables: the percentage of male patients, percentage of 
patients between 15 and 59, 60 and 74, and older than 74 years (the reference category is the age 
range between 0 and 14), and percentage of emergency admissions. We also use a dummy for 
Foundation Trusts. Information for these variables comes from the NHS Digital. In addition, we 
control for exogenous variation in input prices (e.g. nurses, buildings) through the market forces 
factor (MFF) index collected from the reference cost database. We also add the number of beds to 
the regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen 
costs. 
4.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics. The sample includes between 143 (laundry and linen 
costs) and 173 (RCI) hospitals observed on average for a period of almost 9 years. In each year, 
there are on average 110 admissions per bed. The bed occupancy rate is 86%. 30.7% of patients 
are on average admitted as day cases, and hospitals cancel on average 359 elective operations in a 
year. On average, 7.6% of meals served to patients remain untouched, the cleaning services and 
the laundry and linen costs are respectively £2,842 thousands and £807 thousands. The reference 
                                                 
60 The patient share Sok is the ratio between the number of hospital k’s patients living in neighbourhood o (Iko) and the 
number of patients living in neighbourhood o (Io), while Sko is computed dividing Iko by the number of hospital k’s 
patients (Ik). 
61 The neighbourhood is a small geographical area called LSOA (Lower Super Output Area), which includes on 
average 1,500 inhabitants but no less than 1,000. 
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cost indexes are 100 by construction: a RCI greater than 100 indicates that a hospital’s total costs 
are greater than the national average total costs for the same HRG groups.62 
Although all indicators are used to capture efficiency, we expect admissions per bed, bed 
occupancy rate, and proportion of day cases to be positively correlated with efficiency, while the 
others to be negatively correlated. Table A4.1 of the Appendix 4 shows simple pairwise 
correlations. For example, admissions per bed is positively correlated with bed occupancy rate and 
negatively correlated with the RCIs. Similarly, the bed occupancy rate is negatively correlated 
with the RCIs, and the proportion of day cases is negatively correlated with the laundry and linen 
costs. Correlations are generally low and mostly below 30%. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the trend in some efficiency indicators from 2002/03 to 2010/11.63 Over 
the whole period, we note a positive time trend in admissions per bed, cleaning services costs, and 
laundry and linen costs. A negative trend is instead observed for the percentage of untouched 
meals. Bed occupancy rate, rate of day cases, and cancelled elective operations have a positive 
trend only from or after 2006/07. Cancelled elective operations, however, decrease from 2009/10 
to 2010/11. 
Table 4.1 also shows descriptive statistics on covariates. There are on average 3.7 equivalent 
rivals. 44.1% of patients are male, 13.5% are between 0 and 14 years old, 44.4% are between 15 
and 59, 21% are between 60 and 74, and 20.8% are older than 74 years. 35.2% of patients are 
admitted in an emergency. Hospitals have on average 686 beds. 28.3% of trusts are Foundation 
Trusts, and the MFF is on average one by construction. 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.2 shows the results for Model I. The key coefficient indicates whether the effect of 
                                                 
62 Table A4.2 provides the unconditional quantiles of the efficiency indicators. 
63 We omit the trend of the RCIs because their annual average equals 100 by construction. 
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competition on efficiency changed after the policy. It is statistically significant at 5% level in the 
regression for admissions per bed, proportion of day cases, cancelled elective operations, and 
proportion of untouched meals. One more equivalent rival increases on average admissions per 
bed by 1.1%. Table A4.3 in the Appendix 4 suggests that this is due to competition reducing beds 
but having no effect on admissions.64 
Competition increases efficiency when measured by the proportion of day cases and untouched 
meals. An additional equivalent rival increases the proportion of day cases by 0.38 percentage 
points and reduces the proportion of untouched meals by 0.35 percentage points. In contrast, 
competition reduces efficiency when measured as cancelled elective operations: one more 
equivalent rival increases cancelled elective operations by 2.6%. 
Table 4.2 also displays the coefficients on control variables. For instance, the proportion of 
male patients is associated with a higher proportion of day cases (0.323). A one percentage point 
increase in patients between 60 and 74 years old is associated with more admissions per bed by 
1.2%. A higher proportion of emergency patients is associated with a lower proportion of day cases 
(-0.646). Foundation trusts are associated with greater inefficiency having on average fewer 
admissions per bed by 3% and a lower bed occupancy by one percentage point. The bottom of 
Table 4.2 reports the p-value for the Breusch-Pagan test, which indicates the presence of 
correlation among the error terms across regressions. This suggests that SUR may have better 
explanatory power than OLS thanks to its higher precision of the estimates (i.e. lower standard 
errors).65 
Table 4.3 has the key results for Model II, in which the policy break dummy is interacted with 
                                                 
64 Evidence on beds is weak in model I and III but stronger in model IV (Table A4.3). In Model I, an additional 
equivalent rival reduces beds by 0.5%, but this estimate is only significant at 10 % level. We observe higher statistical 
significance in model IV: an additional equivalent rival significantly reduces beds by 0.6% in 2007/08, 0.8% in 
2008/09, and 1.3% in 2010/11. 
65 The Breusch-Pagan test suggests that SUR is favoured also for Model II, III, and IV. 
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three dummies indicating whether a hospital is subject to low competition, high competition or 
very high competition, respectively. The reference category indicates hospitals subject to very low 
competition. The estimates suggest that the choice policy has a greater effect on efficiency for 
hospitals exposed to high or very high competition compared to hospitals exposed to very low 
competition. Admissions per bed decrease by 5.2% and the proportion of untouched meals reduces 
by 2.18 percentage points for hospitals exposed to very high competition. The proportion of day 
cases goes up by 1.09 and 2.1 percentage points for hospitals facing high competition and very 
high competition, while the RCI falls by 2.7 points for hospitals facing high competition. 
Table 4.4 illustrates the key results for Model III and IV. Model III controls for market 
structure varying over time. Compared to Model I, the key coefficient is unchanged for admissions 
per bed and proportion of day cases, but it is no longer significant at 5% level for cancelled elective 
operations and proportion of untouched meals. The association between competition and 
efficiency before the reform (δ) is never statistically significant at 5% level. The association 
between competition and efficiency after the reform (β+δ) is significant only for the admissions 
per bed: an additional equivalent rival increases admissions per bed by 1.5% (0.9%+0.6%) after 
the reform. 
Model IV analyses how the effect of competition on efficiency changes in every year before 
and after the policy implementation. Considering the proportion of day cases, for example, the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term is negative and insignificant in the pre-reform periods, 
and increasingly positive and significant in the post-reform periods. Such estimates clearly indicate 
a persistent effect of the reform on efficiency as captured by the proportion of day cases. 
Table 4.5 illustrates UQR results. They suggest that less efficient hospitals tend to respond 
more to competition. This is the case of efficiency outcomes as the admissions per bed, the 
percentage of day cases and, to a lesser extent, the percentage of untouched meals. For hospitals 
 106 
with fewer admissions per bed (25th quantile), an additional equivalent rival increases admissions 
per bed by 2.2%. Similarly, for hospitals with lower proportions of day cases (10th or 25th quantile), 
an additional equivalent rival increases such proportions by 0.91 or 0.4 percentage points. If 
hospitals have a high proportion of untouched meals (75th quantile), an additional equivalent rival 
decreases untouched meals by 0.43 percentage points, even though this result is only significant 
at 10% level. Finally, when hospitals have fewer cancelled elective operations (10th quantile), an 
additional equivalent rival leads to an increase in this indicator by 7.2%. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This study has investigated whether competition improves some dimensions of hospital efficiency 
in England using the exogenous variation generated by the Patient Choice reform and the 
geographical variation in the market structure. We find that greater competition induces hospitals 
to increase their efficiency by increasing admissions per bed and proportion of day cases, and by 
reducing the proportion of untouched meals. In contrast, hospitals appear less efficient in terms of 
cancelled elective operations. The effect of the choice reform is larger for hospitals facing more 
rivals. We also observe that less efficient hospitals generally respond more to competition. 
After the introduction of Patient Choice, hospitals may have varied their efficiency levels by 
spreading their fixed costs on a larger share of patients through an increase in admissions per bed 
and proportion of day cases. Our findings on admissions per bed are in line with the recent 
concerns about the reduction of beds in NHS hospitals (Hosken, 2016). Also the result on the 
proportion of day cases is largely coherent with the reduction in pre-surgery and overall length of 
stay on specific elective procedures found by Cooper et al. (2012). The authors highlight that “by 
2010, patients were 41.7% more likely to receive surgery on the day that they were admitted to the 
hospital than they were in 2002” (Cooper et al., 2012, p.17-18). Similarly, hospitals might have 
reduced their variable costs by, for example, reducing the proportion of untouched meals.  
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The improvements in such efficiency dimensions, however, may have brought hospitals close 
or over their full capacity levels, especially in the presence of understaffing of nurses and doctors 
(Bates, 2005). The increases in admissions per bed and proportion of day cases may have therefore 
caused a rise in the number of cancelled elective operations. Since public hospitals cannot refuse 
treatments for emergency patients, cancelling elective operations is the most likely mechanism 
that hospitals have to release pressure due to excess demand of overall hospital services (i.e. the 
sum of emergency and elective admissions). In addition, hospitals can increase waiting times in 
order to reduce excess demand. But such an alternative mechanism was not available to managers 
and doctors in the years following the Choice policy (i.e. 2006-2011) due to the waiting time 
reforms, which implied heavy penalties for hospitals with long waiting times (Propper et al., 2008).  
Cancelled elective operations may have increased also because of some distortions in the 
payment arrangements. Cookson et al. (2017b) show that providers were more likely to cancel 
elective operations until 2009/10 (our last but one analysed financial year). Hospitals could cancel 
operations and still receive a tariff until 2009/10 and, therefore, the authors suggest that this 
produced an incentive to cancel operations to increase revenues. Such behaviour may have been 
exacerbated once competition had been introduced in 2006. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Def Obs Trust Year Mean 
SD 
Min Max 
Overall Between Within 
Efficiency indicator                     
Admissions per bed E 1,498 171 8.76 110 31 25 18 38 319 
Bed occupancy rate (%) E 1,503 172 8.74 86.0 6.3 5.3 3.5 50.5 99.2 
Proportion of day cases (%) E 1,477 169 8.74 30.8 8.6 7.9 3.5 4.6 90.5 
Cancelled elective operations I 1,477 170 8.69 360 288 250 142 6 2426 
Proportion of untouched meals (%) I 1,382 160 8.64 7.6 5.4 3.7 4.0 0.0 49.0 
Cleaning services costs (£1,000) I 1,381 159 8.69 2,842 1,823 1,580 901 69 12,941 
Laundry and linen costs (£1,000) I 1,215 143 8.5 807 488 459 160 40 2,864 
Reference cost index I 1,516 173 8.76 100.8 12.9 11.5 5.8 66.0 195.8 
Elective reference cost index I 1,498 171 8.76 100.2 16.5 13.6 9.3 60.5 197.3 
Measure of market structure                     
Equivalent number of rivals (HHI-1) 3.7 2.5 2.4 0.7 1.0 13.6 
Control variable                     
Percentage of male patients (%) 44.1 4.8 4.7 0.9 14.8 65.3 
Percentage of patients between 0 and 14 years (%) 13.5 13.1 12.9 1.2 0.0 94.2 
Percentage of patients between 15 and 59 years (%) 44.4 8.0 7.8 1.6 5.8 74.3 
Percentage of patients between 60 and 74 years (%) 21.0 5.9 5.7 1.1 0.0 47.0 
Percentage of patients older than 74 years (%) 20.8 6.2 6.1 1.3 0.0 42.8 
Percentage of emergency admissions (%) 35.2 9.6 9.1 2.7 0.2 61.8 
Number of beds 686 382 374 65 31 2,523 
Foundation trust 0.287 0.453 0.301 0.339 0 1 
Market forces factor 1.003 0.074 0.074 0.014 0.886 1.323 
E=positive indicator of efficiency, I=negative indicator of efficiency. 
Descriptive statistics for competition measure and control variables are calculated on the admissions per bed's sample. 
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Table 4.2 – Competition and efficiency: Model I. 
Regressor 
Log of 
admissions 
per bed 
Bed 
occupancy 
rate 
Proportion 
of day cases 
Log of 
cancelled 
operations 
Proportion 
of 
untouched 
meals 
Log of 
cleaning 
services 
costs 
Log of 
laundry and 
linen costs 
Reference 
cost index 
Elective 
reference 
cost index 
Policy break 2006/07*Pre-reform HHI-1 
0.011 0.053 0.381 0.026 -0.347 0.0004 -0.005 -0.306 -0.516 
(0.004)** (0.120) (0.118)*** (0.013)** (0.172)** (0.007) (0.008) (0.275) (0.391) 
Proportion of male patients 
-0.001 -0.036 0.323 -0.033 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.053 0.108 
(0.004) (0.152) (0.147)** (0.017)* (0.242) (0.009) (0.009) (0.257) (0.417) 
Proportion of patients between 15 and 59 
0.018 -0.043 0.019 -0.017 -0.178 0.018 0.005 -0.509 -0.447 
(0.004)*** (0.143) (0.120) (0.014) (0.171) (0.010)* (0.007) (0.283)* (0.420) 
Proportion of patients between 60 and 74 
0.012 -0.185 1.085 0.011 -0.273 0.010 -0.003 -0.424 -0.855 
(0.006)** (0.205) (0.172)*** (0.021) (0.238) (0.011) (0.012) (0.361) (0.637) 
Proportion of patients beyond 74 
-0.002 0.120 -0.303 0.014 -0.098 0.006 0.021 -0.200 0.267 
(0.005) (0.172) (0.143)** (0.019) (0.244) (0.012) (0.010)** (0.309) (0.568) 
Proportion of emergency patients 
-0.007 -0.035 -0.646 -0.020 -0.106 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.336 
(0.002)*** (0.055) (0.056)*** (0.006)*** (0.069) (0.003) (0.003) (0.119) (0.178)* 
Log of beds 
      -0.013   0.088 0.318     
      (0.248)   (0.101) (0.080)***     
Foundation trust 
-0.030 -1.021 -0.505 0.079 -0.283 0.015 0.116 0.309 1.143 
(0.012)** (0.441)** (0.328) (0.054) (0.541) (0.024) (0.539) (0.801) (1.439) 
Market forces factor 
0.348 7.295 -16.257 -0.120 -27.029 -0.347 0.028 -1.691 -29.030 
(0.280) (8.839) (9.187)* (1.053) (12.636)** (0.568) (0.029) (20.431) (27.186) 
Constant 
3.694 86.790 42.691 8.049 52.485 6.388 3.568 137.249 142.996 
(0.474)*** (15.379)*** (13.890)*** (2.257)*** (17.983)*** (1.291)*** (1.000)*** (29.858)*** (47.614)*** 
SUR estimation. All regressions control for hospital and year fixed effects. Policy break 2006/07 is an indicator for years 2006/07 to 2010/11.  
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value<0.001. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 4.3 – Competition quartiles and efficiency: Model II. 
Efficiency indicator 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Log of admissions per bed 
0.011 0.026 0.052 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)** 
Bed occupancy rate 
0.549 1.285 0.951 
(0.661) (0.691)* (0.815) 
Proportion of day cases 
0.809 1.085 2.104 
(0.626) (0.497)** (0.744)*** 
Log of cancelled elective operations 
-0.025 0.084 0.119 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.084) 
Proportion of untouched meals 
-1.342 -1.805 -2.175 
(0.908) (0.948)* (1.043)** 
Log of cleaning services costs 
-0.036 -0.054 -0.021 
(0.038) (0.048) (0.045) 
Log of laundry and linen costs 
0.055 -0.009 0.020 
(0.054) (0.046) (0.046) 
Reference cost index 
-0.369 -2.702 -1.892 
(1.147) (0.998)*** (1.497) 
Elective reference cost index 
2.473 -2.331 -3.301 
(1.939) (1.986) (1.973)* 
SUR estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control 
for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, foundation trusts, and market 
forces factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services 
costs, and laundry and linen costs also control for beds. 
Quartile dummies are constructed on the pre-reform HHI-1: 2nd quartile=low-
competition market, 3rd quartile=high-competition market, 4th quartile=very high-
competition market; 1st quartile=very low-competition market (reference category). 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 4.4 – Competition and efficiency: with time varying competition. 
Regressor 
Log of 
admissions 
per bed 
Bed 
occupancy 
rate 
Proportion 
of day cases 
Log of 
cancelled 
operations 
Proportion 
of 
untouched 
meals 
Log of 
cleaning 
services 
costs 
Log of 
laundry and 
linen costs 
Reference 
cost index 
Elective 
reference 
cost index 
Model III 
Policy break*HHI-1 
0.009 0.051 0.329 0.022 -0.256 0.002 0.00002 -0.186 -0.422 
(0.004)** (0.110) (0.105)*** (0.011)* (0.156) (0.006) (0.007) (0.220) (0.338) 
HHI-1 
0.006 0.020 -0.277 -0.003 -0.156 -0.019 -0.013 -0.556 -0.387 
(0.007) (0.208) (0.170) (0.027) (0.306) (0.010)* (0.015) (0.370) (0.710) 
Model IV 
Dummy 2002/03*HHI-1 
-0.004 -0.007 -0.246 -0.016 0.567 0.024 0.012 0.122 -0.533 
(0.006) (0.214) (0.179) (0.034) (0.317)* (0.015)* (0.012) (0.460) (0.713) 
Dummy 2003/04*HHI-1 
-0.004 -0.036 -0.134 -0.018 0.178 -0.007 0.018 -0.129 -0.268 
(0.004) (0.144) (0.137) (0.020) (0.225) (0.018) (0.010)* (0.269) (0.489) 
Dummy 2004/05*HHI-1 
-0.002 -0.042 -0.035 -0.024 0.347 0.004 -0.007 -0.094 0.204 
(0.003) (0.105) (0.086) (0.013)* (0.192)* (0.007) (0.009) (0.190) (0.383) 
Dummy 2006/07*HHI-1 
0.003 -0.221 0.161 0.010 0.118 0.008 0.002 0.014 -0.197 
(0.004) (0.099)** (0.087)* (0.009) (0.114) (0.006) (0.006) (0.258) (0.353) 
Dummy 2007/08*HHI-1 
0.008 0.195 0.239 0.025 0.070 -0.005 0.001 -0.603 -0.542 
(0.004)* (0.171) (0.138)* (0.013)* (0.153) (0.010) (0.009) (0.255)** (0.382) 
Dummy 2008/09*HHI-1 
0.006 0.205 0.292 0.024 -0.015 0.006 0.001 -0.204 -0.531 
(0.005) (0.205) (0.113)*** (0.015) (0.253) (0.006) (0.009) (0.250) (0.446) 
Dummy 2009/10*HHI-1 
0.008 -0.001 0.350 -0.002 -0.374 0.003 0.002 -0.189 -0.546 
(0.005) (0.161) (0.126)*** (0.019) (0.200)* (0.006) (0.009) (0.253) (0.480) 
Dummy 2010/11*HHI-1 
0.013 0.153 0.423 -0.016 -0.353 0.005 0.007 -0.356 -0.691 
(0.005)** (0.174) (0.155)*** (0.018) (0.193)* (0.007) (0.009) (0.279) (0.489) 
HHI-1 
0.004 0.044 -0.359 0.014 -0.096 -0.016 -0.009 -0.504 -0.555 
(0.008) (0.228) (0.186)* (0.028) (0.335) (0.013) (0.016) (0.401) (0.735) 
SUR estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, number of beds, foundation trusts, and 
market forces factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen costs also control for beds. 
Post-reform effect of market structure (p-value) in Model III (β+δ). Log of admission per bed: 0.015 (0.014); bed occupancy rate: 0.071 (0.745); proportion of day cases: 0.052 
(0.753); log of cancelled operations: 0.019 (0.469); proportion of untouched meals: -0.412 (0.155); log of cleaning services costs: -0.017 (0.114); log of laundry and linen costs: 
-0.013 (0.360); reference cost index: -0.742 (0.101); elective reference cost index: -0.809 (0.214). 
Breusch-Pagan test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix: p-value=0.000. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 4.5 – Effects of competition at different efficiency quantiles: Model V. 
Efficiency indicator 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Log of admissions per bed 
0.019 0.022 0.002 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.015) (0.011)** (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Bed occupancy rate 
0.461 0.147 -0.079 -0.183 -0.211 
(0.408) (0.190) (0.148) (0.191) (0.252) 
Proportion of day cases 
0.914 0.396 0.220 0.101 0.277 
(0.372)** (0.201)** (0.202) (0.255) (0.377) 
Log of cancelled elective operations 
0.072 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.041 
(0.037)** (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) 
Proportion of untouched meals 
-0.076 -0.196 -0.168 -0.429 -0.627 
(0.160) (0.128) (0.144) (0.245)* (0.469) 
Log of cleaning services costs 
0.018 -0.037 -0.031 -0.007 0.053 
(0.036) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.035) 
Log of laundry and linen costs 
-0.075 -0.021 0.010 -0.018 0.016 
(0.046) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.032) 
Reference cost index 
-0.419 -0.319 -0.233 -0.532 0.062 
(0.281) (0.248) (0.250) (0.424) (1.068) 
Elective reference cost index 
0.295 -0.316 -0.395 -0.390 -1.934 
(0.501) (0.386) (0.487) (0.742) (1.592) 
Unconditional quantile regression. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions control 
for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, number of beds, foundation trusts, and market forces 
factor. The regressions for cancelled elective operations, cleaning services costs, and laundry and linen 
costs also control for beds. 
Bootstrapped clustered standard errors (using 1,000 replications) in parenthesis. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Figure 4.1 – Trend in the efficiency indicators from 2002/3 to 2010/11. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated two topics. The first two chapters focus on specialisation in the 
hospital sector with a focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals. Chapter 1 studies the efficiency of 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals compared to trauma & orthopaedics (T&O) departments in general 
hospitals. The key finding suggests that there is no statistical difference in efficiency, as measured 
by length of stay (LOS), between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. Chapter 
2 examines the financial viability of specialist orthopaedic hospitals by testing whether their costs 
are higher than T&O departments in general hospitals after accounting for differences in revenues. 
The findings suggest that specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on average 13% lower overall profit 
margins than T&O departments. Such lower profit margins are due to some patient characteristics 
such as patient age and severity as captured by number of diagnoses and procedures. 
Specialisation is an organisational form which is supposed to generate a number of benefits 
such as greater efficiency, quality, and responsiveness (Skinner, 1974, Herzlinger, 1996, Schneider 
et al., 2008). On this basis, we would expect specialist hospitals to exhibit better financial 
performance compared to general hospitals that undertake similar activities. The evidence 
provided in this thesis does not support this claim and it may therefore have important policy 
implications. 
Since specialist hospitals may not be as efficient as advocates proclaim, at least for T&O 
services that we consider, it may be better financially to manage and operate services as part of a 
larger organisational entity. This might allow T&O departments to benefit from economies of 
scope, including access to a larger pool of staff and shared facilities such as operating theatres and 
pharmacy. On the other hand, other variables that we have not thoroughly explored may justify 
such a difference in the financial performance. For example, specialist hospitals may provide 
services of higher quality compared to T&O departments, which will therefore have relatively 
lower costs and, in turn, higher profits. Moreover, being part of a general hospital does not 
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necessarily translate into better financial performance. Further investigations are needed to clarify 
which factors determine higher profit margins in some T&O departments compared to specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals. The resulting best practices could be then applied to the least performing 
hospitals to produce savings. 
Another important implication of this thesis relates to the prospective payment system. It has 
been long recognised that the English Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) classification can only 
imperfectly account for patient complexity (Mason et al., 2008, Gutacker et al., 2013). The 
capacity of a prospective payment system to reimburse hospitals for their actual activity might be 
insufficient especially for providers with a more complex patient case-mix such as specialist 
hospitals. Adjustments that take account of the specific nature of specialist hospitals may help to 
reduce the relative unbalance of their financial performance. Similar solutions have already been 
implemented in other countries. The French prospective payment system, for instance, 
differentiates prices for public and private hospitals (Busse et al., 2011). The reimbursement 
system of the Lombardy region in Italy applies a tariff top-up to all hospitals with ‘high 
specialisation’ units (Ettelt et al., 2006). In England, hospitals are paid extra if their patients receive 
specialised care (Daidone and Street, 2013). 
This first part of the thesis has some limitations. The main limitation is that results are based 
on a sample including only three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. The small number of specialist 
orthopaedic hospital trusts, however, reflects the reality that there are only three specialist 
orthopaedic hospital trusts in the English NHS. Although the hospital sector is moving towards a 
greater degree of specialisation (e.g. Barro et al., 2006, Tang et al., 2013), there are still a few 
specialist hospitals in many countries. Hence, the analysis proposed in this thesis is appropriate 
and generally applicable. A second limitation is that the patient’s LOS is only a proxy to measure 
efficiency. Cost data provide a more comprehensive measure of efficiency by capturing, for 
example, the inputs’ productivity through the salary of doctors and nurses. The analysis of costs 
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may therefore yield a different efficiency ranking compared to the analysis of LOS (e.g. Gaughan 
et al., 2012). Finally, to disentangle efficiency from quality and to test whether quality drives profit 
margins in specialist hospitals, we use the health gains for hip and knee replacement. Although we 
take into account the outcome of only two procedures, we argue that these surgeries are indicative 
of departmental performance being the most common in T&O departments. Future research may 
focus also on the evaluation of differences in quality between specialist and general hospitals as 
better quality indicators (e.g. patient self-reported outcome measures on other procedures) become 
more widespread. 
The remaining two chapters in the second part of the thesis investigate different aspects of 
hospital competition. Chapter 3 analyses whether hospitals that strategically interact with 
neighbouring hospitals improve their quality or efficiency. The results indicate that a hospital’s 
quality or efficiency does not respond to its rivals’ quality or efficiency, except for a hospital’s 
overall mortality which is positively associated with that of its rivals. Chapter 4 evaluates the effect 
of market structure on a number of efficiency measures. The findings suggest that competition 
may affect efficiency in different ways. Competition increases efficiency as measured by 
admissions per bed, proportion of day cases, and untouched meals. Competition, however, reduce 
efficiency by increasing the number of cancelled elective operations. In addition, hospitals 
exhibiting low efficiency may be more responsive under greater competition. 
The primary objective of the Choice policy introduced in 2006 was to stimulate hospital quality 
and reduce waiting times giving elective patients the freedom to choose where to be admitted. This 
policy is supposed to have affected the system of incentives in the hospital sector implying a 
number of other indirect effects that are relevant to the policy maker. A potential consequence is 
that hospital mergers may have an effect on the quality and efficiency of non-merging 
neighbouring hospitals. Another possible effect is that policy interventions incentivising quality 
or efficiency at local level (e.g. adoption of a new technology) may generate spillovers to other 
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hospitals. This thesis however suggests that such indirect implications do not occur because a 
hospital will not respond to its nearer hospitals although these can potentially absorb volumes of 
patients and, in turn, revenues. This finding implies that there may be scope for the policy maker 
to develop policies which encourage cooperation across hospitals. In France, for instance, hospitals 
can be associated in groups which share activity, equipment, medical teams and a joint information 
system (Choné, 2017, Siciliani et al., 2017). 
An additional implication is the extent to which the Choice policy can affect efficiency along 
with quality and waiting time. A hospital that, after the policy, provides services of higher quality 
will face an increase in demand. Such an increase can be dealt with only through changes of the 
hospital supply. Higher admissions per bed, greater proportions of day cases, and smaller 
proportions of untouched meals imply that hospitals tend to increase their efficiency in addition to 
quality. But the effect of the policy does not necessarily move in the direction of greater efficiency. 
It may also generate negative incentives for hospitals which, for example, may cancel more 
elective operations if this produces higher revenues (Cookson et al., 2017a). Further research is 
required to identify and better monitor other potential side effects of the reform. 
Moreover, since 2008, competition is extended to all qualified providers including private 
hospitals which are generally smaller and more profit-oriented and thus less altruistic than public 
hospitals. Healthcare systems with both public and private hospitals are common among some 
European and low- and middle-income countries (Basu et al., 2012, Siciliani et al., 2017) but 
evidence on strategic interactions between these two hospital types is scarce. Future research may 
therefore yield a more complete picture also on this subject. 
Finally, the recent emergence of new healthcare paradigms such as the integration models 
poses new challenges for the research agenda. Greater integration between healthcare sectors 
implies that services will be delivered through a system that puts primary, community, mental 
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health, and hospital care together with the aim of improving quality. This may generate forms of 
competition based on selective contracting mechanisms where a commissioner negotiates a 
contract with a group of providers in order to encourage collaborative networks (Siciliani et al., 
2017). Future investigations may evaluate whether such new healthcare models produce better 
outcomes compared to the current models where care is mostly fragmented and competition occurs 
between providers. 
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Appendix 1 
A1.1 Sample definition 
We extract data from HES, which includes information at patient level. We select patients 
whose main specialty is T&O. Then, we eliminate duplicates, observations with misreported HRG, 
and missing values. We also eliminate outliers by applying the rule: 
  90% 90% 10% 5 0upper LOS LOS LOSikLOS CV Q Q Q          (A1.1) 
Where 
ikLOS  is the LOS of patient i in hospital k excluding the day of admission, 
upperCV  is the 
upper critical value, 
10%
LOSQ  and 90%
LOSQ  indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the LOS distribution, 
respectively. The rule does not apply if CV is equal to zero. The lower critical value is neglected 
since LOS cannot be lower than zero. The rule in (A1.1) can be viewed as a conservative version 
of the more standard interquartile range rule. The idea is to remove all observations that are far 
apart from the 90th percentile. 
We drop all hospitals not reporting PROMs data. Finally, we eliminate departments with less 
than 500 patients, and HRGs with less than 100 observations to improve comparability across 
hospitals. In total, we remove approximately 120,000 observations. 
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A1.2 Diagnoses, procedures, and HRG codes 
Table A1.1 – Diagnosis dummies’ descriptive statistics and estimates. 
No 
Diagnosis dummy 
Mean Cumulative Estimate Std Err. p-value 
Code Label 
1) M179 Gonarthrosis, unspecified 0.076 7.6% 0.040 0.029 0.167 
2) M232 Derangement of meniscus due to old tear or injury 0.047 12.3% 0.110 0.029 0.000 
3) M169 Coxarthrosis, unspecified 0.051 17.4% 0.023 0.028 0.403 
4) S720 Fracture of neck of femur 0.040 21.4% 0.629 0.032 0.000 
5) G560 Carpal tunnel syndrome 0.036 25.0% 0.103 0.032 0.001 
6) M255 Pain in joint 0.025 27.4% 0.081 0.028 0.001 
7) S525 Fracture of lower end of radius 0.023 29.7% 0.025 0.028 0.377 
8) S470 Follow-up care involving removal of fracture 
plate and other internal 
0.022 31.9% 0.106 0.030 0.033 
9) M201 Hallux valgus (acquired) 0.017 33.6% -0.052 0.030 0.083 
10) M199 Arthrosis, unspecified 0.019 35.5% 0.042 0.028 0.132 
11) T840 Mechanical complication of internal joint 
prosthesis 
0.018 37.3% 0.125 0.028 0.000 
12) S721 Pertrochanteric fracture 0.015 38.7% 0.732 0.032 0.000 
13) M511 Lumbar and other intervertebral disc disorders 
with radiculopathy 
0.015 40.3% 0.052 0.030 0.085 
14) M754 Impingement syndrome of shoulder 0.012 41.5% 0.035 0.029 0.224 
15) S828 Fractures of other parts of lower leg 0.012 42.7% 0.444 0.030 0.000 
16) M720 Palmar fascia fibromatosis (Dupuytren) 0.012 43.9% -0.004 0.032 0.889 
17) M233 Other meniscus derangements 0.011 45.0% 0.064 0.029 0.026 
18) M171 Other primary gonarthrosis 0.013 46.4% 0.024 0.034 0.493 
19) M545 Low back pain 0.010 47.4% 0.037 0.031 0.236 
20) M751 Rotator cuff syndrome 0.011 48.5% -0.017 0.028 0.549 
21) T848 Other complications of internal orthopaedic 
prosthetic devices 
0.011 49.7% 0.036 0.029 0.203 
22) M238 Other internal derangements of knee 0.010 50.6% 0.107 0.028 0.000 
23) M480 Spinal stenosis 0.009 51.6% 0.062 0.031 0.046 
24) M161 Other primary coxarthrosis 0.010 52.6% -0.002 0.030 0.953 
25) M674 Ganglion 0.008 53.4% 0.104 0.028 0.003 
26) M159 Polyarthritis, unspecified 0.010 54.3% -0.008 0.030 0.799 
27) S526 Fracture of lower end of both ulna and radios 0.006 55.2% 0.103 0.029 0.030 
28) M553 Trigger finger 0.007 55.9% 0.051 0.032 0.111 
29) M512 Other specified intervertebral disc displacement 0.007 56.6% 0.106 0.031 0.001 
30) S422 Fracture of upper end of humerus 0.007 57.3% 0.345 0.030 0.030 
31) M841 Nonunion of fracture (pseudarthrosis) 0.007 58.0% 0.099 0.028 0.000 
32) T845 Infection and inflammatory reaction due to 
internal joint prosthesis 
0.006 58.6% 0.453 0.029 0.000 
33) S424 Fracture of lower end of humerus 0.006 59.2% 0.268 0.028 0.000 
34) S623 Fracture of lower end of tibia 0.006 59.9% 0.598 0.034 0.000 
35) M750 Adhesive capsulitis of shoulder 0.006 60.5% 0.056 0.029 0.057 
36) M139 Arthritis, unspecified 0.006 60.9% 0.050 0.029 0.087 
37) G562 Lesion of ulnar nerve 0.006 61.5% 0.031 0.030 0.984 
38) S626 Fracture of other finger 0.006 62.1% -0.036 0.029 0.211 
39) S326 Fracture of lateral malleolus 0.005 62.6% 0.049 0.036 0.178 
40) S322 Fracture of shaft of tibia 0.005 63.0% 0.478 0.031 0.000 
41) S821 Fracture of upper end of tibia 0.005 63,5% 0.607 0.031 0.000 
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42) T814 Infection following a procedure, not elsewhere 
classified 
0.005 64.0% 0.016 0.032 0.624 
43) M241 Other articular cartilage disorders 0.005 64.4% 0.175 0.029 0.003 
44) S520 Fracture of upper end of ulna 0.005 64.9% 0.531 0.035 0.000 
45) L031 Cellulitis of other parts of limb 0.005 65.4% 0.473 0.030 0.000 
46) M513 Other specified intervertebral disc degeneration 0.005 65.9% 0.253 0.029 0.000 
47) M796 Pain in limb 0.005 66.3% 0.054 0.029 0.068 
48) T841 Mechanical complication of internal fixation 
device of bones of limb 
0.005 66.8% 0.148 0.030 0.000 
49) L024 
Cutaneous abscess, furuncle and carbuncle of 
limb 
0.004 67.2% 0.248 0.0.31 0.000 
50) S420 Fracture of clavicle 0.004 67.6% 0.087 0.030 0.004 
51) M254  Effusion of joint 0.004 68.0% 0.845 0.034 0.000 
52) S723 Fracture of shaft of femur 0.004 68.3% 0.223 0.028 0.000 
53) M205  Other deformities of toe(s) (acquired) 0.003 68.7% -0.016 0.030 0.597 
54) M189  Arthrosis of first carpometacarpal joint, 
unspecified 
0.004 69.0% 0.014 0.030 0.650 
55) S623 Fracture of other metacarpal bone 0.004 69.4% 0.035 0.030 0.236 
56) S524 Fracture of shafts of both ulna and radius 0.004 69.8% 0.044 0.031 0.158 
57) M758  Other shoulder lesions 0.004 70.1% 0.030 0.028 0.293 
58) S724 Fracture of lower end of femur 0.003 70.4% 0.784 0.035 0.000 
59) M202  Hallux rigidus 0.003 70.7% 0.014 0.030 0.633 
60) G576  Lesion of plantar nerve 0.003 71.0% 0.093 0.033 0.005 
61) M549  Dorsalgia, unspecified 0.003 71.3% 0.051 0.031 0.093 
62) M244  Recurrent dislocation and subluxation of joint 0.003 71.7% 0.010 0.033 0.767 
63) M478  Other spondylosis 0.003 72.0% -0.009 0.043 0.835 
64) M170  Primary gonarthrosis, bilateral 0.004 72.3% 0.036 0.032 0.259 
65) C795 Secondary malignant neoplasm of bone and bone 
marrow 
0.003 72.6% 0.504 0.037 0.000 
66) M204 Other hammer toe(s) (acquired) 0.003 72.9% 0.060 0.030 0.043 
67) M659  Synovitis and tenosynovitis, unspecified 0.003 73.2% 0.031 0.029 0.280 
68) M431  Spondylolisthesis 0.003 73.5% 0.118 0.036 0.001 
69) Z478 Other specified orthopaedic follow-up care 0.003 73.7% 0.035 0.087 0.686 
70) M706 Trochanteric bursitis 0.003 74.0% 0.028 0.031 0.367 
71) M190  Primary arthrosis of other joints 0.003 74.3% 0.043 0.028 0.131 
72) M069  Rheumatoid arthritis, unspecified 0.003 74.6% 0.068 0.030 0.023 
73) S610 Open wound of finger(s) without damage to nail 0.003 74.8% -0.079 0.039 0.046 
74) S825 Fracture of medial malleolus 0.003 75.1% 0.258 0.032 0.000 
75) M257  Osteophyte 0.002 75.3% 0.019 0.029 0.516 
76) L600 Ingrowing nail 0.002 75.5% 0.044 0.032 0.178 
77) S324 Fracture of fibula alone  0.002 75.8% 0.780 0.038 0.000 
78) S860 Injury of Achilles’ tendon 0.003 76.0% 0.195 0.033 0.000 
79) M543  Sciatica 0.002 76.2% 0.047 0.034 0.175 
80) S320 Fracture of lumbar vertebra 0.002 76.5% 0.582 0.037 0.000 
81) M771  Lateral epicondylitis 0.002 76.7% 0.111 0.029 0.000 
82) M253  Other instability of joint 0.003 76.9% 0.117 0.045 0.011 
83) S520 Fracture of patella 0.002 77.2% 0.444 0.031 0.000 
84) S920 Fracture of calcaneus 0.002 77.4% 0.336 0.033 0.000 
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85) S423 Fracture of shaft of humerus 0.002 77.6% 0.566 0.036 0.000 
86) S325 Fracture of pubis 0.002 77.8% 0.249 0.030 0.000 
87) M191 Post-traumatic arthrosis of other joints 0.002 78.0% 0.111 0.030 0.000 
88) S722 Subtrochanteric fracture 0.002 78.3% 0.384 0.033 0.000 
89) M840 Malunion of fracture 0.002 78.5% 0.900 0.033 0.006 
90) M234  Loose body in knee 0.002 78.7% 0.090 0.030 0.003 
91) M160   Primary coxarthrosis, bilateral 0.002 78.9% 0.150 0.030 0.625 
92) M258  Other specified joint disorders 0.002 79.1% 0.050 0.032 0.121 
93) S099 Unspecified injury of head 0.002 79.3% 0.575 0.042 0.000 
94) M242 Disorder of ligament 0.002 79.5% 0.055 0.030 0.064 
95) T846  Infection and inflammatory reaction due to 
internal fixation device 
0.002 79.7% 0.090 0.340 0.008 
96) M150  Primary generalized (osteo)arthrosis 0.002 79.9% 0.040 0.370 0.274 
97) M899 Disorder of bone, unspecified 0.002 80.1% 0.051 0.330 0.127 
98) M235 Chronic instability of knee 0.002 80.3% -0.345 0.035 0.000 
99) M248 Other specific joint derangements, not elsewhere 
classified 
0.002 80.6% 0.133 0.031 0.000 
100) - Any other diagnoses 0.195 100.0% 0.159 0.028 0.000 
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Table A1.2 – Procedure dummies’ descriptive statistics and estimates. 
No 
Procedure dummy 
Mean Cumulative Estimate Std Err. p-value 
Code Label 
1) - No procedure performed 0.124 11.2% 0.371 0.016 0.000 
2) W822  Endoscopic resection of semilunar cartilage 0.054 17.3% 0.551 0.020 0.000 
3) W401  
Primary total prosthetic replacement of knee joint 
using cement 
0.061 22.6% 1.026 0.032 0.000 
4) W903  Injection of therapeutic substance into joint 0.046 27.2% 0.757 0.021 0.000 
5) A651 Carpal tunnel release 0.035 30.7% 0.520 0.025 0.000 
6) W283  Removal of internal fixation from bone 0.030 33.7% 0.551 0.029 0.000 
7) W371 
Primary total prosthetic replacement of hip joint 
using cement 
0.027 36.3% 0.651 0.017 0.000 
8) W201 
Primary open reduction of fracture of long bane 
and extramedullary fixation using plate 
0.026 38.8% 0.647 0.020 0.000 
9) W381 
Primary total prosthetic replacement of hip joint 
not using cement 
0.024 41.2% 0.777 0.032 0.000 
10) O291 Subacromial decompression 0.020 43.1% 0.356 0.020 0.000 
11) W242  
Closed reduction of fracture of long bone and 
rigid internal fixation 
0.017 44.8% 0.622 0.021 0.000 
12) W262  Manipulation of fracture of bone 0.016 46.4% 0.400 0.016 0.000 
13) W461  
Primary prosthetic replacement of head of femur 
using cement 
0.016 47.9% 0.710 0.024 0.000 
14) A522  Therapeutic sacral epidural injection 0.013 49.2% 0.530 0.052 0.000 
15) W742  Reconstruction of intraarticular ligament 0.012 50.4% 0.381 0.020 0.000 
16) W901  Aspiration of joint 0.011 51.5% 0.660 0.019 0.000 
17) A577 
Injection of therapeutic substance around spinal 
nerve root 
0.010 52.5% 0.470 0.046 0.000 
18) W241 
Close reduction of intracapsular fracture of neck 
of femur and fixation using nail or screw 
0.009 53.4% 0.407 0.045 0.000 
19) T723  Release of constriction of sheath of tendon 0.008 54.3% 0.554 0.023 0.000 
20) V544  Injection around spinal facet of spine 0.009 55.1% 0.691 0.025 0.000 
21) W879  
Unspecified diagnostic endoscopic examination 
of knee joint  
0.008 55.9% 0.639 0.021 0.000 
22) W531  Primary resurfacing arthroplasty of joint 0.008 56.6% 0.768 0.030 0.000 
23) W791 Soft tissue correction of hallux valgus 0.006 0.6% 0.586 0.022 0.000 
24) W941 
Primary hybrid prosthetic replacement of hip 
joint using cemented femoral component 
0.007 58.0% 0.639 0.024 0.000 
25) W471  
Primary prosthetic replacement of head of femur 
not using cement 
0.006 58.5% 0.688 0.026 0.000 
26) T676 Primary simple repair of tendon 0.006 59.1% 0.763 0.028 0.000 
27) W243 
Closed reduction of fracture of long bone and 
flexible internal fixation 
0.006 60.2% 0.648 0.021 0.000 
28) WI91 
Primary open reduction of fracture of neck of 
femur and open fixation using pin and plate 
0.006 60.8% 0.677 0.020 0.000 
29) W192  
Primary open reduction of fracture of long bone 
and fixation using rigid nail 
0.006 59.6% 0.477 0.030 0.000 
30) T521 Palmar fasciectomy 0.006 61.3% 0.528 0.018 0.000 
31) S571 Debridement of skin 0.005 61.9% 0.538 0.021 0.000 
32) X481  Application of plaster cast 0.005 62.4% 0.299 0.022 0.000 
33) W205  
Primary open reduction of fracture of ankle and 
extramedullary fixation 
0.006 63.4% 0.696 0.033 0.000 
34) U212  Computerised tomography 0.005 62.9% 0.537 0.025 0.000 
35) S069 Unspecified other excision of lesion of skin 0.005 63.9% 0.811 0.022 0.000 
36) S472 Drainage of lesion of skin 0.005 64.9% 0.563 0.024 0.000 
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37) W198 
Other specified primary open reduction of 
fracture of bone and intramedullary fixation 
0.005 65.4% 0.610 0.034 0.000 
38) W802  Open debridement of joint 0.005 64.4% 0.445 0.020 0.000 
39) U211  Magnetic resonance imaging 0.005 65.8% 0.584 0.019 0.000 
40) W232  
Secondary open reduction of fracture of bone and 
extramedullary fixation 
0.005 66.3% 0.611 0.018 0.000 
41) U051  Computed tomography of head 0.004 67.1% 0.596 0.031 0.000 
42) W593 Fusion of first metatarsophalangeal joint 0.004 66.7% 0.439 0.026 0.000 
43) W852  Endoscopic irrigation of knee joint 0.003 67.5% 0.611 0.046 0.000 
44) W396  
Closed reduction of dislocated total prosthetic 
replacement of hip joint  
0.004 67.9% 0.546 0.024 0.000 
45) W621  Primary arthrodesis and internal fixation of joint 0.004 68.3% 0.617 0.023 0.000 
46) S421 Primary suture of skin 0.004 68.6% 0.605 0.023 0.000 
47) W891 Endoscopic chondroplasty 0.003 69.0% 0.543 0.022 0.000 
48) W068 Other specified total excision of bone 0.004 69.4% 0.593 0.021 0.000 
49) U136 Computed tomography of bone 0.004 69.7% 0.537 0.020 0.000 
50) T791 Plastic repair of rotator cuff of shoulder 0.004 70.1% 0.561 0.021 0.000 
51) A671 Cubital tunnel release 0.004 70.7% -0.044 0.028 0.115 
52) V255 
Primary posterior decompression of lumbar spinal 
cord 
0.003 70.4% 1.061 0.039 0.000 
53) W833  Endoscopic shaving of articular cartilage 0.004 71.1% 0.381 0.022 0.000 
54) A521  Therapeutic lumbar epidural injection 0.003 71.4% 0.693 0.022 0.000 
55) W411  
Primary total prosthetic replacement of knee joint 
not using cement 
0.003 72.1% 0.439 0.041 0.000 
56) W595 Fusion of interphalangeal joint of toe 0.003 71.7% 0.551 0.021 0.000 
57) T625  Injection into bursa 0.003 72.4% 0.609 0.025 0.000 
58) T525 Digital fasciectomy 0.003 72.7% 0.529 0.023 0.000 
59) A611  Excision of lesion of peripheral nerve 0.003 73.0% 0.476 0.023 0.000 
60) W919  Unspecified other manipulation of joint 0.003 73.3% 0.658 0.028 0.000 
61) W248  
Other specified closed reduction of fracture of 
bone and internal fixation 
0.003 73.6% 0.706 0.023 0.000 
62) U055  Magnetic resonance imaging of spine 0.003 73.9% 0.457 0.020 0.000 
63) W164  Osteotomy and internal fixation 0.002 74.4% 1.045 0.045 0.000 
64) W373  
Revision of total prosthetic replacement of hip 
joint using cement 
0.002 74.2% 0.614 0.047 0.000 
65) T591 Excision of ganglion of wrist 0.003 74.7% 0.749 0.023 0.000 
66) W391  Primary total prosthetic replacement of hip joint 0.002 75.0% 0.476 0.021 0.000 
67) W712  Open excision of intraarticular osteophyte 0.003 75.7% 0.472 0.022 0.000 
68) T962  Excision of lesion of soft tissue 0.002 75.4% 0.614 0.024 0.000 
69) W421 Primary total prosthetic replacement of knee joint 0.002 75.2% 0.530 0.024 0.000 
70) W208 
Other specified primary open reduction of 
fracture of bone and extramedullary fixation 
0.002 76.1% 0.583 0.094 0.000 
71) W403  
Revision of total prosthetic replacement of knee 
joint using cement 
0.003 76.6% 0.749 0.024 0.000 
72) W153 Osteotomy of first metatarsal bone 0.002 75.9% 0.627 0.024 0.000 
73) W202 
Primary open reduction of fracture of long bone 
and extramedullary fixation using cerclage 
0.002 76.4% 0.665 0.021 0.000 
74) W083  Excision of excrescence of bone 0.002 77.0% 0.334 0.022 0.000 
75) U054  Computed tomography of spine 0.002 75.8% 0.565 0.026 0.000 
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76) W195 
Primary open reduction of fragment of bone and 
fixation using screw 
0.002 77.2% 0.467 0.023 0.000 
77) T392 Excision of ganglion of hand 0.002 77.8% 0.558 0.023 0.000 
78) W771  Repair of capsule of joint for stabilisation of joint 0.002 77,6% 0.564 0.020 0.000 
79) W085 Partial excision of bone 0.002 77.4% 0.500 0.024 0.000 
80) W851  
Endoscopic removal of loose body from knee 
joint 
0.002 78.4% 0.388 0.023 0.000 
81) T691  Primary tenolysis 0.002 78.8% 0.529 0.022 0.000 
82) W781  Release of contracture of shoulder joint 0.002 78.2% 0.527 0.020 0.000 
83) W889  
Unspecified diagnostic endoscopic examination 
of other joint 
0.002 79.0% 0.575 0.021 0.000 
84) W845  
Endoscopic drilling of epiphysis for repair of 
articular cartilage 
0.002 78.6% 0.684 0.030 0.000 
85) W303  Removal of external fixation from bone 0.002 78.0% 0.505 0.025 0.000 
86) W669  
Unspecified primary closed reduction of 
traumatic dislocation of joint 
0.002 79.3% 0.689 0.028 0.000 
87) W664  
Primary open reduction of fracture dislocation of 
joint and internal fixation 
0.001 79.2% 0.748 0.022 0.000 
88) W572  Primary excision arthroplasty of joint 0.001 79.5% 0.022 0.039 0.569 
89) T702  Tenotomy 0.002 80.2% 0.584 0.028 0.000 
90) V337  
Primary microdiscectomy of lumbar 
intervertebral disc 
0.002 79.7% 0.471 0.046 0.000 
91) V254  
Primary posterior laminectomy decompression of 
lumbar spinal cord 
0.002 79.9% 0.441 0.042 0.000 
92) W194 
Primary open reduction of fracture of small bone 
and fixation using screw 
0.002 80.0% 0.541 0.049 0.000 
93) - Any other procedures 0.175 100.0% 0.585 0.019 0.000 
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Table A1.3 – HRG dummies’ descriptive statistics and estimates. 
No 
HRG dummy 
Mean Cumulative Estimate Std Err. p-value 
Code Label 
1) H10 Arthroscopies 0.100 10.0% -0.370 0.024 0.000 
2) H04 Primary knee replacement 0.072 17.1% 0.194 0.032 0.000 
3) H22 Minor procedures to the musculoskeletal system 0.067 23.8% -0.635 0.026 0.000 
4) H13 Hand procedures - category 1 0.043 28.2% -0.326 0.030 0.000 
5) H17 
Soft tissue or other bone procedures - category 1 
<70 w/o cc 
0.042 32.4% -0.313 0.024 0.000 
6) A07 Intermediate pain procedures 0.036 36.0% -0.364 0.049 0.000 
7) H80 Primary hip replacement cemented 0.037 39.5% 0.614 0.025 0.000 
8) H19 
Soft tissue or other bone procedures - category 2 
<70 w/o cc 
0.035 43.0% -0.272 0.021 0.000 
9) H37 Closed pelvis or lower limb fractures <70 w/o cc 0.031 46.1% -0.046 0.020 0.024 
10) S22 Planned procedures not carried out 0.029 48.9% 0.334 0.023 0.000 
11) H40 
Closed upper limb fractures or dislocations <70 
w/0 cc 
0.027 51.8% -0.311 0.021 0.000 
12) H99 
Complex elderly with a musculoskeletal system 
primary diagnosis 
0.029 54.5% -0.408 0.023 0.000 
13) P15 Accidental injury without brain injury 0.025 57.0% -0.335 0.020 0.000 
14) H52 Removal of fixation device <70 wlo cc 0.025 59.5% -0.374 0.032 0.000 
15) H81 Primary hip replacement uncemented 0.023 61.9% 0.432 0.035 0.000 
16) H21 
Muscle, tendon or ligament procedures - category 
2 
0.022 64.1% -0.255 0.024 0.000 
17) H12 Foot procedures - category 2 0.020 66.1% -0.358 0.024 0.000 
18) H36 Closed pelvis or lower limb fractures >69 or w cc 0.016 67.7% 0.409 0.022 0.000 
19) H20 
Muscle, tendon or ligament procedures - category 
1 
0.014 69.2% -0.381 0.025 0.000 
20) H39 
Closed upper limb fractures or dislocations >69 or 
w cc 
0.016 70.7% -0.050 0.022 0.025 
21) H71 Revisional procedures to hips 0.015 72.2% -0.261 0.026 0.000 
22) H16 
Soft tissue or other bone procedures - category 1 
>69 or w cc 
0.015 73.6% 0.735 0.025 0.00) 
23) H18 
Soft tissue or other bone procedures - category 2 
>69 or w cc 
0.013 74.9% -0.123 0.023 0.000 
24) J37 Minor skin procedures - category i w/o cc 0.013 76.2% -0.442 0.025 0.000 
25) R03 
Decompression and effusion for degenerative 
spinal disorders 
0.012 77.3% 0.231 0.034 0.000 
26) H14 Hand procedures - category 2 0.010 78.4% -0.455 0.025 0.000 
27) H50 Multiple injury <70 0.009 79.3% 0.177 0.026 0.000 
28) H45 Minor fractures or dislocations 0.010 80.3% -0.435 0.021 0.000 
29) H11 Foot procedures - category 1 0.007 81.0% -0.349 0.024 0.000 
30) H86 Neck of femur fracture with hip replacement w cc 0.008 81.7% 0.286 0.022 0.000 
31) H42 
Sprains, strains, or minor open wounds <70 w/o 
cc 
0.008 82.4% -0.310 0.022 0.000 
32) R16 Thoracic or lumbar spinal disorders <70 w/o cv 0.007 83.1% 0.189 0.025 0.000 
33) S19 Complications of procedures 0.007 83.8% 0.083 0.034 0.017 
34) R15 Thoracic or lumbar spinal disorders >69 or w cc 0.006 84.4% -0.361 0.025 0.000 
35) J35 Minor skin procedures category 2 w/o cc 0.006 85.0% 0.182 0.022 0.000 
36) H49 Multiple injury >69 0.006 86.2% 0.172 0.027 0.000 
37) H27 
Non-inflammatory bone or joint disorders >69 or 
w cc 
0.006 85.6% 0.452 0.025 0.000 
38) H72 Revisional procedures to knees 0.007 86.7% 0.536 0.028 0.000 
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39) H51 Removal of fixation device >69 or w cc 0.036 87.2% 0.195 0.037 0.000 
40) R02 Surgery for prolapsed inter vertebral disc 0.006 87.7% -0.342 0.032 0.000 
41) H41 
Sprains, strains, or minor open wounds >69 or w 
cc 
0.005 88.2% 0.049 0.033 0.140 
42) H07 
Primary or revisional shoulder, elbow, or ankle 
replacements 
0.005 89.1% -0.018 0.026 0.491 
43) H88 Other neck of femur fracture w cc 0.004 88.7% -0.367 0.066 0.000 
44) J36 Minor skin procedures - category 1 w cc 0.004 89.5% -0.315 0.026 0.000 
45) H84 
Intracapsular neck of femur fracture with fixation 
w cc 
0.004 90.0% -0.006 0.027 0.827 
46) H87 
Neck of femur fracture with hip replacement w/o 
cc 
0.004 90.4% 0.265 0.022 0.000 
47) C57 Major mouth or throat procedures 0.005 91.2% 0.125 0.025 0.000 
48) H24 Soft tissue disorders <70 w/o cc 0.004 90.8% 0.329 0.022 0.000 
49) J34 Minor skin procedures - category 2 w cc 0.004 91.5% -0.029 0.029 0.310 
50) - Any other HRG category 0.088 100.0% 0.113 0.020 0.000 
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A1.3 Square root transformation of the dependent variable 
Table A1.4 – First-stage estimates using a square root transformation. 
Regressor Coeff Std Err. p-value 
Male     -0.037*** 0.002 0.000 
Age    -0.008*** 0.001 0.000 
Age Squared 0.0001*** 0.000 0.000 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.035*** 0.006 0.000 
Ethnicity: black 0.057*** 0.009 0.000 
Ethnicity: Chinese 0.056** 0.024 0.019 
Ethnicity: mixed 0.005 0.008 0.565 
Ethnicity: Any other 0.037*** 0.010 0.000 
Urban 0.014*** 0.003 0.000 
Deprivation index: income -0.003 0.018 0.876 
Deprivation index: disability 0.006* 0.003 0.066 
Deprivation index: living environment 0.0003*** 0.000 0.001 
Deprivation index: crime 0.002 0.002 0.342 
Elective 0.132 0.150 0.382 
Day case -0.849*** 0.013 0.000 
Transferred from other provider 0.210 0.183 0.253 
Other admission type 0.016 0.014 0.262 
Waiting time -0.00003** 0.000 0.039 
Waiting time squared 0.000 0.000 0.180 
Number of secondary diagnoses 0.086*** 0.003 0.000 
Number of secondary procedures 0.090*** 0.003 0.000 
Constant -0.203*** 0.059 0.001 
Standard deviation of alpha 0.110     
Standard deviation of epsilon 0.755     
842,460 observations, 197 hospital trusts 
R-square (overall) = 0.700 
Test of alphas jointly equal to zero, F(196, 196) = 77.05 p-value = 0.000 
Primary diagnosis, primary procedure, HRG code, and hospital fixed effects are included but not 
reported 
Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 replications) 
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Table A1.5 – Second-stage estimates using a square root transformation. 
Regressor Coeff Std Err. p-value 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.065 0.058 0.261 
Average health change after hip replacement -0.143 0.160 0.372 
Average health change after knee replacement 0.397*** 0.151 0.009 
T&O emergency readmission rate 0.219 1.082 0.840 
Number of patients in orthopaedics -0.000002 0.000 0.579 
Market forces factor 0.101 0.121 0.405 
Teaching hospital 0.054** 0.021 0.011 
Foundation trust with no more than 3 years -0.019 0.032 0.561 
Foundation trust with 4 to 5 years 0.031 0.022 0.164 
Foundation trust with more than 5 years -0.013 0.023 0.589 
Constant -0.188 0.180 0.300 
197 observations 
R squared = 0.09, Adjusted R squared = 0.04 
Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 replications) 
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Figure A1.1– Distribution of the square root of the length of stay. 
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Appendix 2 
A2.1 Estimation of the salary of doctors 
We assume that the salary of doctors follows an s-shape function depending on age, minimum 
and maximum salary. This means that salary rises with increasing returns in the first half of the 
working life, and it goes up with decreasing returns during the second half. In symbols, we estimate 
the salary as follows: 
  min max, ,nk nk agew f W w w A   (A2.1) 
where wnk is the salary of doctor n=1,…,N in hospital k, fnk is the full time equivalent ratio,66 W is 
the s-shape salary function, wmin and wmax are the minimum and maximum salaries associated to 
the doctor’s grade, and Aage is a coefficient varying depending on the doctor’s age. The salary 
function W can be represented as follows: 
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where, 
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 (A2.3) 
In Figure A2.1, we illustrate the salary function W(∙) or consultant and associate specialist 
doctors. 
The average salary of doctors in hospital k (wk) is therefore calculated as follows:  
                                                 
66 The full time equivalent ratio is the proportion of the total number of paid hours during a period over the number of 
working hours in that period. 
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Figure A2.1 – Estimated salary function for consultants and associate specialists 
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A2.2 Descriptive statistics by admission type 
Table A2.1 – Descriptive statistics for day case and elective activity. 
  Variable at HRG level 
All hospitals 
  
Specialist 
hospitals   
General hospitals 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Day case 
  Inlier unit cost 1,408 876   1,492 973   1,406 872 
  Number of patients (FCEs) 26 67   33 77   25 66 
  Number of specialised services 0.07 0.75   0.43 3.10   0.06 0.52 
  Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 1.8   0.6 4.2   0.2 1.6 
  Proportion of males (%) 49.8 19.5   48.6 22.5   49.8 19.4 
  Age 49.6 17.2   44.2 17.3   49.8 17.1 
  Deprivation index 16,039 4,769   16,140 3,868   16,036 4,795 
  Number of diagnoses 3.718 1.704   3.983 1.926   3.709 1.695 
  Number of procedures 3.449 1.630   4.041 1.729   3.430 1.623 
  Number of HRGs 509   239   490 
  Observations 14,181   441   13,740 
Elective 
In
li
er
 
Inlier unit cost 3,680 3,620   5,978 8,808   3,586 3,200 
Number of patients (FCEs) 16 42   23 58   15 41 
Number of specialised services 0.07 0.94   0.61 4.06   0.05 0.47 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 2.3   1.2 6.3   0.2 1.9 
Proportion of males (%) 48.9 19.5   49.4 26.3   48.9 19.2 
Age 54.6 16.9   47.6 17.9   54.8 16.8 
Deprivation index 16,080 4,807   16,368 4,648   16,068 4,813 
Number of diagnoses 4.644 2.369   4.908 2.640   4.633 2.357 
Number of procedures 3.516 1.901   4.195 2.288   3.488 1.879 
Number of HRGs 730   350   696 
Observations 18,179   716   17,463 
E
x
ce
ss
 b
ed
 d
ay
 
Per diem unit cost 358 897   563 3,450   344 245 
Number of excess bed days 19 34   49 92   17 25 
Number of specialised services 0.24 1.91   1.65 6.66   0.14 0.88 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.4 2.9   2.5 9.0   0.3 1.8 
Proportion of males (%) 46.7 14.4   46.6 18.1   46.7 14.1 
Age 56.2 13.3   48.9 16.3   56.7 12.9 
Deprivation index 16,235 4,350   16,557 3,762   16,213 4,386 
Number of diagnoses 4.343 2.076   4.807 2.494   4.312 2.041 
Number of procedures 3.656 1.838   4.416 2.263   3.605 1.795 
Number of HRGs 313   151   282 
Observations 4,087   257   3,830 
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Table A2.2 – Descriptive statistics for short non-elective and long non-elective activity. 
  Variable at HRG level 
All hospitals 
  
Specialist 
hospitals   
General hospitals 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Short non-elective 
  Inlier unit cost 1,253 1,381   2,154 3,412   1,248 1,358 
  Number of patients (FCEs) 6 12   2 1   6 12 
  Number of specialised services 0.03 0.39   0.20 1.93   0.03 0.36 
  Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 0.9   0.4 3.8   0.1 0.8 
  Proportion of males (%) 49.5 18.6   50.0 21.9   49.5 18.6 
  Age 52.7 20.8   47.8 16.8   52.7 20.8 
  Deprivation index 15,908 4,843   15,869 4,634   15,908 4,845 
  Number of diagnoses 4.840 2.562   4.490 2.196   4.842 2.564 
  Number of procedures 2.466 1.907   3.656 2.115   2.459 1.903 
  Number of HRGs 839   97   836 
  Observations 19,523   119   19,404 
Long non-elective 
In
li
er
 
Inlier unit cost 4,720 4,241   10,181 12,150   4,661 4,035 
Number of patients (FCEs) 8 17   3 3   8 18 
Number of specialised services 0.04 0.76   1.31 6.28   0.03 0.37 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.7   1.9 8.4   0.1 1.4 
Proportion of males (%) 48.6 20.5   49.4 22.6   48.5 20.4 
Age 58.9 18.7   51.4 15.7   59.0 18.7 
Deprivation index 15,902 5,035   16,529 4,240   15,895 5,043 
Number of diagnoses 5.933 2.947   5.547 2.770   5.937 2.949 
Number of procedures 3.035 2.458   4.235 2.403   3.022 2.456 
Number of HRGs 1,022   175   1,020 
Observations 27,186   288   26,898 
E
x
ce
ss
 b
ed
 d
ay
 
Per diem unit cost 286 162   247 148   287 162 
Number of excess bed days 23 36   35 53   23 36 
Number of specialised services 0.07 1.02   2.61 9.25   0.04 0.40 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.6   3.2 10.8   0.1 1.1 
Proportion of males (%) 46.9 16.8   49.6 18.1   46.8 16.8 
Age 58.4 16.4   49.8 15.9   58.5 16.4 
Deprivation index 15,983 4,633   16,370 3,353   15,979 4,643 
Number of diagnoses 5.352 2.625   5.126 2.512   5.354 2.626 
Number of procedures 2.992 2.151   4.296 2.276   2.979 2.146 
Number of HRGs 647   86   643 
Observations 12,011   116   11,895 
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A2.3 Additional sensitivity analysis 
Table A2.3 – Stepwise regression analysis in model III for inlier unit costs. 
Regressor 
Inlier 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specialist orthopaedic 
hospital 
0.147 0.199** 0.200** 0.178** 0.181** 0.159* 0.165* 0.170* 
(0.099) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089) (0.083) (0.095) (0.086) (0.091) 
Market forces factor 
0.810* 0.947** 0.945** 0.875** 1.043** 0.927** 1.027** 1.036** 
(0.450) (0.441) (0.441) (0.435) (0.469) (0.459) (0.468) (0.463) 
Proportion of 
specialised services 
0.010* 0.011** 0.011** 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Proportion of males 
0.00005   0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0002 0.0004 
(0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 
-0.015***     -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014***   
(0.004)     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
Age (squared) 
0.00008**     0.00007* 0.00008* 0.00009** 0.0001**   
(0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Deprivation index 
-0.000003       -0.000004 -0.000003 -0.000004 -0.000004 
(0.000)       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
0.041***         0.042***   0.033*** 
(0.011)         (0.010)   (0.010) 
Number of procedures 
0.028***           0.032*** 0.027*** 
(0.007)           (0.008) (0.007) 
Salary of doctors 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 0.003 -0.0007 0.003 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Teaching trust 
  0.081** 0.081** 0.070** 0.066* 0.058* 0.063* 0.066* 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Foundation trust 
  -0.063** -0.063** -0.060** -0.058** -0.050* -0.055** -0.052** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Medium department 
  -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -0.021 -0.017 -0.022 -0.015 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Large department 
  -0.013 -0.013 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Very large department 
  0.026 0.026 0.022 0.02 0.023 0.019 0.024 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Average health change 
after hip replacement 
  0.825 0.825 0.847 0.89 0.952* 0.900* 0.936* 
  (0.554) (0.553) (0.546) (0.546) (0.524) (0.540) (0.531) 
Average health change 
after knee replacement 
  -0.519 -0.515 -0.485 -0.373 -0.453 -0.332 -0.402 
  (0.474) (0.474) (0.477) (0.476) (0.467) (0.473) (0.466) 
Constant 
7.100*** 6.372*** 6.356*** 6.913*** 6.697*** 6.681*** 6.618*** 5.979*** 
(0.553) (0.589) (0.592) (0.589) (0.607) (0.603) (0.611) (0.612) 
HRG fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A2.4 – Stepwise regression analysis in model III for per diem unit costs. 
Regressor 
Per diem 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specialist orthopaedic 
hospital 
-0.131 -0.107 -0.131 -0.123 -0.102 -0.101 -0.096 -0.112 
(0.304) (0.295) (0.304) (0.306) (0.278) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) 
Market forces factor 
0.490 0.910 0.497 0.529 1.239 1.246 1.234 1.133 
(1.274) (1.144) (1.271) (1.244) (1.357) (1.334) (1.356) (1.371) 
Proportion of 
specialised services 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of males 
  -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 
  -0.011   -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010   
  (0.013)   (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)   
Age (squared) 
  0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Deprivation index 
  -0.000010     -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00002 
  (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
  0.006       -0.002   0.002 
  (0.029)       (0.029)   (0.029) 
Number of procedures 
  -0.022         -0.012 -0.018 
  (0.021)         (0.021) (0.020) 
Salary of doctors 
-0.068   -0.068 -0.068 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 
(0.049)   (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Teaching trust 
0.014   0.015 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.001 
(0.087)   (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
Foundation trust 
0.045   0.045 0.045 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.050 
(0.071)   (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) 
Medium department 
-0.065   -0.064 -0.061 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.098 
(0.088)   (0.088) (0.089) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Large department 
0.069   0.07 0.073 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.052 
(0.094)   (0.094) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) 
Very large department 
-0.036   -0.036 -0.032 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.048 
(0.092)   (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092) 
Average health change 
after hip replacement 
-0.225   -0.222 -0.228 -0.031 -0.036 -0.028 -0.020 
(1.275)   (1.274) (1.276) (1.282) (1.283) (1.280) (1.283) 
Average health change 
after knee replacement 
0.936   0.924 0.895 1.392 1.397 1.375 1.382 
(1.211)   (1.215) (1.222) (1.255) (1.267) (1.255) (1.275) 
Constant 
5.539*** 4.979*** 5.568*** 5.732*** 4.810*** 4.810*** 4.863*** 4.854** 
(1.744) (1.350) (1.752) (1.647) (1.753) (1.754) (1.759) (1.922) 
HRG fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A2.5 – Analysis of interactions between covariates in model III. 
Regressor Inlier     Per diem 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.083     -0.146 
(1) Market forces factor -6.022     -1.440 
(2) Proportion of specialised services -0.198*     -0.054 
(3) Proportion of males -0.005     -0.012 
(4) Age 0.044     -0.004 
(5) Age (squared) -0.001***     0.000 
(6) Deprivation index 0.000     0.000 
(7) Number of diagnoses 0.116     0.064 
(8) Number of procedures -0.123     0.022 
(9) Salary of doctors -0.614     -1.054 
(10) Teaching trust -1.071     -1.821 
(11) Foundation trust -0.712     -2.798*** 
(12) Medium department 0.100     4.843*** 
(13) Large department 1.150     2.900 
(14) Very large department 1.099     4.579** 
(15) Average health change after hip repl. 0.656     13.009 
(16) Average health change after knee repl. -0.082     -27.838 
Interactions 
(1) x (2) 0.150**   (4) x (10) 0.010** 
(3) x (2) 0.0002**   (6) x (2) 0.000002*** 
(3) x (9) -0.001**   (6) x (13) -0.00002** 
(5) x (11) 0.0001**   (6) x (14) -0.00005*** 
(5) x (4) 0.00001***   (6) x (15) 0.001*** 
(7) x (2) -0.003**   (7) x (2) 0.002** 
(7) x (3) -0.0004**   (7) x (5) -0.00004** 
(8) x (11) 0.026**   (8) x (11) 0.029*** 
(8) x (4) -0.003***   (11) x (9) -0.167** 
(8) x (5) 0.00003***   (12) x (1) -3.635*** 
(13) x (11) -0.184***   (13) x (11) 0.398*** 
(14) x (2) 0.028***   (14) x (1) -3.815*** 
(15) x (2) -0.18**   (15) x (12) -5.829** 
(15) x (11) 2.199**   (16) x (9) 3.314*** 
(15) x (12) -2.634**   (16) x (11) 8.573*** 
(15) x (14) 3.088**   (16) x (12) 5.422** 
(16) x (14) -3.108**       
Constant   13.516**     12.454 
HRG fixed effects   YES     YES 
Regional fixed effects   YES     YES 
Adjusted R-squared   0.814     0.307 
Interactions not significant at 1% or 5% level are not reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A2.6 – Results for model V that includes hospital random effects. 
Regressor Inlier Per diem 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 
0.122 -0.201 
(0.342) (0.288) 
Market forces factor 
0.428 0.049 
(0.651) (1.488) 
Proportion of specialised services 
0.014* 0.002 
(0.008) (0.003) 
Proportion of males 
-0.0006 -0.0003 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Age 
-0.018*** -0.006 
(0.004) (0.006) 
Age (squared) 
0.0001*** 0.00008 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Deprivation index 
-0.000001 -0.000003 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
0.040*** -0.016 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Number of procedures 
0.013 -0.015* 
(0.009) (0.008) 
Salary of doctors 
0.008 -0.044 
(0.030) (0.048) 
Teaching trust 
0.076 0.108 
(0.051) (0.086) 
Foundation trust 
-0.052 0.03 
(0.037) (0.071) 
Medium department 
0.006 -0.063 
(0.051) (0.090) 
Large department 
-0.015 0.041 
(0.047) (0.098) 
Very large department 
0.008 -0.121 
(0.049) (0.088) 
Average health change after hip replacement 
1.345* -2.202 
(0.768) (1.361) 
Average health change after knee replacement 
-0.137 0.003 
(0.691) (1.389) 
Constant 
-0.050*** -0.024 
(0.018) (0.031) 
Hospital random effects YES YES 
HRG fixed effects YES YES 
Regional fixed effects YES YES 
Maximum likelihood estimation. For ease of computation, we control for the 
HRG fixed effects using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell transformation. 
Clustered standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions and are 
reported in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Appendix 3 
Table A3.1 – Definition for the quality indicators. 
Quality indicators 
The Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) is a ratio of the observed number of deaths to the expected 
number of deaths for a trust (provider). The observed number of deaths is the total number of finished provider spells 
for the trust which resulted in a death either in-hospital or within 30 days (inclusive) of discharge from the trust. The 
expected deaths are estimated through a logistic regression controlling for age, gender, admission method, year index, 
Charlson Comorbidity Index and diagnosis grouping. A three year dataset is used to create the risk-adjusted models. 
The hip fracture mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency admission 
to hospital with a primary diagnosis of fractured proximal femur (ICD-10 codes S720, S721, S722). It is indirectly 
standardised by age and sex. 
The stroke mortality rate captures deaths within 30 days (from 0 to 29 days inclusive) of an emergency admission to 
hospital with a primary diagnosis of stroke (all ICD-10 codes from I61 to I64). It is indirectly standardised by age and 
sex. 
The emergency readmission rate captures the percentage of emergency admission to any hospital in England occurring 
within 28 days of the last discharge from hospital after admission. The rate is calculated considering all patients aged 
between 16 and 74. It is indirectly standardised by age, sex, method of admission of discharge spell, diagnosis within 
medical specialties, and procedure within surgical specialties. 
Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre, NHS Digital Indicator Portal 
Link: https://indicators.hscic.gov.uk/webview/ 
The average health change after hip replacement is extracted from PROMs data. PROMs comprise a pair of 
questionnaires completed by the patient, one before and one after surgery (at least six months after for hip 
replacements). All patients, irrespective of their condition, are asked to complete a common set of questions about 
their health status. This includes sections about the patient’s circumstances, pre-existing conditions and the EQ-5D 
health questionnaire consisting of a five-dimensional descriptive system and a visual analogue scale (EQ-VAS). Post-
operative questionnaires also contain additional questions about the surgery, such as how the patient perceives the 
results of the operation and whether there were any post-operative complications, such as bleeding or wound problems. 
Patients undergoing hip replacement surgery are also asked to complete a condition-specific section. The collected 
data are risk-adjusted for patient characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnics), initial health status, self-assessed health 
status, economic deprivation, comorbidity, procedure, and post-operative length of stay. 
Source: Health and Social Care Information Centre 
Link: http://content.digital.nhs.uk/proms 
Patient satisfaction indicators are derived from the NHS Inpatient Surveys for the Care Quality Commission which is 
administered to a random sample of patients in all acute trusts. The variables relate to three questions to patients: 1) 
From 0 to 100, "Overall, how would you rate the care you received?" (Overall patient satisfaction); 2) From 0 to 100, 
"In your opinion, how clean was the hospital room or ward that you were in?" (Satisfaction on hospital cleanliness); 
3) From 0 to 100, “Were you involved as much as you wanted to be in decisions about your care and treatment?” 
(Satisfaction on decision involvement). The data has been standardised to adjust for these differences in patient-mix 
using the respondent’s age, gender, ethnic group and method of admission (emergency or elective). 
Source: NHS patient surveys 
Links: http://www.nhssurveys.org/surveys , https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/patients-experience-using-
hospital-services 
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Table A3.2 – Definition for the efficiency indicators. 
Efficiency indicators 
The bed occupancy rate is the ratio of the overnight occupied beds to the overnight available beds. For wards open 
overnight, an occupied bed day is defined as one which is occupied at midnight on the day in question. The number 
of occupied beds excludes any bed days of occupation by well babies. The number of available beds only includes 
beds in units managed by the provider, not beds commissioned from other providers. It excludes any beds designated 
solely for the use of well babies. Such data are available quarterly. 
The rate of cancelled elective operations is the ratio of the number of last minute cancellations by the hospital for non-
clinical reasons to the number of elective patients. Last minute means on the day the patient was due to arrive, after 
the patient has arrived in hospital, or on the day of the operation or surgery. Elective cancelled operations are provided 
in each quarter. The number of elective patients is calculated as the sum of planned and waiting list admissions, where 
the admission is a finished admission episode, i.e. the first period of inpatient care under one consultant within one 
healthcare provider. The number of elective patients is published annually. 
Source: NHS statistics 
Link: https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ 
The reference cost index shows the actual cost of an organisation’s case-mix compared with the same case-mix 
delivered at national average cost. Each organisation’s reference cost index is calculated by dividing its total costs 
(unit costs × activity) by the expected costs (national average mean unit cost × activity). The reference cost index is 
computed separately also for elective and non-elective activity. Elective activity refers to patients whose admission to 
hospital is planned, including day case patients. Non-elective activity refers to patients whose admission is not planned, 
including emergency admissions and admissions for maternity, births, and non-emergency patient transfers, and 
requires staying in hospital for more than one day. The reference cost index for hip replacement is calculated selecting 
the HRG codes: HB11A, HB11B, HB11C, HB12A, HB12B, and HB12C. 
Source: Reference costs data 
Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs 
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Table A3.3 – ML estimates for the quality indicators in 2013/14. 
Regressor SHMI 
Hip fract. 
mortality 
Stroke 
mortality 
Emerg. 
readm. 
Health 
change hip 
repl. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanlin. 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
  Spatial lag of the dependent variable 0.145 -0.156 -0.272** 0.137 -0.163 0.105 0.086 0.055 
D
em
an
d
 s
h
if
te
r 
Population density -0.903 0.032 0.240 -0.052 0.009** 0.156 0.246 -0.058 
Proportion of individuals aged 65 and over -0.037 -0.268** 0.089 -0.216** 0.004*** 0.330** 0.322** 0.624*** 
Proportion of ind. employed or looking for a job 0.237 0.148 -0.109 -0.037 -0.001 0.044 0.058 0.080 
Proportion of individuals with a degree -0.397 0.052 0.060 0.031 -0.002* -0.069 -0.157* -0.073 
Proportion of owner occupier households 0.019 0.103* 0.041 0.002 0.0000 -0.086 -0.081 -0.196* 
Proportion of ind. in good/very good health -0.603 -0.541*** -0.164 -0.200 0.008** 0.147 0.043 0.279 
C
o
st
 s
h
if
te
r Number of managers -1.797 -0.315 -1.606**   -0.004 0.435 -0.888 0.293 
Proportion of junior doctors in training 0.917 -0.016 0.637   -0.016*** -0.664** -0.587** -0.827** 
Proportion of consultants -0.605 -0.160 0.404   0.002 0.090 0.117 0.049 
Number of beds 2.667 -0.165 -0.767 0.362 0.010 0.578 1.357 1.272 
T
y
p
e 
Foundation trust 0.432 -0.224 -0.480 -0.049 -0.002 1.44*** 0.523 1.434** 
Teaching hospital -2.005 0.698 0.149 -0.160 -0.010 0.838 1.172 0.693 
Specialist hospital       -1.257*** -0.024 5.434*** 4.620*** 5.795*** 
  Constant 126.827*** 39.683*** 34.329* 31.199*** -0.067 56.281*** 75.031*** 43.391** 
Variance 42.184 2.058*** 8.212*** 1.422*** 0.001*** 4.094*** 5.156*** 8.019*** 
Observations 119 106 111 142 107 132 132 132 
ML estimation. Only cross-sectional results for 2013/14 are reported. Results for the emergency readmission rate refer to the most recent available financial year 
(2011/12). 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist hospitals in these samples. 
Estimates for the emergency readmission rate refer to 2011/12. Data on this variable are currently available up to 2011/12. Data on hospital staff are available from 
2010/11 onwards. Hence, all regressions for the emergency readmission rate do not include the number of managers, the proportion of junior doctors in training, and the 
proportion of consultants. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A3.4 – ML estimates for the efficiency indicators in 2013/14. 
Regressor 
Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations 
RCI 
Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
RCI for hip 
repl. 
  Spatial lag of the dependent variable -0.079 -0.008 0.003 -0.030 -0.121 0.096 
D
em
an
d
 s
h
if
te
r 
Population density 1.529** 0.043 2.06** 2.813** 1.754 0.590 
Proportion of individuals aged 65 and over 0.018 -0.010 -0.942** -0.831 -0.821 -0.140 
Proportion of ind. employed or looking for a job -0.215 0.016 1.341** 0.824 2.832** 2.623* 
Proportion of individuals with a degree -0.421** -0.027** 0.519** -0.234 1.045** 0.635 
Proportion of owner occupier households 0.143 0.007 0.526** 0.036 0.482 -0.723 
Proportion of ind. in good/very good health 1.194* 0.028 -1.474* 0.141 -3.247* -2.512 
C
o
st
 s
h
if
te
r Number of managers 0.364 0.048 2.602 0.147 3.677 -3.900 
Proportion of junior doctors in training -0.051 -0.037 -0.398 1.164 0.205 1.974 
Proportion of consultants -0.237 0.028 0.489 0.406 0.839 -1.076 
Number of beds 1.123 0.010 -0.018 -4.200 3.977 11.189 
T
y
p
e 
Foundation trust -2.458** -0.145** -1.342 -2.186 -1.717 4.757 
Teaching hospital -1.148 0.170 0.614 2.456 0.087 -5.376 
Specialist hospital -5.618* -0.048 9.426*** 11.789** 21.428*** 25.155 
  Constant 11.159 -2.494 91.661** 41.426 129.643 135.915 
Variance 28.800*** 0.118*** 41.994*** 110.523*** 193.989*** 298.786*** 
Observations 134 134 140 140 140 127 
ML estimation. Only cross-sectional results for 2013/14 are reported 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A3.5 – Likelihood Ratio test: spatial lag vs SDM or SAC model. 
Indicator Model 
Cross-Section Panel 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 FE RE 
Quality              
     Clinical               
Summary Hospital-level Mortality 
Indicator 
SDM (0.254) (0.047)** (0.298) (0.674) (0.090)* (0.539) 
SAC (0.687) (0.560) (0.419) (0.556) (0.363)   
Hip fracture mortality rate 
SDM (0.246) (0.024)** (0.011)** (0.638) (0.812) (0.149) 
SAC (0.348) (0.779) (0.078)* (0.189) (0.333)   
Stroke mortality rate 
SDM (0.589) (0.824) (0.098)* (0.492) (0.198) (0.459) 
SAC (0.201) (0.570) (0.524) (0.795) (0.766)   
Emergency readmission rate 
SDM (0.656) (0.092)*     (0.871) (0.884) 
SAC (0.659) (0.087)*     (0.816)   
     Patient reported               
Average health change after hip 
replacement 
SDM (0.010)*** (0.467) (0.792) (0.188) (0.679) (0.332) 
SAC (0.491) (0.831) (0.671) (0.408) (0.643)   
Overall patient satisfaction 
SDM (0.000)*** (0.002)** (0.173) (0.090)* (0.004)*** (0.013)** 
SAC (0.045)** (0.550) (0.509) (0.397) (0.726)   
Patient satisfaction on hospital 
cleanliness 
SDM (0.194) (0.386) (0.819) (0.909) (0.741) (0.797) 
SAC (0.968) (0.580) (0.431) (0.586) (0.793)   
Patient satisfaction on decision 
involvement 
SDM (0.001)*** (0.012)** (0.398) (0.103) (0.080)* (0.012)** 
SAC (0.453) (0.790) (0.353) (0.705) (0.815)   
Efficiency              
Bed occupancy rate 
SDM (0.711) (0.655) (0.768) (0.081)* (0.605) (0.687) 
SAC (0.200) (0.895) (0.184) (0.989) (0.616)   
Rate of cancelled elective operations 
SDM (0.940) (0.209) (0.020)** (0.005)*** (0.016)** (0.698) 
SAC (0.015)** (0.705) (0.035)** (0.075)* (0.001)***   
Reference cost index 
SDM (0.295) (0.530) (0.966) (0.613) (0.013)** (0.415) 
SAC (0.201) (0.151) (0.428) (0.338) (0.928)   
Elective reference cost index 
SDM (0.537) (0.270) (0.315) (0.142) (0.000)*** (0.072)* 
SAC (0.241) (0.504) (0.337) (0.231) (0.020)**   
Non-elective reference cost index 
SDM (0.058)* (0.256) (0.372) (0.222) (0.001)*** (0.170) 
SAC (0.121) (0.033)** (0.075)* (0.313) (0.324)   
Reference cost index for hip 
replacement 
SDM (0.128) (0.560) (0.885) (0.391) (0.246) (0.783) 
SAC (0.180) (0.632) (0.850) (0.675) (0.995)   
Null hypothesis: the spatial lag model is nested in the SDM or SAC model 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A3.6 – Spatial lag model for the quality indicators allowing for spatially lagged efficiency. 
Variable 
  Quality indicators 
  SHMI 
Hip fract. 
mortality 
Stroke 
mortality 
Readm. 
Health 
change 
hip repl. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanliness 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
0.212 0.016 -0.156 0.203 -0.006 0.047 -0.016 0.035 
(0.043)** (0.891)  (0.156)  (0.047)** (0.958)  (0.568)  (0.873)  (0.719)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.281 -0.044 0.161 0.022 -0.001 -0.078 -0.004 0.006 
(0.142)  (0.372)  (0.014)** (0.411)  (0.341)  (0.102)  (0.923)  (0.902)  
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
-0.154 0.014 0.002 0.033 -0.001 0.015 -0.067 0.031 
(0.420)  (0.775)  (0.972)  (0.132)  (0.060)* (0.745)  (0.116)  (0.502)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
/1
2
 
0.159 0.094 -0.176 0.117 -0.064 0.061 -0.054 0.075 
(0.130)  (0.403)  (0.132)  (0.254)  (0.606)  (0.460)  (0.565)  (0.405)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.495 0.026 0.038 0.051 -0.001 -0.069 -0.079 -0.051 
(0.019)** (0.632)  (0.698)  (0.005)*** (0.133)  (0.171)  (0.071)* (0.323)  
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
-0.070 -0.067 0.017 0.017 -0.001 -0.037 -0.080 -0.090 
(0.723)  (0.196)  (0.846)  (0.438)  (0.383)  (0.444)  (0.058)* (0.070)* 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
2
/1
3
 
0.098 -0.199 -0.189 0.091 -0.157 0.003 -0.082 -0.130 
(0.328)  (0.085)* (0.097)* (0.327)  (0.207)  (0.971)  (0.371)  (0.163)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.551 0.0004 -0.057 0.018 0.000001 -0.063 -0.048 -0.102 
(0.004)*** (0.995)  (0.521)  (0.351)  (0.999)  (0.064)* (0.222)  (0.028)** 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.040 -0.023 -0.137 0.008 -0.0004 -0.060 -0.089 -0.134 
(0.812)  (0.682)  (0.080)* (0.625)  (0.482)  (0.142)  (0.065)* (0.015)** 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
3
/1
4
 
0.156 -0.205 -0.305 0.092 -0.195 0.084 0.044 0.029 
(0.164)  (0.083)* (0.013)** (0.351)  (0.082)* (0.349)  (0.624)  (0.761)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.180 0.024 0.106 0.021 -0.001 -0.039 -0.072 -0.095 
(0.352)  (0.590)  (0.212)  (0.362)  (0.371)  (0.312)  (0.080)* (0.064)* 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.160 -0.040 0.059 -0.036 -0.0005 -0.026 -0.081 -0.061 
(0.378)  (0.346)  (0.465)  (0.092)* (0.367)  (0.550)  (0.084)* (0.296)  
Spatial lag 
F
E
 
0.170 -0.040 -0.060 0.065 -0.039 0.084 -0.069 -0.032 
(0.001)*** (0.468)  (0.279)  (0.233)  (0.505)  (0.113)  (0.218)  (0.552)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
-0.051 0.004 -0.047 0.014 -0.001 -0.060 -0.027 -0.071 
(0.626)  (0.924)  (0.456)  (0.082)* (0.225)  (0.109)  (0.347)  (0.089)* 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.049 -0.008 -0.116 0.009 0.0003 -0.006 -0.020 0.021 
(0.563)  (0.816)  (0.028)** (0.463)  (0.515)  (0.856)  (0.431)  (0.562)  
Spatial lag 
R
E
 
0.181 -0.021 -0.057 0.114 -0.035 0.092 -0.045 -0.001 
(0.000)*** (0.710)  (0.316)  (0.028)** (0.557)  (0.052)* (0.382)  (0.986)  
Spatially lagged bed 
occupancy rate 
0.091 0.015 0.004 0.018 -0.001 -0.060 -0.043 -0.067 
(0.374)  (0.622)  (0.933)  (0.044)** (0.093)* (0.025)** (0.083)* (0.031)** 
Spatially lagged 
reference cost index 
0.051 -0.007 -0.070 0.004 -0.001 -0.032 -0.044 -0.035 
(0.544)  (0.791)  (0.116)  (0.713)  (0.092)* (0.223)  (0.064)* (0.251)  
ML estimation. Control variables are identical to those in the main regression 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A3.7 – Spatial lag model for the efficiency indicators allowing for spatially lagged quality. 
Variable 
  Efficiency indicators 
  
Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations 
RCI 
Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
Unit cost 
of hip repl. 
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
0
/1
1
 
-0.054 0.084 -0.029 0.016 -0.064 -0.122 
(0.619)  (0.424)  (0.806)  (0.886)  (0.572)  (0.292)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.021 -0.002 -0.256 -0.494 -0.615 0.00002 
(0.817)  (0.773)  (0.030)** (0.032)** (0.004)*** (0.548)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.639 0.006 -0.573 -0.966 -1.582 0.0001 
(0.026)** (0.785)  (0.090)* (0.172)  (0.014)** (0.221)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
/1
2
 
-0.114 -0.024 -0.038 0.034 -0.081 -0.230 
(0.333)  (0.839)  (0.742)  (0.757)  (0.468)  (0.039)** 
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.113 -0.005 -0.157 -0.540 -0.415 0.00003 
(0.248)  (0.415)  (0.169)  (0.006)*** (0.037)** (0.239)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-1.083 0.003 -0.185 -0.627 -0.512 0.00009 
(0.000)*** (0.866)  (0.566)  (0.261)  (0.357)  (0.215)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
2
/1
3
 
-0.097 0.125 -0.124 0.030 -0.145 -0.011 
(0.401)  (0.246)  (0.286)  (0.787)  (0.189)  (0.925)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
0.037 -0.004 -0.088 -0.257 -0.367 0.00003 
(0.705)  (0.574)  (0.478)  (0.183)  (0.047)** (0.199)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.427 0.041 -0.259 -1.094 -0.714 -0.00010 
(0.242)  (0.120)  (0.579)  (0.131)  (0.308)  (0.325)  
Spatial lag 
2
0
1
1
3
/1
4
 
0.049 0.040 0.060 -0.049 -0.018 0.060 
(0.641)  (0.713)  (0.609)  (0.682)  (0.884)  (0.613)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.203 -0.009 -0.053 -0.274 -0.395 -0.00001 
(0.049)** (0.209)  (0.717)  (0.248)  (0.075)* (0.691)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.290 -0.026 0.035 -0.112 -0.299 0.00004 
(0.331)  (0.199)  (0.933)  (0.872)  (0.635)  (0.591)  
Spatial lag 
F
E
 
-0.090 0.018 0.029 0.046 -0.076 -0.095 
(0.136)  (0.736)  (0.607)  (0.430)  (0.179)  (0.091)* 
Spatially lagged SHMI 
0.003 0.010 0.077 -0.051 0.077 0.00003 
(0.954)  (0.017)** (0.233)  (0.685)  (0.537)  (0.115)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.280 -0.006 0.050 0.403 0.434 0.00003 
(0.064)* (0.560)  (0.758)  (0.214)  (0.168)  (0.552)  
Spatial lag 
R
E
 
-0.053 0.050 0.090 0.059 0.025 -0.069 
(0.367)  (0.353)  (0.103)  (0.297)  (0.647)  (0.220)  
Spatially lagged SHMI 
-0.031 0.003 0.024 -0.183 -0.171 0.00002 
(0.561)  (0.485)  (0.713)  (0.116)  (0.150)  (0.203)  
Spatially lagged overall 
patient satisfaction 
-0.512 -0.001 -0.144 -0.025 -0.364 0.00003 
(0.001)*** (0.929)  (0.403)  (0.937)  (0.257)  (0.522)  
ML estimation. Control variables are identical to those in the main regression 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A3.8 – First-stage estimates on the instrument and F statistic using quality indicators. 
IV Estimate   SHMI 
Hip fract. 
mortality 
Emerg. 
readm. 
Overall 
satisf. 
Satisf. on 
cleanliness 
Satisf. on 
involvem. 
Wt-2 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
2
/1
3
 0.610 0.499 0.778 0.587 0.830 0.707 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
94.49 16.58 140.68 175.89 282.66 282.66 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
3
/1
4
 0.560 0.489 0.875 0.621 0.940 0.794 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
95.69 52.46 168.39 261.03 467.54 467.54 
Wt-3 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
3
/1
4
 0.393 0.320 0.796 0.600 0.880 0.784 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
39.70 14.30 101.60 159.30 234.30 145.80 
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 20% 
maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed 
and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals 
with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in training, 
proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are included in 
the first stage of the 2SLS estimator. 
In the regressions for SHMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality, the specialist dummy is omitted because of the absence of specialist 
hospitals in these samples. 
Data on the emergency readmission rate are currently available up to 2011/12. The estimate refers to the most recent available years 
(2010/11 and 2011/12). 
For stroke mortality and average health change after hip replacement, estimates are omitted because of the absence of relevant 
instruments. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A3.9 – First-stage estimates on the instrument and F statistic using efficiency indicators. 
IV Estimate   
Bed 
occupancy 
Cancelled 
operations 
RCI 
Elective 
RCI 
Non-elect. 
RCI 
RCI for 
hip repl. 
Wt-2 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
2
/1
3
 0.641 0.484 0.594 0.271 0.525 0.437 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
85.14 30.46 87.65 16.29 60.16 44.49 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
3
/1
4
 0.775 0.897 0.734 0.419 0.461 0.236 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
135.99 105.08 206.49 56.77 59.51 13.39 
Wt-3 
I stage coefficient on the 
instrument 
2
0
1
3
/1
4
 0.616 0.480 0.704 0.380 0.483 0.291 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
I stage F (Cragg-Donald) 
statistic 
113.70 35.60 177.60 53.30 51.30 23.45 
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size critical value = 16.38; Stock-Yogo 15% maximal IV size critical value = 8.96; Stock-Yogo 
20% maximal IV size critical value = 6.66; Stock-Yogo 25% maximal IV size critical value = 5.53 
Each regression controls for: population density, proportion of individuals aged 65 and over, proportion of individuals employed 
and looking for a job, proportion of individuals with a degree, proportion of owner occupier households, proportion of individuals 
with a degree, proportion of individuals in good and very good health, number of managers, proportion of junior doctors in 
training, proportion of consultants, number of beds, foundation trust, teaching hospital, specialist hospital. Control variables are 
included in the first stage of the 2SLS estimator. 
p-value in parentheses, *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Appendix 4 
Table A4.1 – Pairwise correlations across efficiency indicators. 
Efficiency indicator Def (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Log of admissions per bed E 1.0000                 
(2) Bed occupancy rate E 0.2018* 1.0000               
(3) Proportion of day cases E 0.1028* -0.1041* 1.0000             
(4) Log of cancelled elective operations I -0.0181 0.1674* 0.0551 1.0000           
(5) Proportion of untouched meals I 0.0405 0.0159 -0.0199 0.0134 1.0000         
(6) Log of cleaning services costs I 0.2821* 0.2116* -0.1088* 0.5955* -0.002 1.0000       
(7) Log of laundry and linen costs I 0.1926* 0.3147* -0.2760* 0.6670* 0.0185 0.8133* 1.0000     
(8) Reference cost index I -0.2197* -0.1566* 0.0982* -0.1022* -0.0121 -0.0550 -0.1696* 1.0000   
(9) Elective reference cost index I -0.2575* -0.1590* -0.045 -0.1227* -0.0267 -0.0904* -0.1776* 0.7412* 1.0000 
E=positive indicator of efficiency, I=negative indicator of efficiency 
* = statistically significant at 5% level after Bonferroni adjustment 
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Table A4.2 – Unconditional quantiles of the efficiency indicators. 
Efficiency indicator 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Admissions per bed 75 91 109 126 142 
Bed occupancy rate 78.2 82.8 86.6 90.2 93.3 
Proportion of day cases 22.1 26.4 30.0 34.6 39.1 
Cancelled elective operations 86 154 284 475 763 
Proportion of untouched meals 2.4 4.2 6.4 9.6 14.5 
Cleaning services costs 987  1,547  2,440  3,676  5,207  
Laundry and linen costs 280  465  709  1,052  1,430  
Reference cost index 88.2 92.6 98.0 106.3 116.2 
Elective reference cost index 82.2 88.9 97.2 108.6 122.6 
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Table A4.3 – Competition, admissions, and beds. 
Regressor Model 
Log of 
admissions 
Log of 
beds 
Policy break 2006/07*Pre-reform HHI-1 I 
0.006 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.003)* 
        
Policy break 2006/07*HHI-1 
III 
0.004 -0.005 
(0.003) (0.003) 
HHI-1 
-0.001 -0.007 
(0.005) (0.004)* 
        
Dummy 2002/03*HHI-1 
IV 
-0.008 -0.005 
(0.005)* (0.004) 
Dummy 2003/04*HHI-1 
-0.004 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Dummy 2004/05*HHI-1 
-0.003 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Dummy 2006/07*HHI-1 
0.003 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Dummy 2007/08*HHI-1 
0.004 -0.006 
(0.003) (0.003)** 
Dummy 2008/09*HHI-1 
-0.002 -0.008 
(0.004) (0.003)** 
Dummy 2009/10*HHI-1 
0.001 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.004)* 
Dummy 2010/11*HHI-1 
0.003 -0.013 
(0.004) (0.004)*** 
HHI-1 
-0.002 -0.005 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Observations   1,516 1,507 
Number of trusts   173 172 
Average   73,232 682 
OLS estimation. In addition to hospital and year fixed effects, all regressions 
control for gender, age categories, emergency admissions, foundation trusts, 
and market forces factor. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A4.4 – Data sources. 
Variable Link 
Efficiency indicator   
Admissions http://content.digital.nhs.uk/article/2021/Website-
Search?q=title%3A%22Hospital+Episode+Statistics%2C+Admitted+patient+care+-
+England%22+or+title%3A%22Hospital+Admitted+Patient+Care+Activity%22&go=Go
&area=both  Day cases 
Beds https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/bed-availability-and-
occupancy/bed-data-overnight/  Bed occupancy rate 
Cancelled elective operations 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/cancelled-elective-
operations/cancelled-ops-data/  
Proportion of untouched meals 
http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp  Cleaning services costs 
Laundry and linen costs 
Reference cost index 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorga
nisation/NHScostingmanual/DH_129310?PageOperation=email  
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs  
Covariate   
Patient gender http://content.digital.nhs.uk/article/2021/Website-
Search?q=title%3A%22Hospital+Episode+Statistics%2C+Admitted+patient+care+-
+England%22+or+title%3A%22Hospital+Admitted+Patient+Care+Activity%22&go=Go
&area=both  
Patient age 
Emergency admissions 
Foundation trusts http://hefs.hscic.gov.uk/DataFiles.asp  
Market forces factor 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorga
nisation/NHScostingmanual/DH_129310?PageOperation=email  
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nhs-reference-costs  
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